Cold War Intelligence

Cold War Intelligence
Cold War Intelligence Online: The Secret War Between the U.S. and the USSR, 1945-1991

This collection of 2,360 formerly classified U.S. government documents (most of them classified Top Secret or higher) provides readers for the first time with the declassified documentary record about the successes and failures of the U.S. intelligence community in its efforts to spy on the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

Editor: Matthew M. Aid
Number of documents: 2,360
Number of pages: 21,700
Languages used: English
E-ISBN: 978 90 04 24462 7

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THE SOVIET TARGET: THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY VERSUS THE USSR: 1945-1991

By Matthew M. Aid

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SCOPE OF THE COLLECTION

THE SOVIET UNION AS “THE MAIN TARGET"

THE SOVIET TARGET


SPYING ON THE USSR

Human Intelligence
Signals Intelligence
Peripheral Aerial Reconnaissance
Reconnaissance Overflights
Satellite Reconnaissance

INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS OF THE USSR


The purpose of this unique collection is to give the reader the declassified documentary record, such as it exists as of this date, about the successes and failures of the U.S. intelligence community and its foreign partners in monitoring what was going on inside the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The reader should bear in mind that while the Cold War is over and the Soviet Union is no more, the U.S. and its European allies continue to spy on the Russian Federation to this very day because the country still is a nuclear power and a rival to the U.S. in the foreign policy arena.

Only now, twenty-two years after the end of the Cold War, is it possible to begin the arduous task of trying to tell the story in a dispassionate and objective fashion about the U.S. intelligence effort against the USSR during the Cold War. Over the past twenty years, the U.S. government has declassified tens of thousands of pages of formerly classified documents concerning its espionage efforts against the former Soviet Union from the end of World War II in 1945 until the collapse of the USSR in 1991. But the vast majority of the U.S. government’s document holdings on this subject remain classified, which means that what is presented here should be regarded as an important first step, but it should not be viewed as the final word on the subject.

SCOPE OF THE COLLECTION

This document collection contains 2,360 declassified documents (21,700 pages), most of them written at the Top Secret level, concerning U.S. intelligence operations against the Soviet Union during the Cold War (1945-1991) obtained from both archival sources and dozens of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests submitted to more than two dozen U.S. government agencies. 

Many of the documents you see here have only just been declassified, with over 5,000 pages of the documents contained in this collection having been released by the U.S. government since January 2012.

More than half of the declassified documents contained in this collection were obtained from more than twenty-five different records groups currently held at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) research facility at College Park, Maryland, including the following:

RG-38 Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations


RG-59 Records of the Department of State

RG-80 Records of the Secretary of the Navy

RG-84 Records of Foreign Service Posts

RG-107 Records of the Secretary of War

RG-111 Records of the Chief Signal Officer

RG-165 Records of the War Department, General Staff

RG-200 National Archives Gift Collection; Entry 13230A Robert S. McNamara Papers

RG-218 Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

RG-226 Records of the Office of Strategic Services

RG-263 Records of the Central Intelligence Agency

RG-273 Records of the National Security Council

RG-313 Records of the Naval Operating Forces

RG-319 Records of the Department of the Army

RG-330 Records of the Secretary of Defense

RG-331 Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters

RG-335 Records of the Office of the Secretary of the Army

RG-338 Records of U.S. Army Operational, Tactical, and Support Organizations

RG-340 Records of the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force

RG-341 Records of Headquarters, U.S. Air Force

RG-342 Records of U.S. Air Force Commands, Activities, and Organizations

RG-407 Records of the Army Adjutant General's Office

RG-457 Records of the National Security Agency

RG-531 Records of U.S. European Command

RG-549 Records of United States Army, Europe

RG-550 Records of U.S. Army, Pacific

RG-554 Records of Far East Command

Other declassified documents relating to U.S. intelligence and covert action operations against the USSR were obtained from the collections of the following presidential libraries in the U.S.:

* Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri
* Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas
* John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts
* Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas
* Richard M. Nixon Presidential Library, Yorba Linda, California

* Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan
* Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, Georgia
* Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California

Smaller in size but no less important were a series of documents concerning joint U.S.-British intelligence operations against the USSR, especially concerning naval reconnaissance and aerial overflights, obtained from the declassified files of the National Archives of the United Kingdom (formerly PRO) in Kew, England, which supplement the documents obtained in the U.S.

Many of the documents destined for inclusion in the Soviet document set came from my decade-long exploitation of the CIA’s CREST digital database of declassified intelligence documents at the National Archive’s research facility in College Park, Maryland, and to a lesser degree from materials on the CIA’s “electronic FOIA reading room” collection of declassified documents at http://www.foia.cia.gov. The CREST database is a much maligned and underappreciated source for information about the activities of the U.S. intelligence community. Since 1999, the CIA and other branches of the U.S. intelligence community have placed over 10.4 million pages of declassified documents on the CREST system covering the period from 1945 until 1984. This document collection contains more than five hundred formerly Secret and Top Secret documents concerning the U.S. intelligence community’s efforts against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. And each year the CIA adds thousands of pages of new declassified documents to the CREST database, making it an invaluable future source of information about all aspects of the work of the U.S. intelligence community, including but not limited to the Soviet Union.

And finally, documents concerning U.S. intelligence and covert action operations against the Soviet Union were obtained from the Hoover Institution Archives in Palo Alto, California, the Library of Congress Manuscript Division in Washington, D.C., the George C. Marshall Research Library in Lexington, Virginia, and the General Douglas MacArthur Memorial Library in Norfolk, Virginia.

THE SOVIET UNION AS “THE MAIN TARGET”

On April 14, 1950, the National Security Council sent to President Harry S. Truman a Top Secret report entitled NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, which became the theoretical underpinning for the U.S. government’s Cold War strategy viz the USSR. This study's principal conclusion, which appears grossly simplistic and unrealistic today because it was rooted in a fundamental lack of understanding of what was going on inside the Soviet Union, stated that “The Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its own authority over the rest of the world. Any substantial further extension of the area under the domination of the Kremlin would raise the possibility that no coalition adequate to confront the Kremlin with greater strength could be assembled.... Thus unwillingly our free society finds itself mortally challenged by the Soviet system.”1

From this point onwards, the Soviet Union became the U.S. intelligence community’s single largest and most important target. And the USSR remained the U.S. intelligence community’s “Main Target” for the next forty-one years. A Top Secret December 1951 report by the CIA to the NSC stated that “The USSR is now the center of opposition to American policy, and the one power menace to American security; thus the need for knowledge of the USSR, the orbit of its domination, and its worldwide communist organization transcends all other intelligence requirements.”2

As such, the vast majority of the U.S. intelligence community’s collection resources were devoted to monitoring the Soviet Union and its allies in Eastern Europe. The declassified documents contained in this collection reveal that throughout the Cold War, the U.S. intelligence community committed between 50-60 percent of its vast collection and analytic resources to covering the Soviet Union. If one includes the Warsaw Pact nations of Eastern Europe, these figures rise to approximately 60-75 percent of all resources available to the U.S. intelligence community, which are staggering figures when you take into consideration how large the U.S. intelligence community was at the time.3 To give but one example of how the Soviet Union ate up most of the U.S. intelligence community’s assets during the Cold War, the following declassified data reveals that the National Security Agency (NSA), the U.S. intelligence community’s huge electronic eavesdropping organization, consistently devoted approximately 50 percent of its resources to the Soviet target:

* 1949: 71 percent of all American SIGINT intercept personnel and 60 percent of all COMINT processing personnel were devoted to the “Soviet problem”.4

* 1958: 54 percent of NSA’s SIGINT collection and analytic resources were devoted to the Soviet Union.5

* 1961: 50 percent of the personnel assigned to NSA’s SIGINT collection and analysis organization worked the Soviet target.6

* 1968: 50 percent of all of NSA’s SIGINT collection and analytic resources were devoted to the USSR.7


THE SOVIET TARGET

In terms of its breadth and scope, the reader can most easily navigate this document collection by examining it through two prisms. The first is the U.S. intelligence community’s efforts to physically penetrate the former Soviet Union and collect intelligence about what was going on behind the Iron Curtain. And the second prism is what American intelligence analysts were able to deduce about what the Soviets were up to from the oftentimes paltry amount of information that was being collected from inside the USSR.

To understand why the Soviet Union was such a difficult target from an intelligence perspective, one must understand the multitude of obstacles that the U.S. intelligence community and its foreign partners had to face in trying to spy on the USSR.

First, there was the sheer size of the Soviet target. At the time, the Soviet Union was the largest country in the world, covering an area of 6.65 million square miles, which made it almost three times the size of the United States. It occupied 17 percent of the world's land mass, stretching across two continents and eleven time zones, which came to a distance of about six thousand miles running from east to west. Most of the Soviet Union lay north of the 49th Parallel (i.e. north of Vancouver, Canada). The Soviet Union's two largest cities, Moscow and Leningrad, were on the same latitude as Edmonton, Canada and Anchorage, Alaska respectively.8

Second, the Soviet Union was a totalitarian police state with a massive, efficient, and omnipresent security and police apparatus that was designed and organized to suppress all forms of internal dissent to the communist regime, as well as prevent foreign espionage on its soil. The U.S. intelligence community quickly learned that the fearsome reputation of the Soviet intelligence and security services was well deserved.9 According to a declassified December 1951 CIA intelligence assessment of the Soviet target, “Espionage directed against specific targets in the Soviet Union must elude the vast counter-espionage organization of the MGB. It must avoid spot checks of the most arbitrary and unexpected sort and seemingly irrational – almost whimsical – arrests, detentions, incarcerations, and deportations. It must allay the suspicion of the bureaucracy, the communist party faithful, and even casual citizens. After thirty-four years of dictatorship, they have perforce to associate the unusual or the surprising with the dangerous.”10

As one can imagine, the obstacles the U.S. intelligence community faced in trying to organize and operate agent networks inside the Soviet Union following World War II were massive. The Soviet regime strictly limited the issuance of travel visas to the Soviet Union to a very small number of foreign diplomats and a few reporters and officially approved visitors. Photography of anything but the most mundane subject inside the Soviet Union was strictly prohibited. Some 220,000 KGB border guards made it extremely difficult to sneak in or out of the Soviet Union. Travel inside the Soviet Union was severely restricted for both Russians and foreigners by an internal passport system. Travel and identity papers were frequently checked by Ministry of the Interior (MVD) internal security forces and KGB counterintelligence officials, which when coupled with the KGB's large and extremely efficient counterintelligence service and a massive network of informers (stukachi) at all levels of Russian society. Foreigners were followed by the KGB whenever they ventured onto the streets of Moscow or other Eastern European cities, their phones were tapped, their mail read, their apartments and cars were bugged, and those “normal” Russians that they spoke to were questioned by the KGB. Because of the extreme difficulty of conducting covert HUMINT operations in this region of the world, the U.S. intelligence community came to refer to the Soviet Union as a “denied area”.11 Third, the Soviets went to extraordinary lengths to keep even the most mundane information about what was transpiring in their country secret. Information resources normally freely available elsewhere around the world, such as newspaper articles and technical journals, were largely unavailable to the Western intelligence community. Those newspapers, such as Pravda and Izvestiya, and the limited number of technical journals that were available contained very little information of intelligence value, although battalions of so-called “Kremlinologists” were still employed by the U.S. intelligence community to try and discern what they could from a close reading Russian newspapers and television/radio broadcasts. Topographical maps and even railroad timetables were treated as classified documents, no telephone directories were distributed because of what they might reveal to hostile intelligence operatives, and even talking with ordinary Russian citizens was an extremely difficult proposition. As a result, the U.S. State Department's political reporting from the U.S. embassy in Moscow was sketchy at best, based largely on what could be learned on the “Moscow cocktail party circuit” from other equally ill-informed foreign diplomats and western journalists.12

SPYING ON THE USSR

Human Intelligence

The U.S. intelligence community knew even before the end of World War II in 1945 that conducting traditional espionage inside Russia was an extremely difficult proposition. A 1946 report prepared by a senior American intelligence officer who had worked in Moscow during World War II came to the conclusion that “The available evidence indicates that the surveillance of foreigners within the USSR and the peculiar readiness of the Soviet administrative and police personnel to suspect all foreigners of espionage intentions or activities raises sufficient operational hazards to require postponement of such intra-USSR operations until the time when both our information and our expertise  are on a very much higher level than they will be for the foreseeable future.”13Although dozens of books and hundreds of articles have been written on the subject, declassified documents concerning the CIA and U.S. military’s efforts to collect intelligence inside the USSR using human sources (referred to as “Human Intelligence” or HUMINT within the U.S. intelligence community) are few and far between. The CIA has consistently refused to declassify documents concerning its clandestine HUMINT efforts for decades, but has over the past twenty years released a limited number of selected documents concerning a few of its more successful operations inside the Soviet Union and Poland. There have been a few exceptions to this rule. For example, in 2003 the CIA published an unclassified article about Adolf Tolkachev, one its most important agents, who passed classified Soviet weapons secrets to the CIA for seven years until he was caught and executed. But the Agency refused to release any of the classified documents about the Tolkachev case at the time the article was released.14Nevertheless, this collection includes those documents that the CIA and the U.S. military have declassified to date concerning U.S. HUMINT operations inside the USSR and those directed against Soviet forces stationed in Eastern Europe. Of particular interest are the more than two dozen CIA documents concerning one of the top agents inside the USSR, Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy, who briefly spied for the CIA and the British intelligence service, MI6, from 1961 to 1962. Penkovskiy was arrested on October 22, 1962 and subsequently executed on May 16, 1963.15 Despite the quality of the information that he provided, CIA analysts refused to include Penkovskiy’s material in their 1961 intelligence estimates on Soviet strategic forces because he was deemed to be unreliable and his information unverifiable.16This collection includes a series of documents covering the period 1945 to 1950, which show how dependent the U.S. and British intelligence communities were on information obtained from low-level defectors and refugees who somehow managed to cross the border into the allied occupation zones in West Germany and West Berlin. Refugees fleeing to West Berlin remained a key intelligence source right up until the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961.17 The documents also reveal that in 1948, U.S. intelligence officials in West Germany were being forced to hide these defectors, most of whom were Soviet officers and enlisted men who had left their army units in East Germany to reach the West, because there was an unwritten agreement to return these defectors to Soviet authorities if they were caught.18Declassified documents also reveal that in the years immediately after the end of World War II, the CIA and the U.S. military were dependant on information provided by foreign government sources for much of what they knew about the Soviet military forces based in Eastern Europe. For example, in the years immediately after World War II the U.S. intelligence community was largely dependent on the British foreign intelligence service, MI6, for most of its high-level information about the Soviet Union, although much of the information the U.S. got from London was deemed to be unreliable.19The tentative beginnings of the joint Anglo-American intelligence collection effort against the Soviet Union are revealed here for the first time. Included in this collection are a number of declassified cables and memoranda which detail the first planning and coordination efforts between the CIA and the British foreign intelligence service, MI6, as they attempted to synchronize their human intelligence (HUMINT) collection efforts against the USSR.20 Ironically, the declassified documents show that the British intelligence official charged with coordinating the early Anglo-American spying efforts against the USSR was none other than H.A.R. “Kim” Philby, the Soviet’s top spy inside British intelligence. No doubt, the details of each and every meeting that Philby was involved in with his American counterparts found its way to Moscow in short order.21Other documents reveal that first the U.S. Army, then the CIA came to depend heavily on General Reinhard Gehlen’s nascent West German intelligence organization, the Gehlen Org, for much of its intelligence information about Soviet military forces in East Germany. A 1947 US European Command (EUCOM) memorandum stated that their intelligence staff (G-2) considered the Gehlen Org “to be its most dependable and prolific source of information on Russian military intentions and strength.”22 The declassified documents reveal also that the Swedish intelligence services were also an extraordinarily important source of information for the US intelligence community about the USSR, particularly during the late 1940s and the 1950s.23 Sweden even tacitly permitted the CIA to run agent operations into the Soviet-occupied Baltic States during the early 1950s.24

This collection includes 110 newly declassified documents concerning the CIA’s disastrous attempts to infiltrate agents into the USSR from 1949 to 1954. Most of the agents were parachuted into the USSR, but the CIA also attempted to infiltrate agents into the Soviet Union both by overland infiltration routes and by landing them from submarines or torpedo boats on the Soviet coastline.

There were at least six separate CIA operations involved in trying to infiltrate agents into the USSR, each focused on a specific geographical area: Latvia (Project AECOB), Lithuania (Projects AEGEAN/AECHAMP), Estonia (Projects AEROOT/AEBASIN), Belorussia (Project AEQUOR), the Ukraine (Project AERODYNAMIC), and agent insertion operations inside Russia proper (Projects AESAURUS/AENOBLE).

The first CIA agent parachute drop behind the Iron Curtain took place on the night of September 5, 1949, when an unmarked CIA C-47 transport aircraft dropped a two-man team of agents into the Ukraine near the city of L’vov. The team never established radio contact with their CIA handlers in West Germany, and the CIA later concluded that they had been killed shortly after landing by Soviet security forces.25 Over the next five years, over eighty CIA agents, all of them Russians who had fled to the West after the end of World War II, were parachuted into the Soviet Union. The last known CIA parachute drops into the Soviet Union took place on the night of March 5-7, 1954, when three agents were dropped into Estonia. All were quickly caught by Soviet security forces.26 All of these operations were failures from start to finish. The declassified CIA documents show that the loss rates among the agents sent into the USSR was almost 100 percent, and that these operations produced virtually no intelligence information of any value, leading the chief of the CIA’s Soviet Russia Division, John M. Maury, to admit in 1957 that his unit’s “black penetration” operations inside the Soviet Union were “strewn with disaster”.27 Declassified documents contained in this collection reveal that the CIA and the British foreign intelligence service, MI6, which normally worked very closely together, refused to cooperate with one another on certain key operations inside the USSR, such as the effort to penetrate the Ukraine, because of irreconcilable differences between the two countries over which émigré groups to support.28 There is no question that one of the important reasons that these REDSOX “black penetration” operations failed was because the CIA and the British intelligence service, MI6, depended almost completely on unreliable Russian émigré organizations based in West Germany for their supply of agents. All of these organizations were tainted to one degree or another by the fact that prior to World War II many of these groups had engaged in terrorist activities, and during World War II many of the top leaders of these organizations collaborated with the German army or secret police.29 For example, the West German-based Russian émigré organization, the People’s Labor Union organization, or Narodny Trudovy Soyuz (NTS), was widely known within American and British intelligence circles to have openly collaboration with the Germans during World War II.30 To one degree or another, all of these émigré groups were thoroughly penetrated by Soviet intelligence. Some of the Soviet agents were so senior that they were able to compromise many of the parachute drops inside the Soviet Union. For example, one of the top Soviet agents, Myron Matviyeyko, was given command of one of three teams of agents dropped into the western Ukraine and Poland on the night of May 14-15, 1951. Not only did he help Soviet security forces capture or kill all of the members of his team, but the other two agent teams as well. The captured agents were then turned by Soviet intelligence, radioing false information back to their MI6 controllers in West Germany for years before British intelligence finally realized that their agents were under Soviet control.31 The CIA and MI6 remained uncertain about who had betrayed their agent teams until November 24, 1960, when Radio Kiev broadcast a statement by Matviyeyko admitting that he had been a KGB spy all along.32 The failures of all of these CIA efforts to penetrate the USSR resulted in some very harsh critiques of the Agency’s performance within the U.S. government. In a Top Secret April 1952 report sent to the NSC (which senior officials in the CIA’s Clandestine Service strenuously objected to), CIA director Walter B. Smith painted a grim picture of the state of the CIA’s clandestine intelligence efforts against the Soviet Union, admitting that “The Council is generally acquainted with the Central Intelligence Agency’s secret operations designed to produce raw intelligence. Although we are making every effort to develop these latter sources, our experience so far has been in general disappointing. They are costly by comparison with other intelligence operations and they present in most cases a gambler’s chance of obtaining really significant critical strategic information, although they consistently produce a significant quantity of useable information. We must and shall devote our best effort to their improvement and to the exploitation of every reasonable chance for penetration. On a few rare occasions there have been really brilliant accomplishments.”33 Another result of the CIA’s failure to build agent networks inside the Soviet Union was that it forced the U.S. intelligence community to shift its resources away from the CIA and its HUMINT collection programs to a variety of technical means for collecting intelligence inside the USSR, which are described in greater detail below.

Signals Intelligence

This collection contains a number of formerly classified documents concerning the early history of the U.S. signals intelligence (SIGINT) effort against the Soviet Union, which provide new details about the work of America’s codebreakers trying to solve the Soviet codes and ciphers well before the end of World War II.34

During the period 1945 to 1948, NSA’s predecessor organizations were able to solve a number of important Soviet military machine cipher systems. But a traitor inside the U.S. Army’s SIGINT organization named William W. Weisband betrayed these successes to Soviet intelligence. In the fall of 1948, the Soviets changed all of their codes and ciphers, and in the process destroyed the ability of American and British codebreakers to read their high-level communications traffic. It would take NSA almost thirty years before it once again was able to solve high-level Soviet cipher systems.35 In the post-1948 era, Soviet communications security practices and procedures were excellent, making the interception of high-level Soviet communications traffic difficult (but not impossible), and the breaking of Soviet codes and ciphers nigh on impossible.36 Despite these seemingly insurmountable obstacles, the National Security Agency (NSA), America’s electronic eavesdropping organization, found ways of getting around these obstacles and retaining access to key Soviet signals traffic. During the 1950s and 1960s NSA was still able to produce valuable intelligence on Soviet military activities by exploiting low-level radio and cable traffic that the Soviets did not bother to encipher. Included in this collection are a number of examples of declassified intelligence reports derived from the exploitation of this low-level Soviet communications traffic.37 NSA’s ability to intercept and exploit these low-level communications proved to be invaluable during the Korean War (1950-1953), when NSA was able to secretly intercept the tactical radio communications of Soviet fighter pilots engaged in aerial combat with American warplanes over the Yalu River from 1951 to 1953. The U.S. government kept the fact that thanks to SIGINT, it knew that American pilots were engaged in combat with Soviet warplanes secret until June 2010, when the CIA quietly declassified and released many of these records. Included in this collection are over fifty Top Secret Codeword CIA reports detailing Soviet military activities during the Korean War.38 Between 1953 and the time the first successful CORONA reconnaissance satellite went into orbit in 1960, SIGINT from NSA was the principal source of intelligence about what the Soviet military was doing despite the fact that the agency was unable to solve any high-level Soviet cipher systems.39 During this time period, the declassified documents show that SIGINT was virtually the only source for the U.S. intelligence community on Soviet bomber deployments and flight activities, Soviet ballistic missile research and development efforts, Soviet satellite and deep-space probe launch activities, the deployment and activities of the Soviet air defense forces, the movements of Soviet merchant shipping around the world and details about the cargoes they were carrying, Soviet civil defense activities, gold production and international sales by the USSR, Soviet imports of strategic commodities such as copper, and Soviet and Warsaw Pact military and economic aid to China, to name but a few areas where SIGINT made a substantive contribution to the U.S. intelligence effort.40 Included in this collection are a number of newly declassified documents concerning the CIA’s enormously successful Berlin Tunnel operation, wherein CIA and British intelligence operatives were able to successfully tap a number of Soviet underground communications active in East Berlin. Among the documents included in this collection is the almost completely declassified CIA history of the operation, as well as the newly released NSA history of its involvement in the Berlin Tunnel operation, known within the agency as Operation REGAL.41 The 1960s saw the advent of new high-tech SIGINT collection sensor systems, which dramatically improved the quantity and quality of the material that NSA was able to collect from deep inside the USSR.42 For example, NSA engineers were able to design and build new sensor and computer systems which led to dramatic improvements in the agency’s SIGINT collection and analytic effort against Soviet missile testing and space launch activities.43 Beginning in 1969, the first SIGINT reconnaissance satellite called CANYON was launched into orbit, which gave NSA first time access to critically-important Soviet military communications traffic carried on microwave links deep inside the USSR. Then in the late 1970s, NSA succeeded in solving the first of a series of high-level Soviet military encryption systems, allowing the agency to successfully predict that the USSR intended to invade Afghanistan on December 25, 1979.44 By the mid-1980s, NSA was once again producing some extremely important intelligence on Soviet military activities. For example, a declassified 1984 intelligence study revealed that a combination of satellite imagery, signals intelligence, and electronic intelligence (ELINT) from spy satellites were able to closely track to the movements and activities of Soviet SS-20 mobile intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) that were capable of striking targets throughout Western Europe and China.45

Peripheral Aerial Reconnaissance

This collection contains what may be the first truly comprehensive compendium of primary source materials on the subject of Soviet attacks on U.S. and allied military and civilian aircraft during the Cold War. Over seventy-five documents, some of them recently declassified for this collection, provide new details on over a hundred of these incidents which claimed the lives of several hundred American airmen during the Cold War. Also included in this collection are a number of formerly classified Soviet documents on these aerial incidents which were turned over to U.S. investigators in the early 1990s.46

One of the most fascinating documents in this collection is a 1993 Secret Codeword article by an NSA historian concerning the role that his agency played in thirteen shootdown incidents involving the Soviets between 1950 and 1964, including the shootdown of Francis Gary Powers’ U-2 spy plane over the USSR in May 1960 by a Soviet surface-to-air missile (SAM). NSA accidently placed the complete unredacted version of the article online, then quickly removed it from their website. A few days later NSA released the document after it became clear that a number of individuals had downloaded the article and placed it online on their own websites.47

Reconnaissance Overflights

The question of how many U.S. and allied reconnaissance overflights of the USSR were conducted during the Cold War remains one of the most closely-guarded secrets of the U.S. intelligence community.48 Declassified documents contained in this collection reveal that between 1947 and 1950, the British Royal Air Force (RAF), and the Swedish and Norwegian air forces flew a small number of shallow overflights of the USSR and the island of Spitsbergen, which was partly controlled by the Soviet Union, using reconnaissance cameras and film provided by the U.S. Air Force (USAF). These countries then forwarded to the USAF copies of the photos taken on these clandestine reconnaissance missions.49 The Swedes conducted several dozen shallow overflights of the Soviet Union, principally over the Baltic States and the Kola Peninsula, using American reconnaissance cameras between 1948 and 1950.50 The number of the still highly classified overflights of the USSR flown by U.S. Air Force aircraft between 1949 and 1956 remains classified for reasons that remain obscure. But the declassified documents contained in this collection confirm that the USAF and the RAF conducted at least several dozen top secret reconnaissance overflights of the USSR between May 1949 and December 1956. The documents also confirm that the USAF deliberately refused to allow the CIA to participate in these overflight operations and kept the photography taken on these missions away from CIA intelligence analysts.51These Sensitive Intelligence (SENSINT) overflights of the USSR were conducted under a strict “plausible deniability” protocol. A October 30, 1953 CIA memo revealed that President Dwight D. Eisenhower had personally approved the program of USAF SENSINT overflights shortly after he was inaugurated in January 1953, but that he had told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he did not want to know any of the details of these missions so that he could deny any knowledge of them if something went wrong. Another CIA report, dated August 1954, stated “Considerations of this highly sensitive subject [overflights] are severely limited by Presidential request. As reported in a memorandum by Admiral Carney [Admiral Robert B. Carney, Chief of Naval Operations, August 1953 - August 1955], the point is made that the President himself does not wish to be informed of overflights.”52 The first officially acknowledged USAF SENSINT overflight of the USSR occurred on May 10, 1949, when an RF-80A tactical reconnaissance jet piloted by 1st Lieutenant Bryce Poe II, flew a secret penetration mission over Soviet military airfields on the Kurile Islands north of Japan. Between March and August 1950, RF-80 reconnaissance aircraft based in Japan performed nineteen more overflights of the Soviet Far East, including missions over Sakhalin Island, the Kurile Islands, and the Soviet mainland around the port city of Vladivostok. The purpose of all of these overflight missions was to document the order of battle of the Soviet Air Force in the Far East prior to, and during the early stages of the Korean War. It would appear that none of these missions were approved by President Harry S. Truman, the Secretary of Defense, or the Joint Chiefs of Staff.53 Only two intelligence reports derived from these Top Secret RF-80 reconnaissance overflights in the Soviet Far East has been declassified so far (probably by accident). The first, dated May 10, 1950, and the second, dated August 24, 1950, provided USAF intelligence in Washington with a detailed precis of the location of every Soviet combat aircraft on Sakhalin Island and the Kurile Islands.54 Another interesting group of records contained in this collection concern the still highly classified 1952 and 1954 joint U.S. Air Force-British Royal Air Force (RAF) overflights of the western USSR known as Project JIU-JITSU. On the night of April 17-18, 1952, three simultaneous night-time overflight missions were flown by U.S.-made RB-45 reconnaissance aircraft with RAF crews: one across Germany covering the Baltic states; the second flight covering all of Belorussia; and the third covering large portions of the western Ukraine. These missions, which targeted Soviet strategic bomber bases and nearby PVO fighter intercept airfields, all returned safely to base without incident. Two years later on the night of April 28-29, 1954, the original JIU-JITSU mission was repeated. Three RB-45s flown by RAF flight crews conducted another series of overflights of the European portion of the Soviet Union. Like the May 1952 RAF RB-45 overflights, the principal targets of these reconnaissance missions were Soviet bomber bases inside the Soviet Union.55 The highly classified photo intelligence derived from these USAF and RAF overflights of the USSR was placed in a restricted access security compartment called “Sensitive Intelligence,” or SENSINT.56 Included in this document collect are the first declassified Top Secret SENINT intelligence reports derived from these USAF overflights, including imagery of Soviet naval bases and shipyards at Vladivostok, Soviet industrial and railroad facilities in and around the city of Vladivostok, and a number of Soviet military airfields in the Soviet Far East and Arctic regions.57 Perhaps the most interesting SENSINT report contained in this collection is a 1959 Top Secret document detailing the locations of Soviet strategic surface-to-air missile sites deployed around Moscow. The imagery which formed the basis of this report was taken from cameras hidden in the bottoms of foreign commercial airliners as they circled Moscow awaiting permission to land.58 This collection includes over a hundred formerly classified documents concerning the twent-six overflight missions of the USSR and Eastern Europe performed by CIA U-2 reconnaissance plane between June 1956 and May 1960. Included among the documents are new details concerning which targets inside the USSR were covered by these missions and the CIA’s net evaluations of the intelligence produced by these missions.59 A number of CIA intelligence reports are included to provide the reader with a sample of the kinds of intelligence information that were produced by these U-2 overflight missions.60 Also included are over a dozen formerly Top Secret memoranda describing President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s personal involvement in planning and approving these missions, as well as his oft stated concerns that these missions could damage the fragile relations between the U.S. and the USSR if one of these planes were shot down, which is exactly what happened on May 1, 1960.61

Satellite Reconnaissance

On August 18, 1960, just three months after Francis Gary Powers’ U-2 was shot down over Sverdlovsk, the first successful CIA CORONA photo reconnaissance satellite (Mission 9009) was launched into orbit carrying a camera and twenty pounds of film. Recovered in the air over the Pacific the next day, CORONA Mission 9009 returned with 3,000 feet of film showing 1,650,000 square miles of the Soviet Union, including the locations of previously unseen Soviet bomber airfields and ballistic missile launch sites. Over the next twelve years, 145 CORONA satellites were launched into orbit, in the process replacing SIGINT as the U.S. intelligence community’s top producer of intelligence information on the Soviet military.62 The advent of photo reconnaissance satellites literally overnight changed the state of what the U.S. intelligence community knew about the Soviet military. The amount of information collected by each spy satellite mission was staggering, covering the entire gamut of Soviet military activities inside the USSR and Eastern Europe.63 Newly declassified documents reveal that as new cameras and film delivery systems were added to each new CORONA and GAMBIT satellite launched into orbit, both the quantity and quality of the information being produced by these satellites on the Soviet military improved geometrically during the 1960s and 1970s.64 Most of the early CORONA satellite missions focused on locating Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch complexes.65 By September 1961, the imagery collected by these reconnaissance satellites allowed the U.S. intelligence community to issue its first comprehensive intelligence estimate on the size and location of the Soviet ICBM force, an extraordinary achievement for the time.66 By the mid-1960s, the technology had improved to the point where a single individual reconnaissance satellite could cover the locations of all known or suspected Soviet ICBM silos and intermediate- and medium-range ballistic missile (IRBM/MRBM) launch sites throughout the USSR.67 Included in this document collection are more than a hundred intelligence reports based on analysis of satellite reconnaissance imagery, including a 1963 report produced by the National Photographic Interpretation Center which identified all of Soviet submarine bases throughout the USSR and the number and types of submarines stationed at each base.68 Another 1965 imagery analysis report identified the locations of all thirty-one Soviet strategic signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection sites.69

INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS OF THE USSR

Unclassified publications produced by the CIA’s history staff meant for wide public distribution are replete with glowing testimonials as to the importance and accuracy of the intelligence estimates on the Soviet Union produced by the Agency’s corps of analysts. While it is true that the Agency’s intelligence assessments on the USSR were oftentimes remarkably prescient in terms of predicting Soviet actions, declassified internal CIA documents reveal that, in fact, the CIA’s analysts repeatedly erred on vitally important questions concerning Soviet political and military intentions and capabilities, and that some of these errors of fact and conclusion were costly indeed.70The internal CIA evaluations of the intelligence estimative process on the Soviet Union generally agree that on those subjects where the Agency’s assessments left much to be desired, one of the principal causes for the failures was the dearth of accurate and reliable intelligence information available to the analysts, especially during the 1950s when the U.S. had few reliable intelligence sources about what was going on inside the USSR.

This was especially true in the area of the political intentions of the Kremlin throughout the Cold War. CIA internal reports confirm that on political matters, the Agency’s intelligence estimates were consistently wrong, in large part because the CIA was never able to recruit an agent with access to high-level Soviet policymaking secrets, nor was the National Security Agency able to solve any of the high-level codes and ciphers used by the Kremlin to convey policy decisions except on military and economic matters. This meant that the CIA’s analysts were left with the extraordinarily difficult task of trying to discern the Soviet regime’s strategic intentions on the basis of virtually no first-hand information, leaving the CIA analysts to try to “guesstimate” the Kremlin’s intentions based on newspaper reports and other low-level and oftentimes unreliable information.

Reflective of the U.S. intelligence community’s inability to accurately gauge political conditions inside the USSR early on in the Cold War is demonstrated by the fact that the CIA experienced great difficulty trying to accurately determine the nature and extent of armed resistance and political dissent within the Soviet Union. Among the declassified documents contained in this collection are a series of intelligence reports from the 1950s that tried to assess the strength and capabilities of various anti-communist resistance movements inside the USSR and Eastern Europe, which the CIA and the U.S. military wanted to use to both collect intelligence inside the Soviet Union as well as subvert the Kremlin’s authority throughout the country. Most of the early assessments, done in the late 1940s and early 1950s erroneously concluded that there was widespread armed resistance to the Soviet regime in the Ukraine, Caucasus, and the Baltic States waiting to be exploited by the U.S. and its European allies.71 Included in this collection are the transcripts of high-level meetings between senior U.S. and British government and intelligence officials in London about how the two countries could best use these resistance groups to cause chaos and confusion inside the USSR and Eastern Europe.72 It was not until 1957-1958 that CIA analysts finally (and reluctantly) concluded that all of the armed resistance movements it had previously believed to be operating inside the USSR had been destroyed by Soviet security forces or were no longer capable of functioning coherently because they had been thorough penetrated by Soviet intelligence.73 Throughout the 1950s, a host of erroneous conclusions about the strength and capabilities of the Soviet military found their way into a number of key CIA intelligence estimates, principally because of a lack of information available to the intelligence analysts in Washington about what was actually going on inside the USSR. For example, beginning in the mid-1950s the U.S. intelligence community adopted a consensus opinion that the Soviets were ahead of the U.S. in strategic bombers and ICBMs (known to history as the “Bomber Gap” and the “Missile Gap”), despite the fact that there was little raw intelligence information to support these conclusions.74 For example, despite the incontrovertible evidence from SIGINT and U-2 overflights of the USSR which showed that production of Soviet strategic bombers was far less than what had previously been believed, in January 1957 the CIA’s Office of National Estimates as a matter of political expediency published a new National Intelligence Estimate, which stated that by mid-1959 the Russians would have about five hundred Bison and three hundred Bear strategic bombers, which ran completely contrary to everything the intelligence collectors were showing at the time.75 Nine months later in October 1957, the CIA’s Office of National Estimates once again decided to agree to a consensus intelligence estimate about the size of the Soviet strategic bomber force so as to prevent a fight with the more hawkish views of the U.S. Air Force. Despite a near total lack of hard intelligence to support the position, the CIA’s Office of National Estimates agreed with the USAF position that the Russians still intended to build a massive bomber strike force, with the CIA analysts predicting that by mid-1960 the Russians would have built at least 400-600 heavy bombers. This prediction, as it would turn out, was completely wrong in that it vastly overestimated Russian intentions.76 The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis is another example of a failure by the CIA’s intelligence analysts to accurately estimate Soviet intentions. Recently declassified documents reveal that in September 1962, despite the preponderance of evidence from signals intelligence (SIGINT) that Soviet cargo ships were carrying weapons to Cuba, the CIA and the Pentagon’s intelligence arm, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), all refused to accept this information. For example, the analysts in the CIA’s Office of National Estimates (ONE) refused to believe that the Soviets would dare to send nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles to Cuba because it defied what they thought was rational behavior. A September 19, 1962 National Intelligence Estimate prepared by the CIA stated unequivocally that the possibility that the Soviets might deploy offensive missiles to Cuba was “incompatible with Soviet practice to date and with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it.” Less than a month later, the analysts were shocked when a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft brought back the first pictures showing that the Russians were in the process of building launch sites for nuclear-armed ballistic missiles throughout Cuba.77 Years later, CIA officials and intelligence analysts were still debating (in secret) how and why the CIA got this estimate so wrong given the growing evidence then available indicating that the Soviets were in the process of deploying offensive weapons to Cuba.78 This collection includes a number of previously unpublished declassified documents concerning the intelligence aspects of the Cuban missile crisis, including a series of reports detailing how the U.S. intelligence community was able to track Soviet weapons shipments to Cuba.79 Also contained in this collection are a series of detailed post-mortem reports analyzing the performance of the U.S. intelligence community during the Cuban Missile Crisis, some of which are quite critical.80 There is also a surprisingly detailed declassified 1994 NSA historical article revealing just how information SIGINT was producing about Soviet military activities in Cuba prior to the situation in Cuba reaching crisis proportions in October 1962.81 A recurring theme is that on many critical subjects involving the Soviet military, the U.S. intelligence community’s assessments started out poorly because of a near complete lack of information available upon which to form an informed opinion about Soviet intentions and capabilities. But the introduction of new high-tech intelligence collection sensors, coupled with the implementation of improved analytic techniques, over time resulted in dramatically better intelligence assessments of Soviet military capabilities starting in the early 1960s.

One such area was on the subject of Soviet nuclear weapons research, development, testing, and production. Collection activities on Soviet nuclear weapons research activities began shortly after the end of World War II, focusing initially on the activities of the dozens of German nuclear scientists who had been taken to the USSR to work on facets of the Soviet nuclear program.82 Because of a dearth of raw material to work with, the early intelligence estimates on the Soviet nuclear program were painfully bare of details and oftentimes woefully wrong about the true state of the Soviet nuclear weapons program.83 But beginning in the mid-1950s and continuing through the end of the Cold War, CIA intelligence estimates on the Soviet nuclear program showed marked and sustained improvement, thanks especially to the information produced by U-2 overflights in the mid- to late-1950s and the CORONA reconnaissance satellite in the early 1960s.84 Another important contributor to the U.S. intelligence community’s ability to assess Soviet nuclear weapons developments was the network of nuclear test detection stations that were constructed around the world beginning in the late 1940s, which over time became increasingly sophisticated and capable of detecting even the smallest nuclear weapons test detonations inside the USSR.85 Of particular interest to the reader are the detailed declassified articles written in the 1960s and 1970s by the CIA’s top nuclear intelligence specialist, Henry S. Lowenhaupt, who described how the Agency secretly located the Soviet Union’s most important military nuclear reactors and monitored their activities, oftentimes using very inventive collection and analytic techniques.86 Another area where the CIA’s intelligence analysts over time came to excel was their effort to document the growth of the Soviet ballistic missile force using imagery obtained from the Agency’s reconnaissance satellites, especially detailed coverage of each successive new generation of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Documents contained in this collection show that prior to 1960, U.S. intelligence estimates on the size of the Soviet ICBM force, the locations of the Soviet ICBM silos, and the identities of the factories inside the USSR that were producing the missiles, was practically non-existent.87 The declassified documents in this document collection confirm that much of what the U.S. intelligence community knew after World War II about the Soviet ballistic missile program came from interrogating German scientists and engineers who worked on the Soviet missile program until they were allowed to return to Germany in the mid-1950s.88 Declassified documents contained in this collection show that beginning in the mid-1950s, a series of new high-tech sensors, such as new telemetry intercept systems and long-range surveillance radars, were brought to bear on the Soviet ballistic missile testing program, giving the U.S. intelligence community its first reliable information about what types of ballistic missiles the Soviets were testing, how often they were being tested, and detailed information about the capabilities of these missiles were.89 During the thirty year period from 1960 until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the overall quality of the CIA’s intelligence assessments, particularly on military subjects, steadily improved as new high-tech collection systems and thousands of skilled and highly educated analysts were added to the arsenal of the U.S. intelligence community. Analytic mistakes were made during this time period, but nothing comparable to the “Bomber Gap” and “Missile Gap” intelligence controversies of the 1950s.

For example, the declassified documents contained in this collection demonstrate that the introduction of spy satellites beginning in 1960s dramatically improved what the U.S. intelligence knew about the Soviet strategic nuclear forces, especially their ICBM force. Between 1961 and 1963, the CORONA reconnaissance satellites were able to precisely locate every Soviet ICBM silo and intermediate- and medium-range ballistic missile launch site, find new missile silos then under construction, as well as identify all Soviet factories engaged in designing or building ballistic missiles.90 Spy satellites also dramatically improved America’s knowledge of the Soviet air defense system. The vast amounts of data about Soviet radar systems obtained by the first generation of American electronic intelligence (ELINT) spy satellites led to a complete overhaul of the national intelligence estimates on the Soviet air defense system beginning in the mid-1960s.91 And as successive new generations of ELINT satellites were lofted in orbit during the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. intelligence community’s knowledge of the strength and weaknesses of the Soviet air defense system grew by leaps and bounds.92 Reconnaissance satellites were instrumental in locating all of the nuclear-hardened command bunkers that the Soviet civilian and military senior leadership would retreat to in wartime in order to direct Soviet military operations.93The ability of NSA’s SIGINT network and American spy satellites to peer deep inside the USSR was critically important in allowing the U.S. intelligence community to track the massive deployment of Soviet troops to positions along the border with the People’s Republic of China beginning in 1965, which reflected the increased tension between these two communist superpowers following the Sino-Soviet split in 1960.94 Declassified documents reveal that the U.S. intelligence community provided Washington with excellent political and military coverage of events following the 1969 clash at Damanskiy Island on the Ussuri River between Soviet and Chinese troops, which led to the Soviets placing their military forces in the Far East on high alert.95 But no matter how good the data coming from the intelligence collectors may have been, there were still instances where the intelligence community’s analysts drew the wrong conclusions from the information they were receiving. In the summer of 1968, despite the numerous indications turning up in SIGINT and other intelligence sources, the CIA’s intelligence analysts at Langley refused to heed the portents and stuck by their judgement that the Soviets would not intervene militarily in Czechoslovakia because it was, in their opinion, not a rational course of action. But shortly after midnight, August 20, 1968, 15 to 16 Soviet combat divisions and supporting Warsaw Pact forces crossed the border and invaded Czechoslovakia.96 The late 1970s was a troubled time for the U.S. from a political and economic perspective. But it was a very exciting time for the U.S. intelligence community in its efforts to achieve something akin to a more complete understanding of the Soviet military threat. America’s electronic eavesdropping giant, NSA, finally achieved a significant breakthrough into a number of high-level Soviet encryption systems. The CIA managed to recruit a small number of important agents inside the Soviet military and in Eastern Europe. And the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), which designed and launched spy satellites into space, placed into orbit the first KH-11 KENNAN/CRYSTAL imaging satellite (December 19, 1976) and the first CHALET/VORTEX SIGINT satellite (June 10, 1978), which at the time was the largest and most advanced electronic eavesdropping satellite ever launched into space. And in August 1979, the submarine USS Parche  (SSN-683) installed a large tap on an Russian underwater communications cable just off the coast of the Kola Peninsula that linked the Soviet Northern Fleet headquarters at Murmansk with other naval bases along the Kola Peninsula.97 Thanks to these new high-tech intelligence collection sensors, in the late 1970s and early 1980s the U.S. intelligence community scored some notable successes. Declassified documents in this collection show that thanks to satellite reconnaissance and SIGINT data received from NSA, the U.S. intelligence community accurately predicted the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 25, 1979, although there was nothing that the U.S. government could do to prevent the Soviets from occupying the entire country.98 And in 1980-1981, a CIA agent inside the Polish General Staff, Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski, provided the U.S. intelligence community incredibly valuable intelligence that permitted the U.S. to monitor day-to-day developments inside Poland at a time when the U.S. government and its allies in Western Europe feared that the Soviet Union would intervene militarily crush the Polish “Solidarity” (Solidarnosc) trade union and its supporters inside the country. Contained in this collection are a selection of formerly highly classified CIA reports detailing the information that Colonel Kuklinski was providing the CIA at the height of the Polish Crisis in 1981.99 Also contained in this collection are a series of formerly classified intelligence assessments and reports derived from a combination of SIGINT and satellite reconnaissance on Soviet military preparations to invade Poland, which neatly complemented Colonel Kuklinski’s reporting from Warsaw.100 But as good as the intelligence was, there was (just like Afghanistan) nothing that the U.S. government could do to save Poland. On December 13, 1981, Polish leader General Wojciech Jaruzelski declared martial law and moved to crush the Solidarity trade union and its supporters. Elements of ten Polish combat divisions were deployed to all major Polish cities. HUMINT and SIGINT showed that no Soviet troops took part in the enforcement of the martial law decree, and that Soviet troops in and around Poland remained at peacetime readiness levels conducting routine training activity.101 Some of the CIA intelligence estimates during the administration of President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) generated more than a fair share of controversy. In July 1981, the CIA issued a report which cast some doubt as to the ability of the U.S. intelligence community to verify a strategic arms limitation agreement (SALT) with the Soviet Union.102 A January 1982 CIA intelligence assessment presented a somewhat alarmist view about the Soviet work on developing a new generation of nuclear-armed strategic ballistic missiles and anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems.103 A February 1982 intelligence estimate alleged that the Soviets had used chemical and/or biological weapons against anti-communist insurgents in Afghanistan and Laos, although most of the evidence was fragmentary and unreliable.104 And in 1983, the intelligence community produced an assessment after the U.S. invasion of the Caribbean island of Grenada which argued that the island’s government was controlled by the Soviet Union and Fidel Castro’s Cuba. But again, the evidence, such as it was, was arguably pretty flimsy.105 And in January 1984, the White House issued a classified directive which found that the Soviets were not complying with a number of requirements pursuant to various arms control agreements. There was considerable dissent within the intelligence community about the veracity of some of the findings contained in this directive, by the intelligence analysts were overruled by the White House.106 Controversy still swirls in the U.S. over whether the CIA and the rest of the intelligence community accurately foresaw the collapse of the Soviet Union and the break of the former Warsaw Pact states in Eastern Europe from Soviet domination. The declassified documents released to date show that beginning in 1989, the U.S. intelligence community accurately forecasted that the Soviet Union was headed into a period of political and economic crisis brought on by political instability at home and in Eastern Europe coupled with overspending on defense and security matters. The CIA also correctly found that the stability of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s government was being threatened by competing political forces within the Soviet hierarchy, especially the “Old Guard” communist party stalwarts who opposed his policy of greater openness (Glasnost) and wider diplomatic engagement and cooperation with the West (Perestroika). It also accurately forecast that the Soviet’s control of Eastern Europe was weakening. But nowhere in the declassified documents reviewed to date is there any definitive statement showing that the U.S. intelligence community predicted the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the complete break of all Eastern European countries from the USSR, or that by 1991 the USSR would fall apart completely. In other words, the U.S. intelligence community’s track record on this, the penultimate “Big Issue” of the Cold War, is mixed, at best.107 The end of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact alliance happened so fast that probably no one could have accurately forecast it. On the night of November 9-10, 1989, East German demonstrators began tearing down the Berlin Wall. On November 19, 1989, a new Czech political party called the Civic Forum, headed by poet Vaclav Havel, called for dramatic political reforms. Czech Communist Party chairman Milos Jakes resigned the same day. In December 1989, the communist governments in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania collapsed. On March 11, 1990, Lithuania declared its independence, making it the first Soviet republic to secede from the USSR. In June 1990, the Ukraine declared its independence. On October 1, 1990, East and West Germany were reunited. In July 1991 the Warsaw Pact was formally disbanded. On August 18, 1991, communist hardliners launched a coup d’etat against President Mikhail Gorbachev. The revolt collapsed the next day when the Soviet military largely refused to back the hardliners. On December 25, 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev resigned as Russian president and the following day the USSR was dissolved. The Cold War was over.

Matthew M. Aid

Washington, D.C., August 2012



1.   Christopher Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1995), p. 181.

3.   Memorandum, Lynn to Secretary of State et al., Options Paper for the President on Organization and Management of the Foreign Intelligence Community, December 16, 1975, Secret, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan. As of 1975, the U.S. intelligence community’s target coverage was divvied up as follows: the USSR and Eastern Europe: 65%, Asia: 25%, the Middle East: 7%, Latin America: 2%; and the rest of the world: 1%, U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final Report, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, 1976, Book I, p. 348. As of 1980, the U.S. intelligence community devoted 58% of its resources to covering the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies, for which see H.D.S. Greenway and Paul Quinn-Judge, “CIA Chief Voices Final Hopes and Fears,” Boston Globe, January 15, 1993, p. B17.

4.    Memorandum, USCIB to Secretary of Defense, Atomic Energy Program of the USSR, May 12, 1949; Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from Admiral Louis Denfield, USN, Atomic Energy Program of the USSR, June 30, 1949; and Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Atomic Energy Program of the USSR, June 23, 1949, all in RG-330, Entry 199 OSD Decimal File 1947-1950, Box 61, File: CD 11-1-2, NA, CP.

5.         U.S. Air Force Security Service, Command Historian, History of COMINT Collection Operations, United States Air Force Security Service, Fiscal Year 1958, 1959, Top Secret Codeword, pp. 7, 14, AIA FOIA.

6.   Dr. Thomas R. Johnson, American Cryptology During the Cold War, 1945-1989 (Ft. George G. Meade: Center for Cryptologic History, 1995), Book II: Centralization Wins, 1960-1972, Top Secret Umbra, p. 294, NSA FOIA.

7.         Dr. Thomas R. Johnson, American Cryptology During the Cold War, 1945-1989 (Ft. George G. Meade: Center for Cryptologic History, 1995), Book II: Centralization Wins, 1960-1972, Top Secret Umbra, p. 294, NSA FOIA.

8.         J.P. Cole, Geography of the Soviet Union (London: Butterworths, 1984), p. 3; Harold Fullard (ed.), Soviet Union in Maps (London: George Philip & Son Limited, 1972), p. 1.

11.       Memorandum, Material Used by DCI 31 March 1953 NSC for Seven Wisemen Briefing (Special), CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP80R000100120004-5, NA, CP; Draft Presentation, Major United States Intelligence Problems, Naval War College, February 18, 1955, pp. 2-3, CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, Document No. 0000482164, http://www.foia.cia.gov.

14.       Barry G. Royden, “Tolkachev, A Worthy Successor to Penkovsky,” Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 47, No. 3, 2003 Unclassified Edition, pp. 5-33. Unclassified.

15.       See for example Translated Blind Letter, Penkovskiy to U.S. Embassy, July 19, 1960, Unclassified, CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, Document No. 0000012267, http://www.foia.cia.gov; Joseph J. Bulik, Memorandum for the Record, Briefing of Mr. Helms, DDP/COP on New Case, August 31, 1960, Secret, CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, Document No. 0000012276, http://www.foia.cia.gov; Transcript, Meeting #1 (London), 20 April 1961, April 20, 1961, [Top Secret], CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, Document No. 0000012392, http://www.foia.cia.gov; CIA, Intelligence Information Report, The 1 May U-2 Incident and Powers’ Fate, undated but circa June 1961, [Secret], CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, Document No. 0000012388, http://www.foia.cia.gov; John M. Maury, Memorandum for the Record, Assessment of deleted, July 13, 1961, [Secret], CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, Document No. 0000012282, http://www.foia.cia.gov;

John M. Maury, Memorandum for the Record, Briefing of General Maxwell Taylor on deleted Material, July 22, 1961, [Secret], CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, Document No. 0000075168, http://www.foia.cia.gov; John M. Maury, Memorandum for the Record, Conversation with Mr. Helms Re deleted Report on Large-Scale Soviet Military Preparations, September 26, 1961, [Secret], CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, Document No. 0000012292, http://www.foia.cia.gov; Memorandum, Bulik to Chief, SR Division, Oleg V. Penkovskiy, May 10, 1963, Secret, CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, Document No. 0000012375, http://www.foia.cia.gov.

17.       Department of State, Notes of Conversation With General Irwin, November 24, 1948, Top Secret, RG-59, Entry 1561, Box 2, File: Department of the Army, NA, CP; Department of State, Exploitation of Intelligence in Occupied Areas, November 24, 1948, Top Secret, RG-59, Entry 1561, Box 28, File: HICOG, NA, CP; Letter, Corrigan to Murphy, December 1, 1948, Top Secret, RG-59, Central Decimal Files 1945-1949, Box 6651, NA, CP; Memorandum, Cabell to Assistant for Production, Expansion of WRINGER Intelligence Collection Activities, November 1, 1950, Top Secret, RG-341, Entry 214, Box 53, File: 2-16800 - 2-16899, NA, CP; Memorandum, Trueheart to Buford, December 28, 1950, Secret, RG-59, Entry 1561, Box 7, File: CHICOM Takeover, NA, CP; Memorandum, Kissinger to Bundy, Intelligence Activities in Berlin, August 4, 1961, Top Secret, National Security Files, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts.

19.       Memorandum, Gold to Bross, The BROADWAY Work Program, August 21, 1945, Secret, RG-226, Entry 108B, Box 90, Folder 733, NA, CP; Memorandum, OP-16-F to OP-16, Exchange of Information Between ONI and NID Regarding USSR, August 24, 1945, Top Secret, RG-38, Entry 98C, Box 9, File: TSC #2501-2600, NA, CP; Great Britain, MI6, USSR: General Report No. 2, January 25, 1946, Top Secret, RG-226, Entry 108B, Box 72, Folder 573, NA, CP; Memorandum, Houck to Valk, January 25, 1946, Top Secret Control, RG-226, Entry 108B, Box 95, Folder 763, NA, CP; Memorandum, SAINT LONDON to SAINT WASHINGTON, British/American Liaison, April 12, 1946, Secret, RG-226, Entry 190A, Box 18, Folder 45, NA, CP; Memorandum, Johnson to Sprouse, Highlights of Attached British Document, April 25, 1950, Top Secret, RG-59, Entry 399, Box 17, File: TS 1950 400.1 Intel, NA, CP.

22.       For General Gehlen’s role in spying on the USSR for U.S. intelligence, see for example Memorandum, Fritzsche to ACofS, G-2, Special Intelligence Reports on the Russian Army, August 16, 1945, Top Secret, RG-319, Entry 1041, Box 15, File: ID 925184, NA, CP; Cable, S 21063, CG, U.S. Forces, European Theater, Main to War Department, September 1, 1945, Top Secret, RG-165, Entry 426 OPD Top Secret Messages 1942-1946, Box 40, File: CM-IN 1-5 September 1945, NA, CP; Cable, WAR 93406, War Department to CG USFET, July 3, 1946, Top Secret/Eyes Only, RG-319, Entry 58, Box 71, File: #2 To Germany, NA, CP; Memorandum, Lewis to Galloway, Keystone Operation, September 22, 1946, Top Secret, RG-226, Entry 211, Box 36, Folder 8, NA, CP; Memorandum, Burress to Vandenberg, Operation RUSTY: Use of the Eastern Branch of the Former German Intelligence Service, October 1, 1946, Top Secret, RG-263, Entry 85, Box 4, Folder 21, NA, CP; Letter, Lewis to Helms, October 8, 1946, Top Secret, RG-226, Entry 210, Box 349, Folder 1, NA, CP; Cable, SX 4118, HQ EUCOM to CSUSA, November 29, 1947, Top Secret, RG-319, Entry 58, Box 96, File: #2 From “S” Germany 7-1-47 -12-31-47, NA, CP; CIA, Memorandum, German Intelligence Service - Data for Wartime Use, June 1956, Secret, RG-263, Entry ZZ-19 CIA Subject Files (2nd Release), Box 3, File: Saturn Operational Project, NA, CP.

23.       Memorandum, Paige to McKee, Swedish Intelligence Service, April 17, 1946, Top Secret, RG-226, Entry 211, Box 38, Folder 6, NA, CP; Memorandum, Acting Chief FBL to Acting Chief SPDS, Brief of Operations (Active & Pending) Against Soviets, July 24, 1946, Top Secret Control, RG-226, Entry 210, Box 329, File: FSRO 101-329, NA, CP; Letter, Lewis to Helms, September 22, 1946, Secret, RG-226, Entry 214, Box 4, File: WN 24600 - 24605, NA, CP; U.S. Navy, Office of Naval Intelligence, Russia: Navy: Fleet Disposition, September 6, 1947, Secret, RG-38, ONI 1947 Secret Intelligence Reports, Box 8, File: NA Stockholm 1947, NA, CP; U.S. Navy, Office of Naval Intelligence, Russia: Navy: Fleet Disposition, September 11, 1947, Secret, RG-38, ONI 1947 Secret Intelligence Reports, Box 8, File: NA Stockholm 1947, NA, CP; Cable, DTO 211620Z, Stockholm to Secretary of State, October 21, 1949, Top Secret, RG-59, Central Decimal Files 1945-1949, Box 6657, File: 861.31/10-2149, NA, CP; Department of the Army, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Weekly Intelligence Report, No. 65, May 19, 1950, Secret, RG-319, Entry 47E G-2 Decimal File 1949-1950, Box 70, File: 319.1, NA, CP.

25.       Joint OSO-OPC Report on the Ukrainian Resistance Movement, December 12, 1950, p. 2, Top Secret, RG-263, Entry ZZ-19 Subject Files (2nd Release), Box 9, Vol 9 Aerodynamic Operations (1 of 2), NA, CP; Memorandum, Ukrainian SSR - Operational Program, August 8, 1952, Secret, RG-263, Entry ZZ-19 Subject Files (2nd Release), Box 10, Vol 10 Aerodynamic Operations (2 of 2), NA, CP; Memorandum, Chief, SR Division to Chief, Foreign Intelligence, An Evaluation of the AERODYNAMIC Project, June 22, 1955, Secret, RG-263, Entry ZZ-19 Subjects File 2nd Release, Box 8, File: Vol. 2 Aerodynamic Development & Plans (1 of 2), NA, CP; Kevin C. Ruffner, “Cold War Allies: The Origins of CIA’s Relationship with Ukrainian Nationalists,” Studies in Intelligence, 1998, p. 39, Secret, RG-263, Entry ZZ-19 Subject Files (2nd Release), Box 61, NA, CP. See also Harry Rositzke, The CIA's Secret Operations: Espionage, Counterespionage, and Covert Action (Boulder: Westview Press, 1977), pp. 18-19.

26.       “West Conducts Espionage Against USSR,” Radio Volga, March 6-7, 1959 Colonel Sechkin and Lt. Colonel Krylov, “Subversion Against Peace,” Pravda, May 20, 1960. See also Soviet Information Bureau, Caught in the Act: Facts About U.S. Espionage and Subversion Against the USSR (Moscow: Soviet Information Bureau, 1960), pp. 54, 56; Maart Laar, “The Armed Resistance Movement in Estonia from 1944 to 1956,” in The Anti-Soviet Resistance in the Baltic States (Vilnius: Du Ka, 2000), pp. 239-240.

28.       CIA, Memorandum of Conversation, Discussion on CIA (OPC) Ukrainian Matters with Mr. Reinhardt, April 19, 1951, Top Secret, RG-263, Entry ZZ-19 Subject Files (2nd Release), Box 9, Aerodynamic Vol. 9 Operations (2 of 2), NA, CP; Memorandum, Assistant Director to Deputy Director, Plans, Ukrainian Position Paper, April 23, 1951, Top Secret, RG-263, Entry ZZ-19 Subject Files (2nd Release), Box 9, Aerodynamic Vol. 9 Operations (2 of 2), NA, CP; WELA-5084, Chief of Station, London to Winston M. Scott, Chief, Foreign Division W, CIA/State Department - SIS/Foreign Office Talks on Operations Against the USSR, April 23-24, 1951, Top Secret, RG-263, Entry ZZ-19 Subject Files (2nd Release), Box 9, Vol. 9 Aerodynamic Operations (2 of 2), NA, CP; Draft Memorandum, Summary of Decisions Reached During London Meeting, 23-26 April 1951, April 1951, Secret, RG-263, Entry ZZ-19 Subject Files (2nd Release), Box 9, Aerodynamic Vol. 9 Operations (2 of 2), NA, CP.

29.       Kevin C. Ruffner, “Cold War Allies: The Origins of CIA’s Relationship with Ukrainian Nationalists,” Studies in Intelligence, 1998, Secret, RG-263, Entry ZZ-19 Subject Files (2nd Release), Box 61, NA, CP. See also Richard Breitman and Norman J.W. Goda, Hitler’s Shadow: Nazi War Criminals, U.S. Intelligence, and the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 2010).

33.       Memorandum, Smith to National Security Council, Report by the Director of Central Intelligence, April 23, 1952, Top Secret, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP80R01731R001100080027-7, NA, CP.

37.       See for example, Dispatch, CNO to CINCPACFLT et al., February 19, 1948, Top Secret Glint, RG-218, JCS Chairman’s File - Admiral Leahy 1942-1948, Box 13, File: Misc. 1948, NA, CP; CIA, Memorandum, Unusual Soviet Activities Observed in Communications Intelligence (COMINT), May 16, 1949, Top Secret [Glint], CIA FOIA; Department of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations (Op-32), SIS 50-17, Soviet Intelligence Summary, April 25, 1950, Top Secret Copse, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP56S00490A000700090018-0, NA, CP; CIA, Memorandum, Some Recent Developments With Regard to Soviet Personnel Abroad, July 8, 1950, [Top Secret Copse], President’s Secretary’s Files, Box 211, File: Situation Summaries, Harry S. Truman, Independence, Missouri; CIA, Memorandum, Recent Developments in Southeastern Europe, July 8, 1950, Top Secret [Copse], President’s Secretary’s Files, Box 211, File: Situation Summaries, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri; CIA, IM-323-SRC, Soviet Preparations for Major Hostilities in 1950, August 25, 1950, Top Secret [Acorn], President’s Secretary’s Files, Box 211, File: Situation Summaries, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri; CIA, Memorandum, Cessation of Soviet Far East Tactical Air Activity, May 12, 1951, [Top Secret Acorn], President’s Secretary’s Files, Box 211, File: Situation Summaries, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri; Special Study Group of the NSA eScientific Advisory Board, The Potentialities of COMINT for Strategic Warning, October 20, 1953, Top Secret Canoe, NSA FOIA.

38.       See for example Extract from CIA, Current Intelligence Bulletin, May 10, 1951, Top Secret Acorn;  Extract from CIA, Office of Current Intelligence, Special Intelligence Supplement to Daily Digest, August 28, 1951, Top Secret Suede; Special Article, “Evidence of a “Soviet Puppet Force” for Korea is Inconclusive,” in CIA, Office of Current Intelligence, Current Intelligence Review, September 12, 1951, Top Secret Suede; Special Article, “Communists Prepare to Expand Korean Air War,” in CIA, Office of Current Intelligence, Current Intelligence Review, November 7, 1951, Top Secret Suede; Special Article, “Communist Intentions in Korea,” in CIA, Office of Current Intelligence, Current Intelligence Review, November 14, 1951, Top Secret Suede; Special Article, “The Soviet Role in the Korean War,” in CIA, Office of Current Intelligence, Current Intelligence Review, December 19, 1951, Top Secret Suede; Special Article, “Communist Intentions in Korea,” in CIA, Office of Current Intelligence, Current Intelligence Review, January 1, 1952, Top Secret Suede;

40.       CIA, Draft NSC Briefing, Soviet Jet Bombers, April 27, 1954, Top Secret [Froth], CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP79R00890A000300010003-0, NA, CP; Memorandum, Chief, Aircraft Branch to Assistant Director, RR, Moscow May Day Air Show, May 5, 1954, Top Secret Froth, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP70T00666R000100010017-6, NA, CP; CIA, NSC Briefing, Disruption of Soviet Shipping in Far East Following Seizure of Tuapse, July 13, 1954, [Top Secret Froth], CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP80R01443R000200360011-0, NA, CP; CIA, NSC Briefing, Soviet Bloc Need for Copper, July 22, 1954, [Top Secret Froth], CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP80R01443R000200370003-8, NA, CP; CIA, NSC Briefing, Soviet Guided Missiles, October 21, 1954, [Top Secret Froth], CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP80R01443R000300090003-8, NA, CP; CIA, NSC Briefing, Soviet Military Aid to Peiping, July 27, 1955, Top Secret Eider, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP80R01443R000400080002-9, NA, CP; CIA, NSC Briefing, Soviet Guided Missiles, July 27, 1955, Top Secret Eider, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP80R01443R000400080002-9, NA, CP; CIA, Memorandum, Intruder Flights Over the USSR During July 1956, undated but circa July 10, 1956, Top Secret [Eider], CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP89B00709R000500930002-0, NA, CP; “Possible Soviet Preparations for Flight Testing an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile or an Earth Satellite,” in CIA, Office of Current Intelligence, Current Intelligence Weekly Review, April 11, 1957, Top Secret [Eider], CIA FOIA; Memorandum, Guthe to Director, Special Projects Staff, Production, Reserves, and Exports of Soviet Gold, November 27, 1957, Top Secret Eider, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP70T00666R000100050004-6, NA, CP; CIA, Office of Scientific Intelligence, Electronic Aspects of the Soviet Air Defense System, March 3, 1958, Top Secret Eider, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP78T04753A000800010002-3, NA, CP; Memorandum, Secretary to Intelligence Advisory Committee, Reporting on Test ICBM and Space Vehicles, July 17, 1958, Top Secret [Eider], CIA FOIA; NSA, 3/0/TALCOM/8-59, Status of Siberian Air Defense District Installations as of deleted, December 1, 1959, Top Secret Daunt Chess, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP78T05439A000500070004-9, NA, CP; CIA, I/GM, The History of the Soviet Long-Range Guided Missile Production Program, December 30, 1959, Top Secret Daunt, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP70T00666R000100090001-5, NA, CP.

41.       CIA, CS Historical Paper No. 150, Clandestine Services History: The Berlin Tunnel Operation, 1952-1956, June 24, 1968, Secret, CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, Document No. 0001407685, http://www.foia.cia.gov; Thomas R. Johnson, Operation REGAL: The Berlin Tunnel, U.S. Cryptologic History, Special Series, Vol. 4 (Ft. George G. Meade: Center for Cryptologic History, 1988), Top Secret Umbra, NSA FOIA; David A. Hatch, “The Berlin Tunnel: Part I: But Did They Call Miss Utility?,” Cryptologic Almanac, March-April 2002, Top Secret/COMINT/X1, NSA FOIA; David A. Hatch, “The Berlin Tunnel: Part II: The Rivals,” Cryptologic Almanac, March-April 2002, Top Secret/COMINT/X1, NSA FOIA; “Engineering the Berlin Tunnel,” Studies in Intelligence, Vol 52, No. 1, March 2008, Secret X1, CIA FOIA.

46.       See for example CIA, Indications Staff, Attacks on Western Aircraft in the Border Regions of the Soviet Orbit, March 12, 1953, Top Secret Canoe, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP80R01143R000100100024-5, NA, CP; Memorandum, Klaus to Becker, C-118 Case, April 21, 1959, Top Secret, RG-59, Central Decimal Files 1955-1959, Box 3512, File: 761.5411/4-1259, NA, CP; CIA, Chronological Account of Handling of U-2 Incident, May 1, 1960, Top Secret Daunt, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP33-02415A000800300018-0, NA, CP; Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Intelligence Information Brief No. 288, US-Soviet Air Incidents, 1950-60, June 8, 1960, Secret, RG-59, Entry 1560, Box 17, File: U-2 Case, NA, CP; CIA, Memorandum, Factual Data Regarding Statements Extracted from “True” Magazine, September 1960, ca September 10, 1960, Top Secret Daunt, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary Records, 1952-1961, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 15, File: Intelligence Matters (13), Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas.          

48.       An excellent two-volume compilation of oral history interviews and declassified documents concerning these USAF reconnaissance overflights can be found in R. Cargill Hall and Clayton D. Laurie, eds., Early Cold War Overflights 1950-1956: Symposium Proceedings (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Historian, National Reconnaissance Office, 2003).

49.       Memorandum, Norstad to Chief of Staff, Daily Activity Report, June 14, 1948, p. 2, RG-341, Entry 337 DCS/Operations General Records 1944-1953, Box 4, File: Daily Activity Report, NA, CP; Cable, No. 82, Air Attache Stockholm Sweden to MILID Washington D.C., September 7, 1948, Top Secret, RG-319, Entry 58 Army G-2 Top Secret Messages 1942-1952, Box 124, File: Spain/Sweden/Switzerland 1948, NA, CP; Memorandum, Mallory to Executive, Air Intelligence Requirements Division, Daily Activity Report, September 17, 1948, Top Secret, RG-341, Entry 214, Box 43, File: 2-3600 - 2-3699, NA, CP; Memorandum, Agee to United States Air Attache, American Embassy, Oslo, Norway, Photo Reconnaissance, October 5, 1948, Top Secret, RG-341, Entry 214 Top Secret Cable and Controls Division, Box 43, File: 2-3700 - 2-3799, NA, CP; Memorandum for Record, Transmittal of Special P.I. Report, October 5, 1948, Top Secret, RG-341, Entry 214 Top Secret Cable and Controls Division, Box 43, File: 2-3900 - 2-3999, NA, CP.

50.       Details of these overflight operations based on declassified Swedish archival records can be found in Lennart Andersson and Leif Hellström. Bortom Horisonten (Stockholm: Freddy Stenboms förlag, 2002).

52.       Memorandum, Guthe to Deputy Director/Intelligence, Staff Study on USAF Over-Flights, October 30, 1953, Top Secret, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP79S01057A000200040017-6, NA, CP; CIA, Memorandum, Desirability of Establishing a Sub-Committee on Photographic Intelligence at the IAC Level, August 1954, Top Secret, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP79S01057A000200040002-2, NA, CP.

53.       Letter, Cabell to Stratemeyer, July 13, 1950, Top Secret, RG-341, Entry 214, Box 51, File: 2-14100 - 2-14199, NA, CP. See also R. Cargill Hall and Clayton D. Laurie, eds., Early Cold War Overflights 1950-1956: Symposium Proceedings (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Historian, National Reconnaissance Office, 2003), p. 527.

54.       Letter, Stratemeyer to Cabell, May 10, 1950, Top Secret, RG-341, Entry 214, Box 50, File: 2-13200 - 2-13299, NA, CP; Letter, Stratemeyer to Cabell with attachment, August 24, 1950, Top Secret, RG-341, Entry 214, File: 2-15900 - 2-15999, NA, CP.

55.       Letter, Cochrane to Elliot, July 25, 1951, Top Secret, Nathan F. Twining Papers, Box 122, File: Top Secret File (2), Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; Letter, Elliot to Cochrane, August 15, 1951, Top Secret, Nathan F. Twining Papers, Box 122, File: Top Secret File (2), Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; Memorandum, Ramey to Gruesendorf, British Proposal to Form a High Altitude Reconnaissance Flight in this Country, August 16, 1951, Top Secret, RG-341, Entry 345A, Box 42, File: #313 AFOOP 373.5 Jan 51, NA, CP; Letter, Twining to Breakey, October 15, 1951, Top Secret, Nathan F. Twining Papers, Box 122, File: Top Secret File (2), Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; Memorandum, James to Pitblado, Operation “JIU-JITSU,”, December 28, 1951, Top Secret, File: AIR 19/1126, National Archives of the UK (NAUK), Kew, Great Britain; Memorandum, James to C.A.S. et al, January 24, 1952, Top Secret, AIR 19/1126 Operation Jiu-Jitsu 1951-1954, NAUK, Kew, England; Memorandum, Churchill to Secretary of State for Air, February 24, 1952, Top Secret, AIR 19/1126 Operation Jiu-Jitsu 1951-1954, NAUK, Kew, England; Memorandum, Secretary of State for Air to Prime Minister, April 4, 1952, Top Secret, AIR 19/1126 Operation Jiu-Jitsu 1951-1954, NAUK, Kew, England; Memorandum, Elliot to Vandenberg, April 23, 1952, Top Secret, Hoyt S. Vandenberg Papers, Box 83, File: Miscellaneous, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; Cable, 7AD-CG-05A, CGADIV SEVEN SG RUISLIP ENG to CGSAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR, April 29, 1952, Top Secret, Curtis E. LeMay Papers, Box B-200, File: B-17785, Library of Congress Manuscripts Division, Washington, D.C.; Letter, Slessor to Vandenberg, September 12, 1952, Top Secret and Strictly Personal, Nathan F. Twining Papers, Box 121, Subject File: Top Secret File (1), Manuscript Division, Library of Congress; Letter, Vandenberg to Slessor, September 18, 1952, Top Secret, Nathan F. Twining Papers, Box 121, Subject File: Top Secret File (1), Manuscript Division, Library of Congress; Memorandum, Colville to James, November 29, 1952, Top Secret, AIR 19/1126 Operation Jiu-Jitsu 1951-1954, NAUK, Kew, England; Memorandum, Eden to Prime Minister, December 1, 1952, Top Secret, AIR 19/1126 Operation Jiu-Jitsu 1951-1954, NAUK, Kew, England; Memorandum, James to Pitblado, March 2, 1954, Top Secret, AIR 19/1126 Operation Jiu-Jitsu 1951-1954, NAUK, Kew, England; Letter, Pitblado to James, March 3, 1954, Top Secret, AIR 19/1126 Operation Jiu-Jitsu 1951-1954, NAUK, Kew, England. See also R. Cargill Hall and Clayton D. Laurie, eds., Early Cold War Overflights 1950-1956: Symposium Proceedings (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Historian, National Reconnaissance Office, 2003), Vol. I, pp. 160-163).

57.       CIA, Office of Research and Reports, Photo Intelligence Memorandum, Vladivostok Shipyards, March 25, 1955, Top Secret SENSINT, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP78T05694A000200100001-5, NA, CP; CIA, Photographic Intelligence Brief, Suspected Soviet Guided Missile Submarine, June 28, 1957, Top Secret SENSINT, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP78T04753A000700010034-9, NA, CP; CIA, Photographic Intelligence Brief, Anadyr/Mys Nizmenny Airfield, August 19, 1957, Top Secret SENSINT, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP78T04753A000700010038-5, NA, CP; CIA, Photographic Intelligence Brief, Tanyurer Airfield, August 19, 1957, Top Secret SENSINT, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP78T04753A000700010039-4, NA, CP; CIA, Photographic Intelligence Brief, Selected Railroad Routes - Vladivostok Area, USSR, November 5, 1957, Top Secret SENSINT, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP78T04753A000700010044-8, NA, CP; CIA, Photographic Intelligence Brief, Vladivostok Naval Base and Shipyard 202, USSR, November 12, 1957, Top Secret SENSINT, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP78T04753A000700010041-1, NA, CP; CIA, Photographic Intelligence Memorandum, Aircraft Assembly Plant No. 116, Semenovka, USSR, December 31, 1957, Top Secret SENSINT, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP78T05166A000200010010-1, NA, CP; CIA, Photographic Intelligence Memorandum, Franz Joseph Land, August 15, 1958, Top Secret SENSINT, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP78T05166A000200010009-3, NA, CP.

59.       Memorandum, Miller to Project Director, Suggestions re the Intelligence Value of AQUATONE, July 17, 1956, Top Secret, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP62B00844R000200020017-3, NA, CP; Memorandum, Bissell to Director of Central Intelligence, Briefing Notes on AQUATONE for November 15, November 15, 1956, Top Secret, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP62B00844R000200010037-2, NA, CP; Memorandum, Bissell to Director of Central Intelligence, High Level Meeting on Project AQUATONE, May 3, 1957, Top Secret, CIA Electronic FOIA Reading room, Document No. 0000743237, http://www.foia.cia.gov; CIA, Memorandum, Accomplishments of the U-2 Program, May 27, 1960, Top Secret Chess, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP33-02415A000100070007-5, NA, CP; Memorandum, Dulles to Goodpaster, U-2 Overflights of Soviet Bloc, August 18, 1960, Top Secret, CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, Document No. 0000227802, http://www.foia.cia.gov; Memorandum, Dulles to Goodpaster, Statistics Relating to the U-2 Program, August 19, 1960, Top Secret, CIA FOIA; CIA, Office of Special Activities, Accomplishments of the U-2 Program, 1965, Top Secret Idealist, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP33-02415A000800300012-6, NA, CP.

61.       See for example Colonel A.J. Goodpaster, Memorandum of Conference with the President, May 28, 1956, Top Secret, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Papers as President of the United States 1953-1961, Ann Whitman File, Box 20, File: May 1956 Diary - Staff Memos, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas; Colonel A.J. Goodpaster, Memorandum for Record, July 10, 1956, Top Secret, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Papers as President of the United States 1953-1961, Ann Whitman File, Box 20, File: July 1956 Diary - Staff Memos, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas; Colonel A.J. Goodpaster, Memorandum for the Record, October 3, 1956, Top Secret, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Papers as President of the United States 1953-1961, Ann Whitman File, Box 20, File: October 1956 Diary - Staff Memos, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas; A.J. Goodpaster, Memorandum for Record, August 23, 1957, Top Secret, White House Office, Records of the Office of the White House Staff Secretary, 1952-1961, Subject Series, Alpha Subseries, Box 14, Intelligence Matters (4), Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.

62.       Leonard F. Parkinson and Lohan H. Potter, “Closing the Missile Gap,” Studies in Intelligence, May 1975, Secret, p. 126, CIA “What Was the Missile Gap?” document release, November 28, 2011; Frederic C.E. Oder, James C. Fitzpatrick, and Paul E. Worthman, The Gambit Story (Washington, D.C.: National Reconnaissance Office, June 1991), Secret, p. 6, NRO FOIA.

64.       Memorandum, Charyk to McCone, December 14, 1962, Top Secret, NRO FOIA; National Reconnaissance Office, Memorandum, Status of Satellite Reconnaissance Programs, November 13, 1963, Top Secret, NRO FOIA; National Reconnaissance Office, Memorandum, United States Overflight of Denied Areas, December 3, 1963, Top Secret, NRO FOIA. Memorandum, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board to The President, National Reconnaissance Program, May 2, 1964, Top Secret, NRO FOIA; Memorandum, McCone to Director, National Reconnaissance Office, Review of FY 1965 (TS) NRP, July 23, 1964, Top Secret Handle Via Byeman System Only, NRO FOIA; Memorandum, McMillan to Deputy Secretary of Defense, Comments on the 23 July 1964 Memorandum to (S) DNRO from DCI, July 29, 1964, Top Secret Handle Via Byeman System Only, NRO FOIA; National Reconnaissance Office, Semi-Annual Report to the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board on the Activities of the National Reconnaissance Program: 1 November 1966 - 30 April 1966, May 1966, Top Secret, NRO FOIA; National Reconnaissance Office, Report to the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board on the National Reconnaissance Program: January 1 to June 30, 1967, July 1,1967, Top Secret, NRO FOIA; Memorandum, Flax to Deputy Secretary of Defense, National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) Issues and Pending Decisions, July 6, 1967, Top Secret, NRO FOIA; Memorandum, Kissinger to President, National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) Annex to the Space Task Group Report, September 26, 1969, Top Secret [codewords not declassified], Staff Records No. 663, NRO FOIA; Memorandum, National Reconnaissance Office to White House Staff, Photographic Satellite Coverage of the USSR, December 2, 1970, Top Secret, CAL Records, NRO FOIA; National Reconnaissance Office, Report to the 40 Committee on the National Reconnaissance Program: July 1, 1970 to June 30, 1971, June 30, 1971, Top Secret, NRO FOIA; Memorandum, McLucas to Laird, Taking Stock of the National Reconnaissance Program, December 18, 1972, Top Secret/Byeman, NRO FOIA.

71.       Strategic Services Unit, Intelligence Report No. A-68827, Poland: Survey of Resistance Elements, June 28, 1946, Secret Control, RG-226, M1656 SSU Intelligence Reports, Roll 3, NA, CP; Strategic Services Unit, Intelligence Report No. A-69995, USSR: History of the Ukrainian Resistance 1941-1946, August 21, 1946, Secret Control, RG-226, M1656 SSU Intelligence Reports, Roll 3, NA, CP; William Holzmann and Zolt Aradi, The Ukrainian Nationalist Movement: An Interim Study, October 1946, Secret Control, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP83-00764R000500040001-3, NA, CP; Memorandum, Chief of Station, Karlsruhe to Chief, FBM, Project ICON, October 20, 1948, Top Secret, RG-263, Entry ZZ-19 CIA Subject Files (2nd Release), Box 9, File Aerodynamic Vol. 9 Operations (1 of 2), NA, CP; Department of State, Airgram No. 200, US Political Adviser for Germany to Secretary of State, Russian Emigree Organizations, May 10, 1949, Secret, RG-59, Central Decimal Files 1945-1949, Box 6649, File: 861.20262/5-1049, NA, CP; Memorandum, Ligon to Assistant Director for Special Operations, CIA, Anti-Soviet Ukrainian Underground Group in Germany, July 6, 1949, Secret, RG-319, Entry 47F G-2 Projects Decimal File 1949-1950, Box 135, File: 000.1 - 000.2438 Germany 1949-50, NA, CP; CIA, Intelligence Memorandum No. 250, Potentialities for Anti-Soviet Underground Resistance in the Event of War in 1950, April 5, 1950, Top Secret, CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, Document No. 0001117974, http://www.foia.cia.gov;

CIA, Information Report, Personalities and Activities of the Ukrainian Resistance, June 20, 1950, Secret, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP82-00457R005000660004-4, NA, CP; Memorandum, Haydon to McClure, Analysis and Evaluation of the Obolensky Proposal Concerning Mobilization of Vlasoff Veterans, Requested by G-3, May 4, 1951, Top Secret, RG-319, Entry 155 (A1), Box 6, File: 091.713 Foreign Officers and Enlisted Men TS, NA, CP; CIA, Information Report, The Resistance Movement in Latvia, October 15, 1951, Secret/Control, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP83-00415R009200080012-8, NA, CP; CIA, Information Report, The History, Development, and Organization of the Ukrainian Resistance Movement, Including the OUN, the UPA, and the UHVR, May 28, 1952, Secret/Control, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP83-00415R010100150006-6, NA, CP; Psychological Strategy Board, Summary of the Report of the Central Intelligence Agency, October 20, 1952, Top Secret, RG-59, Entry 1208, Box 42, File: 440.2 Intelligence re Chicom (II) 1953, NA, CP; CIA, Office of Current Intelligence, Survey of Unrest in Eastern Europe, June 13, 1953, [Top Secret Canoe], CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP91T01172R000200310019-7, NA, CP.

77.       CIA, Special National Intelligence Estimate 85-3-62, The Military Buildup in Cuba, September 19, 1962, p. 2, CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, Document No. 0000242425, http://www.foia.cia.gov. See also Memorandum, Earman to Director of Central Intelligence, Additional Inspector General Conclusions on Cuban Arms Build-up, November 28, 1962, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP80B01676R001800010004-0, NA, CP; Sherman Kent, “A Crucial Estimate Relived,” in Donald P. Steury (ed.), Sherman Kent and the Board of National Estimates (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1994), pp. 173-188; Michael Douglas Smith, “The Perils of Analysis: Revisiting Sherman Kent’s Defense of SNIE 853-62,” Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 51, No. 3, 2007; Robert J. Hanyok, “A Reconsideration of the Role of SIGINT During the Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962 (Part 1 of 4)” Cryptologic Almanac, 2002, NSA FOIA.

79.       “Indications of Soviet Arms Shipments to Cuba,” in NSA, Weekly COMINT Economic Briefing, October 5, 1960, Top Secret Daunt, in NSA and the Cuban Missile Crisis: Document Archive of Declassified Files from the Cuban Missile Crisis, http://www.nsa.gov/cuba; NSA, Soviet Merchant Ship Nikolaj Burdenko Delivers Military Cargo to Cuba, April 10, 1961, Secret Sabre, in NSA and the Cuban Missile Crisis: Document Archive of Declassified Files from the Cuban Missile Crisis, http://www.nsa.gov/cuba; Top Secret Codeword Supplement to Report of Ad Hoc Committee of the U.S. Intelligence Board, The Military Buildup in Cuba: A Chronology of Significant Events Since January 20, 1961 and Major Bloc Arms Shipments to Cuba, July 11, 1961, Top Secret Dinar, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP79S00427A000400050001-0, NA, CP; NSA, Further Unusual Soviet/Cuban Trade Relations Recently Noted, August 7, 1962, Top Secret Dinar, in NSA and the Cuban Missile Crisis: Document Archive of Declassified Files from the Cuban Missile Crisis, http://www.nsa.gov/cuba; Memorandum, Cline to Acting Director of Central Intelligence, Recent Soviet Military Activities in Cuba, September 3, 1962, Top Secret [Dinar Chess], RG-263, Entry 25, Box 1, Folder 11, NA, CP; Memorandum, Assistant Director for Research and Reports to Deputy Director (Intelligence), Further Analysis of Bloc and Western Shipping Calling at Cuban Ports, September 11, 1962, Secret, CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, Document No. 0000307720, http://www.foia.cia.gov; Memorandum, Chairman, Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance [Reber] to Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Historical Analysis of U-2 Overflights of Cuba, October 24, 1962, Top Secret Dinar Ruff Chess Idealist Tackle, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP92B01090R002600080068-8, NA, CP.

80.       Memorandum, Lehman to Director of Central Intelligence, CIA Handling of the Soviet Build-up in Cuba: 1 July - 16 October 1962, November 14, 1962, Top Secret [Multiple Codewords not declassified], CREST Collection, Document No CIA-RDP80B01676R001700180076-4, NA, CP; CIA, Inspector General, Inspector General’s Survey of Handling of Intelligence Information During the Cuban Arms Build-Up: August to mid-October 1962, November 20, 1962, Top Secret Dinar, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP80B01676R001800060005-4, NA, CP; Director of Central Intelligence, Report to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board on Intelligence Community Activities Relating to the Cuban Arms Build-Up: 14 April through 14 October 1962, December 10, 1962, Top Secret [Dinar Chess], National Security Files: Countries: Cuba, Box 61, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts; Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, The 1962 Soviet Arms Build-Up in Cuba, 1963, Top Secret [Dinar], CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP78T05439A000300130013-4, NA, CP; Memorandum, Killian to The President, February 4, 1963, Top Secret, RG-263, Entry 25, Box 78, Folder 111, NA, CP; CIA, National Indications Center, The Soviet Bloc Armed Forces and the Cuban Crisis: A Chronology: July - November 1962, June 18, 1963, Top Secret [Dinar], CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, Document No. 0001161985, http://www.foia.cia.gov; CIA, DD/I Staff Study, Cuba 1962: Khrushchev’s Miscalculated Risk, February 13, 1964, Top Secret [Dinar Chess], RG-263, Entry 82, Box 35, NA, CP; CIA, Presentation, Role of Intelligence During the Cuban Missile Crisis, September 19, 1966, Secret, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP85G00105R000100040005-5, NA, CP.

83.       Memorandum, Hillenkoetter to President, Estimate on the Status of the Russian Atomic Energy Project, July 6, 1948, Top Secret, RG-218, JCS Chairman’s File - Admiral Leahy 1942-1948, Box 19, File: Memos To/From President 1948-49, NA, CP; Memorandum, Hillenkoetter to Executive Secretary, NSC, Atomic Energy Program of the USSR, April 20, 1949, Top Secret, RG-330, Entry 199 OSD Decimal File 1947-1950, Box 61, File: CD 11-1-2, NA, CP; Memorandum, Cabell to Secretary of Defense, Atomic Energy Program of the USSR, June 23, 1949, Top Secret, RG-330, Entry 199 OSD Decimal File 1947-1950, Box 61, File: CD 11-1-2, NA, CP; Memorandum, Denfeld to Secretary of Defense, Atomic Energy Program of the USSR, June 30, 1949, Top Secret, RG-330, Entry 199 OSD Decimal File 1947-1950, Box 61, File: CD 11-1-2, NA, CP; CIA, Office of Scientific Intelligence, Status of the USSR Atomic Energy Project, July 1, 1949, Top Secret, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1948-61, Executive Secretary’s Subject File, Box 16, Special (File #1) (3), Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri; JCS 1942/17, Memorandum, Joint Intelligence Committee to Joint Chiefs of Staff, Intelligence on Soviet Atomic Activities, February 18, 1950, Top Secret, RG-319, G-3/DCSOPS Boxes 1950-51 TS, Box 42, File: G-3 091 Russia TS (Sect. I)(Cases 1-20), NA, CP; Memorandum, Weckerling to Secretary of the Army, Intelligence on Soviet Atomic Energy Program, November 2, 1951, Top Secret, RG-319, Entry 2 (UD), Box 5, File: 091 Russia, NA, CP.

84.       CIA, National Scientific Intelligence Estimate, NSIE-1A, Summary of the Status of the Soviet Atomic Energy Program, January 8, 1953, Top Secret, CIA Electronic FOIA Website, Document No. 0000434880; CIA, National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 11-2-55, The Soviet Atomic Energy Program to Mid-1958, April 26, 1955, Top Secret, CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, , http://www.foia.cia.gov; CIA, National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 11-2-56, The Soviet Atomic Energy Program, June 8, 1956, Top Secret, CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, http://www.foia.cia.gov; CIA, Office of Research and Reports, Photographic Intelligence Memorandum, Semipalatinsk “A” Test Range, September 28, 1956, Secret, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP78T05694A000300010015-9, NA, CP; CIA, National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 11-2-57, The Soviet Atomic Energy Program, May 7, 1957, Top Secret, CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, http://www.foia.cia.gov; CIA, National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 11-2A-58, The Soviet Atomic Energy Program, February 4, 1958, Top Secret, CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, http://www.foia.cia.gov; CIA, National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 11-2-59, The Soviet Atomic Energy Program, June 16, 1959, Top Secret, CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, http://www.foia.cia.gov; CIA, National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 11-2-61, The Soviet Atomic Energy Program, October 5, 1961, Top Secret/Restricted Data, CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, Document No. 0000261335, http://www.foia.cia.gov; CIA, National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 11-2A-62, The Soviet Atomic Energy Program, May 16, 1962, Top Secret, CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, Document No. 0000843187, http://www.foia.cia.gov; CIA, Memorandum, Comparison of US and USSR Atomic Energy Programs, July 1962, Secret/Restricted Data, CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, Document No. 0000873163, http://www.foia.cia.gov.

87.       Memorandum, Irwin to Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Combat Operations, Status of Soviet Guided Missile Program, February 24, 1950, Top Secret, RG-319, Entry 2 (UD), Box 19, File: 471.94, NA, CP; Report, Summary Estimate of Soviet Guided Missile Capabilities, August 7, 1951, Top Secret, RG-319, Entry 1041, Box 136, File: ID 928852, NA, CP; Guided Missile Working Group of JTIS, Deficiencies in Guided Missile Scientific and Technical Intelligence, February 18, 1953, Top Secret, RG-319, Entry 1041, Box 207, File: ID 960546, NA, CP; CIA, Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 11-7-54, Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attacks on the US and Key Overseas Installations Through 1 July 1957, August 17, 1954, Top Secret, RG-263, Entry 29, Box 1, NA, CP; CIA, National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 11-6-54, Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile Field, October 5, 1954, Top Secret, RG-263, Entry 29, Box 2, NA, CP; CIA, NSC Briefing, Soviet Guided Missiles, October 21, 1954, [Top Secret Froth], CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP80R01443R000300090003-8, NA, CP; Memorandum, Guthe to Deputy Director/Intelligence, ORR and EIC Activities in the Field of Soviet Guided Missile Intelligence, February 1, 1955, Secret, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP79R00961A000200010039-3, NA, CP; CIA, NSC Briefing, Soviet Guided Missiles, July 27, 1955, Top Secret Eider, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP80R01443R000400080002-9, NA, CP; ain Memorandum, Samford to Gardner, Soviet Guided Missile Developments, September 15, 1955, Top Secret, RG-341, Entry 214, File: 5-2204, NA, CP; CIA, National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 11-12-55, Soviet Guided Missile Capabilities and Probable Programs, December 20, 1955, Top Secret, RG-263, Entry 29, Box 2, NA, CP; Memorandum, Dulles to Secretary of Defense, Intelligence on Soviet Guided Missile Program, December 23, 1955, Top Secret, RG-59, Entry 1561, Box 14, File: Soviet Interests, Intentions, Capabilities, and Military Activities, NA, CP; Intelligence Advisory Committee, Validity Study of NIE 11-6-54, Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile Field, 5 October 1954, and its Supplement, NIE 11-12-55, Soviet Guided Missile Capabilities and Probable Programs, 20 December 1955, March 21, 1957, Top Secret, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP61-00549R000300020019-1, NA, CP; “Early History of the Soviet Missile Program (1945-1953),” Cryptologic Spectrum, Vol. 5, No. 3, Summer 1975, Secret, NSA FOIA; “Reflections on the Soviet Strategic Missile Threat of 1960,” Cryptologic Spectrum, Vol. 11, No. 3, Summer 1981, Secret Spoke, NSA FOIA.

88.       U.S. European Command, Intelligence Report, Guided Missile Plant at Bolshevo, March 26, 1948, Top Secret, RG-319, Entry 1041, Box 42, File: ID 925985, NA, CP; Memorandum, Norstad to Chief of Staff, USAF, Daily Activity Report, September 16, 1948, Top Secret, RG-341, Entry 337 DCS/O General Records 1944-1953, Box 4, File: Daily Activity Reports, NA, CP; “Soviet Long-Range Missile Proving Ground,” in Air Intelligence Digest, August 1950, Secret, RG-341, Entry 277, Box 72, NA, CP; Guided Missile Working Group of JTIS, Deficiencies in Guided Missile Scientific and Technical Intelligence, February 18, 1953, Top Secret, RG-319, Entry 1041, Box 207, File: ID 960546, NA, CP; Memorandum, Wirsig to ATIRC-1, German Guided Missile Guidance and Control Activities in Russia, March 23, 1953, Secret, RG-341, Entry 288, Box 127, File: INT 2-2-7, NA, CP.

89.       Memorandum, Horner to Quarles, December 8, 1956, Top Secret, RG-340, Entry 1-E, Box 1, NA, CP; Memorandum, Howe to The Secretary, White House Meeting on Aviation Week Article, October 28, 1957, Secret, RG-59, Central Decimal Files 1955-1959, Box 3515, File: 761.5612/10-2457, NA, CP; Memorandum, Douglas to Secretary of Defense, Installation of AN/FPS-17 (XW-3) Radar on Shemya Island, January 15, 1958, Top Secret, RG-340, Entry 1-E, Box 10, NA, CP; Memorandum, Reber to Project Director, CIA Collection Activities Against the Soviet Guided Missile Program, January 16, 1958, Top Secret Eider Chess, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP61S00527A000500040180-2, NA, CP; Memorandum, Erskine to Deputy Secretary of Defense, Army ELINT Installations on Shemya, June 4, 1958, Top Secret, RG-330, Records of the Office of Special Operations, OSD, File: OSO Chronological File: 1 April - 30 June 1958, DoD FOIA; Albert D. Wheelon and Sidney N. Graybeal, “Intelligence for the Space Race,” Studies in Intelligence, Fall 1961, Secret, RG-263, Entry 27, NA, CP; David S. Brandwein, “Telemetry Analysis,” Studies in Intelligence, Fall 1964, Secret, RG-263, Entry 27, Box 15, NA, CP; Stanley G. Zabetakis and John F. Peterson, “The Diyarbakir Radar,” Studies in Intelligence, Fall 1964, Secret, RG-263, Entry 27, Box 15, NA, CP; M.C. Wonus, “The Case of the SS-6,” Studies in Intelligence, Winter 1969, Secret, RG-263, Entry 27, Box 16, NA, CP; Nicholas R. Garofalo, “Present and Future Capabilities of OTH Radars,” Studies in Intelligence, Spring 1969, Secret, RG-263, Entry 27, Box 16, NA, CP; David S. Brandwein, “The SS-8 Controversy,” Studies in Intelligence, Summer 1969, Secret, RG-263, Entry 27, Box 16, NA, CP.

92.       Compare the paucity of information about the Soviet air defense system contained in CIA, National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 11-3-60, Sino-Soviet Air Defense Capabilities Through Mid-1965, March 29, 1960, Top Secret, CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, http://www.foia.cia.gov. with the level of detail in subsequent editions of this estimate, for which see CIA, National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 11-3-62, Soviet Bloc Air and Missile Defense Capabilities Through Mid-1967, October 31, 1962, Top Secret, CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, http://www.foia.cia.gov; CIA, National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 11-3-64, Soviet Air and Missile Defense Capabilities Through Mid-1970, December 16, 1964, Top Secret, RG-263, Entry 29, NA, CP; National Intelligence Estimate No. 11-3-66, Soviet Strategic Air and Missile Defenses, November 17, 1966, Top Secret, CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, Document No. 0000231621, http://www.foia.cia.gov; CIA, National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 11-3-71, Soviet Strategic Defenses, February 25, 1971, Top Secret, RG-263, Entry 37, Box 4, Folder 50, NA, CP; CIA, Memorandum to Holders of National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 11-3-72, Soviet Strategic Defenses, December 20, 1973, Top Secret [Ruff Umbra], RG-263, Entry 37, Box 4, Folder 57, NA, CP.

93.       National Photographic Interpretation Center, Photographic Interpretation Report, Hardened Central Command Facilities, Moskva Area, USSR, September 1966, Top Secret [multiple codewords not declassified], CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP02T06408R000400010012-3, NA, CP; National Photographic Interpretation Center, Photographic Interpretation Report, Hardened Command and Control Facilities, Penza, USSR, January 1967, Top Secret [multiple codewords not declassified], CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP02T06408R000600010036-5, NA, CP; NPIC, Monino Hardened Possible Command/Control Facility, USSR, January 22, 1968, Top Secret Ruff, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP78T05929A0027000030006-9, NA, CP; NPIC, Perkhushkovo SRF National Command Center/Bunker, Moscow, USSR, May 12, 1982, Secret, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP82T00709R000101050001-0, NA, CP.

94.       CIA, Soviet Military Strategy and the Chinese Problem, April 26, 1963, Top Secret [Dinar], CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, CEASAR, POLO and ESAU Papers Special Collection, http://www.foia.cia.gov/CPE/CAESAR/caesar-32.pdf; CIA, Board of National Estimates, Special Memorandum, The Soviet Military Buildup Along the Chinese Border, March 25, 1968, Top Secret [Ruff Trine], CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP79R00967A000800010012-0, NA, CP; http://www.foia.cia.govCIA, Board of National Estimates, Special Memorandum, The Soviet Buildup Against China: Dimensions and Implications, May 6, 1969, Top Secret, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP85T00875R002000170004-4, NA, CP; CIA, Research Study, The Chinese Assessment of the Soviet Military Threat, April 1975, Top Secret [Ruff Umbra], CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, Document No. 0001431168, http://www.foia.cia.gov.

97.       Sherry Sontag and Christopher Drew, Blind Man's Bluff (New York: Public Affairs, 1998), p. 215.

98.       Memorandum, Acting NIO for Warning to NIO/USSR-EE, Soviet Options in Afghanistan, August 10, 1979, Secret, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP83B01027R000100200018-6, NA, CP; Memorandum, deleted to NIO for Warning, Afghanistan - Pressures for Soviet Military Escalation, August 10, 1979, Secret, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP83B01027R000100200018-6, NA, CP; Memorandum, Turner to National Security Council, Alert Memorandum on USSR-Afghanistan, September 14, 1979, Top Secret [multiple codewords not declassified], CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP83B01027R000200030012-0, NA, CP; CIA, Memorandum, The Buildup of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan Since 29 November, December 28, 1979, Top Secret, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP81B00401R000600230019-4, NA, CP; http://www.foia.cia.gov.CIA, Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: Implications for Warning, October 1980, Top Secret [Ruff Umbra], p. 17, CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, Document No 0000278538, http://www.foia.cia.gov; Memorandum, deleted to Director of Central Intelligence, Senior Review Panel Study of Intelligence Judgements Preceding Significant Historical Failures: The Hazards of Single-Outcome Forecasting, December 16, 1983, Secret, “Afghanistan” section, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP86B00269R001100100010-7, NA, CP; Memorandum, Senior Review Panel to Director of Central Intelligence, A Review of Intelligence Performance in Afghanistan, April 9, 1984, Secret, p. 2, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP86B000269R00110010003-5, NA, CP. See also Douglas J. MacEachin, Predicting the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: The Intelligence Community’s Record (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, April 2002), Unclassified, p. 18.

99.       Memorandum, McMahon to Secretary of State et al., Polish Ministry of Defense Drafting Plans to Utilize the Polish Military to Implement Martial Law, January 23, 1981, Top Secret, CIA FOIA; Memorandum, McMahon to Secretary of State et al., Current Situation in the Polish Government and Ministry of Defense, February 24, 1981, Top Secret, CIA FOIA; Memorandum, McMahon to Secretary of State et al., Polish Government Plans for Possible Soviet Military Intervention and Declaration of Martial Law, February 27, 1981, Top Secret, CIA FOIA; Memorandum, McMahon to Secretary of State et al., deleted Report, March 16, 1981, Top Secret, CIA FOIA; Memorandum, McMahon to Secretary of State et al., Comments on the Military Aspects of the Current Crisis in Poland, March 30, 1981, Top Secret, CIA FOIA; Memorandum, McMahon to Secretary of State et al., Soviet Reaction to Polish Proposals Regarding the Declaration of Martial Law, April 2, 1981, Top Secret, CIA FOIA; Memorandum, Hugel to Secretary of State et al., Polish Military and Security Reactions to the Current Political Situation in Poland, June 15, 1981, Top Secret, CIA FOIA; Memorandum, Hugel to Secretary of State et al., Attitudes of the Polish Ministry of Defense and Soviet Military Positions in Connection With the Current Political Situation in Poland, June 24, 1981, Top Secret, CIA FOIA; Memorandum, Stein to Secretary of State et al., Polish General Staff Evaluation of Soviet Military Presence and Activities in Poland, July 17, 1981, Top Secret, CIA FOIA; Memorandum, Stein to Secretary of State et al., The Current Political Situation in Poland, August 14, 1981, Top Secret, CIA FOIA; Memorandum, George to Secretary of State et al., New Draft Decree on Martial Law; Current Situation in Poland, September 9, 1981, Top Secret, CIA FOIA; Memorandum, George to Secretary of State et al., Current Plan for the Introduction of Martial Law in Poland, September 11, 1981, Top Secret, CIA FOIA; Memorandum, George to Secretary of State et al., Current Political/Military Situation in Poland, October 13, 1981, Top Secret, CIA FOIA; Memorandum, deleted to Director of Central Intelligence et al., Polish Preparations for Martial Law, December 7, 1981, Top Secret, CIA FOIA.

100.     CIA, Alert Memorandum: Poland, July 21, 1980, Top Secret [Ruff Umbra], CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, Document No. 0000234954, http://www.foia.cia.gov; CIA, National Foreign Assessment Center, Memorandum, Soviet Options for Military Intervention in Poland, August 30, 1980, classification markings deleted, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP81B00401R002300140005-0, NA, CP; NPIC, Imagery Analysis Report, Summary of Soviet Reaction to the Polish Situation, 17 Through 23 September 1980, September 1980, Secret, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP80T01782R000100600001-0, NA, CP; CIA, National Foreign Assessment Center, Spot Commentary, Review of Polish Developments, November 10, 1980, Secret [Spoke], RG-263, Entry 42, Box 101, NA, CP; NPIC, Imagery Analysis Report, Improved Soviet Readiness Posture on Polish-Soviet Border, December 1980, Top Secret Ruff Umbra, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP81T00380R000100970001-6, NA, CP; Memorandum, Director, SWS to National Intelligence Officer for Warning, The Problem of Strategic Warning and Continuing Tension in Poland, January 9, 1981, Top Secret [multiple codewords not declassified], CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP83B01027R000300150013-8, NA, CP; Memorandum, deleted to NIO for Warning, Polish-Soviet Tensions, March 2, 1981, Top Secret, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP83B01027R000100110025-7, NA, CP; CIA, Memorandum, A/NIO/W to NIO for \fs24softlineWarning, SOYUZ-81 - Backdrop for a Declaration of National Emergency and Confrontation With Solidarity?, March 12, 1981, Top Secret [Umbra], CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP83B01027R000100110031-1, NA, CP; CIA, Poland: Warning of Intervention, March 28, 1981, Top Secret [Ruff Umbra], CIA Electronic FOIA Reading Room, Document No. 0000235233, http://www.foia.cia.gov; CIA, Memorandum, Talking Points - Current Situation [Poland], April 1981, Top Secret [Ruff Umbra], CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP84B00049R000601530003-9, NA, CP; Memorandum, Spiers to Secretary, Poland: Soviet Military Options, April 3, 1981, Top Secret Ruff Umbra Gamma, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP84B00049R000601530017-4, NA, CP; Memorandum, Acting Director, SWS to National Intelligence Officer for Warning, Warning on Poland, October 16, 1981, Top Secret [multiple codewords not declassified], CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP83B01027R000300150002-0, NA, CP.

101.     CIA, National Foreign Assessment Center, Spot Commentary: Poland, December 13, 1981, Secret [Spoke], CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP84B00049R000601710006-6, NA, CP; CIA, National Foreign Assessment Center, Briefing Note: Poland, December 14, 1981, Top Secret [Ruff Umbra], CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP84B00049R000601710006-6, NA, CP.

Location of originals

- National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, Maryland
- CIA-CREST database
- Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri
- Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas
- John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts
- Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas
- Richard M. Nixon Presidential Library, Yorba Linda, California
- Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan
- Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, Georgia
- Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California
- Hoover Institution Archives, Palo Alto, California
- Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.
- George C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, Virginia
- General Douglas MacArthur Memorial Library, Norfolk, Virginia
- National Archives of the United Kingdom, Kew, England

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Chronology 

May 8, 1945 Nazi Germany surrenders.
August 6, 1945 First atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima, Japan.
August 9, 1945 Second atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki, Japan.
August 14, 1945 Victory Over Japan (VJ) Day. Last day of World War II.
August 15, 1945 Joint Anglo-American cryptologic effort to break Soviet codes and ciphers, codenamed “Bourbon,” commenced.
September 5, 1945 Soviet GRU code clerk Igor Gouzenko defects in Ottawa, Canada.

Early May 1947 U.S. Army cryptanalyst Meredith Gardner solved part of a message sent from the KGB's New York Rezidentura to Moscow on December 13, 1944, which showed that during World War II the KGB had an agent working within the U.S. Army General Staff in Washington, who had evidently provided the Soviets with highly classified military information. 

February 25, 1948 Soviet-backed bloodless coup d’etat in Czechoslovakia overthrows the democratically elected government.
June 24, 1948 Soviet troops impose a blockade on all road and rail traffic from West Germany to West Berlin. Two days later, on June 26, 1948, the U.S. and Great Britain begin the Berlin Airlift to resupply West Berlin.

June 28, 1948 Tito breaks with Stalin. The COMINFORM expels the Yugoslav Communist Party from membership in the organization.


May 12, 1949
Soviets lift the Berlin Blockade
August 29, 1949 First Soviet atomic bomb is tested at Semipalatinsk.
September 5, 1949 First CIA agents parachuted into the USSR. A CIA C-47 transport aircraft dropped a two-man team of agents into the Ukraine near the city of L’vov. Both agents were captured or killed shortly after landing.
May 30-31, 1950 CIA C-47 dropped into the western Ukraine south of the city of Stryj a four-man agent team. Only one member of the team managed to exfiltrate to West Germany in October 1950, bringing with him a packet of documents which convinced the CIA that the Ukrainian resistance movement was a viable entity.
June 25, 1950
North Korean Army invades South Korea.

October 3, 1950 First CIA agent parachute drop into Lithuania. CIA parachutes three-man agent team into Lithuania to establish contact with the Lithuanian underground.
October 25, 1950 Elements of three Chinese armies launched a concerted surprise attack on U.S. and South Korean forces near the North Korean town of Unsan. Beginning of Chinese military intervention in the Korean War.
November 1, 1950 Soviet MiG-15 jet fighters, flying from the air bases inside Manchuria, engaged American combat aircraft for the first time over North Korea. U.S. intelligence did not know at the time that the MiGs were piloted by Russian fliers. U.S. intelligence community did not learn of Soviet military intervention in the Korean War until April 1951, but kept the discovery a secret.
November 25, 1950
At 8:00 p.m., the Chinese military openly intervened in the Korean War, striking American and South Korean forces deployed along the full length of the Yalu River. U.S. military forces are decimated, and for the next month retreat southwards, in the process abandoning all of North Korea to the Chinese and North Korean forces.
April 2, 1951 Army Chief of Staff General Omar Bradley wrote a memorandum to the JCS, which stated in part: “Soviet capabilities in the Far East, particularly against Japan, have led me to conclude that there is a danger of overt conflict between the United States and the USSR in that area.”

April 19, 1951 CIA parachuted a second two-man agent team into the Kaunas area of Lithuania.
May 25, 1951 Two senior British Foreign Office officials, Donald Duart MacLean and Guy Francis De Moncy Burgess, fled Great Britain and defected to the Soviet Union.
July 1951 A Moscow-based U.S. air attaché photographed one of the first prototypes of the Soviet TU-95 Bear heavy bomber sitting on a parking stand at Ramenskoye Air Base outside Moscow.
September 21-22, 1951 A CIA agent named Ivan Aleksandrovich Filistovich was parachuted into Belorussia to establish contact with partisan groups.
August 26-27, 1952 A four-man CIA agent team designated AEQUOR II was parachute dropped at night into Belorussia
August 26-27, 1952 A three-man CIA agent team called AECOB was parachuted into Latvia.
March 5, 1953 Soviet leader Marshal Josef Stalin dies.
March 20, 1953 Nikita Khrushchev becomes the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
July 30, 1953 The first prototype of the Soviet M-4 Bison heavy bomber was surreptitiously photographed by the U.S. Air Attaché from the U.S. embassy in Moscow while sitting on a parking stand at the Russian Air Force’s Flight Test Institute at Ramenskoye airfield outside Moscow. 
October 1953 The CIA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to a dramatic and far-reaching reorientation of the national intelligence collection effort against the Soviet Union, which focused on technical intelligence resources in order to monitor what was going on inside the Soviet Union.

May 6-7, 1954 The CIA parachuted two agents into southern Estonia. On the same night the CIA parachuted am agent into Latvia. All of these agents were quickly caught. Last known CIA agent parachute drop inside the USSR.
September 2, 1954 Work on digging the CIA’s Berlin Tunnel began.
March 28, 1955 Construction of the Berlin Tunnel tap chamber was completed and the three target cables exposed.
May 11, 1955 Intercept operations in the Berlin Tunnel commenced around-the-clock.
Mid-1955 Radio intercepts collected by NSA detected the initiation of construction by the Soviet Ministry of Defense of what was believed to be a Russian missile test facility in the middle of the Kazakh desert somewhere in the vicinity of the towns of Novokazalinsk and Dzhusaly. This later was determined to be the Tyuratam missile test center. 
November 1955 Project Genetrix plan was approved by President Eisenhower. The project plan called for launching 2,700 high-altitude reconnaissance balloons from sites in Scotland, Norway, Germany and Turkey. The balloons would traverse the full length of the Soviet Union and land at designated points over the Pacific.
January 10, 1956 The first Genetrix reconnaissance balloon was launched from Turkey for an overflight of the USSR. Between January and February 1956, 516 Genetrix balloons equipped with cameras were launched from Western Europe and Turkey. According to declassified CIA documents, only 46 of the balloons were ever recovered, of which only 34 of the recovered payloads actually yielded useable photo intelligence. President Eisenhower halted the program in February 1956 after the Soviets publicly displayed some of the balloons that they had shot down.
April 21, 1956 A team of East German telephone maintenance workmen discovered the CIA’s Berlin Tunnel while inspecting the cable system. Two days later (April 23, 1956) the Soviets lodged a formal diplomatic protest about the tunnel operation.
June 20, 1956 CIA U-2 reconnaissance aircraft conducted the first overflight of East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

July 4, 1956 First CIA U-2 overflight of the Soviet Union. Primary target was the city of Leningrad. The following day (July 5, 1956), another CIA U-2 aircraft overflew Moscow. 

October 23, 1956 Peaceful anti-Soviet demonstrations in downtown Budapest, Hungary escalated into a full-blown armed insurrection against the Soviet-backed Hungarian government. The hardline Communist Hungarian government called for Soviet military assistance in putting down the riots, which by the end of the day had spread from Budapest to a number of other major Hungarian cities.
November 4, 1956 Soviet troops attacked Budapest and other Hungarian cities that had risen up in revolt. By 8:00 a.m. Soviet troops had captured the Hungarian parliament building in downtown Budapest and had arrested the entire Hungarian government and parliament, including Prime Minister Nagy. 
December 18, 1956 Last USAF SENSINT overflight of the USSR. Three RB-57D aircraft conduct a reconnaissance mission over the Soviet Far East, including the port city of Vladivostok. 
August 21, 1957 The Soviets conducted their first successful ICBM test firing from Tyuratam.
October 4, 1957 Soviets launch the first satellite, Sputnik I, into orbit above the Earth.

January 1959 Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev boasts that Russian factories were turning out ICBMs “like sausages.” Khrushchev’s statement led CIA intelligence analysts to conclude that the Soviets had begun serial production of ICBMs.
September 8, 1960 SIGINT revealed that the first Soviet arms shipment to Cuba had arrived on board the Russian merchant ship Ilya Mechnikov, which brought T-34 medium tanks and anti-aircraft guns.
April 12, 1961 First Soviet manned space flight by Major Yuri Gagarin in Vostok I.
August 12-18, 1961 Berlin Wall was erected by East Germany, effectively closing the border between East and West Berlin.
May 21, 1962 The Soviet Politburo decided to deploy Soviet troops to Cuba. The decision was unanimously approved by an expanded meeting of the Politburo Defense Council on May 24, 1962.

July 15, 1962 The first fully-laden Soviet cargo ships began sailing from Soviet Union for Cuba carrying troops and equipment.
October 14, 1962 U-2 reconnaissance plane discovered the first Soviet ballistic missiles in Cuba.
October 22, 1962 President John F. Kennedy revealed to the American people in a nationally televised broadcast that the Soviet Union had placed offensive missiles in Cuba that were capable of striking targets throughout most of the United States. President Kennedy also declared an immediate quarantine of Cuba, and ordered the U.S. Navy to stop and search any ships suspected of carrying weapons to Cuba.
October 28, 1962 Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev agreed to remove all Russian ballistic missiles from Cuba.
April 23, 1965 The Soviets launched their first communications satellite, designated Molniya 1.
Mid-June 1967 SIGINT determined that over the span of 27 days in June-July 1967, Soviet military transport aircraft flew 350 sorties bring military equipment, ammunition and supplies to Egypt and Syria to replace items lost in the Six Day War.
July 17, 1968 SIGINT detected the first signs that the Soviet military had began mobilizing its forces in the western USSR for a potential invasion of Czechoslovakia, which including the large-scale deployment of frontline combat units from their peacetime garrisons in the western USSR to forward positions from which they could invade Czechoslovakia.
August 3-4, 1968 U.S. intelligence detected the movement of large numbers of Soviet, East German and Polish troops to the Czech border, and further large-scale troop movements were detected within the Soviet Baltic and Belorussian Military Districts towards the Polish and Czech borders.
August 19, 1968 NSA issued a warning message stating that all indications appearing in SIGINT pointed to the strong possibility of a Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.
August 20-21, 1968 Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops invaded Czechoslovakia.

March 2, 1969 Chinese troops opened fire on a Soviet KGB border guard patrol on Damansky Island in the Far East, which the Chinese called Chen-pao. Seven KGB border guards were killed in the incident and another 23 were wounded.
October 1971 Divers from the submarines USS Halibut (SSN-587) placed a tap on a Russian communications cable that ran under the surface of the Sea of Okhotsk which linked the naval base at Petropavlovsk on Kamchatka with the naval base at Magadan on the Soviet mainland. The operation was designated Ivy Bells. 
March 1972 Soviets began flight testing four new ICBMs, each carrying MIRV'd warheads. These missiles were arbitrarily designated the SS-16 Sinner, SS-17 Spanker, SS-18 Satan, and SS-19 Stiletto. 
May 22, 1972 Nixon-Brezhnev summit meeting in Moscow begins. Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty signed by President Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev on May 26, 1972.
July 1972 Egyptian president Anwar Sadat throws all Soviet military personnel and advisors out of Egypt.

October 29, 1975 Soviet airlift of military equipment and supplies to Angola commenced. The airlift, which was performed by dozens of Russian military transport aircraft, was not completed until January 1976. NSA provided extensive SIGINT coverage of the Soviet airlift.
April 20, 1978 A Korean Air Lines Boeing 707 passenger plane (KAL Flight 902), with 110 passengers and crew on board, got lost on a flight from Paris to Alaska and accidently flew for two hours over the Kola Peninsula near the huge Soviet naval base of Murmansk until finally being forced down by PVO fighter interceptors. 
August 1979 The submarine USS Parche  (SSN-683) installed a large tap on an Russian underwater communications cable just off the coast of the Kola Peninsula that linked the Soviet Northern Fleet headquarters at Murmansk with other naval bases along the Kola Peninsula.
August 10, 1979 CIA National Intelligence Officer for Warning writes a memo recommending that an Alert Memorandum be issued concerning the increasing likelihood of Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan.
September 14, 1979 Afghan President Nur Muhammed Taraki was deposed in a bloody coup d’etat. Taraki was killed by Soviet commandoes, and his pro-Soviet deputy Hafizullah Amin took his place as president.
December 19, 1979 The CIA alerted the White House that the Russians had landed three airborne battalions at Bagram Air Base outside Kabul, suggesting that the Soviets intended to intervene militarily in Afghanistan. 
December 22, 1979 Three days before the first Soviet troops crossed the Soviet-Afghan border, NSA reported to the White House that recently received intelligence information indicated that the Russians intended to invade Afghanistan within the next 72 hours.
December 25, 1979 Soviets invade Afghanistan.
September 20, 1980 The increasingly threatening Soviet military moves taking place in the western USSR opposite Poland prompted the CIA to issue an Alert Memorandum, warning that the increasing tempo of Soviet military exercise activity in the USSR’s three westernmost military districts “manifest the Soviet leaders’ growing concern over developments in Poland.”
December 1980 NSA radio intercepts and satellite imagery determined that three  Soviet combat divisions in the Baltic, Belorussian and Carpathian Military Districts had been placed on alert along the Soviet border of Poland, along with the élite 76th Guards Airborne Division at Pskov in the Baltic Military District. 

April 3, 1981 Using SIGINT and satellite imagery, U.S. intelligence analysts spotted the Russians making further military preparation along the border with Poland involving increased activity by between 12 and 20 divisions in the western USSR, leading the CIA to issue an Alert Memorandum, which stated that: “We believe that the Soviet leaders have been convinced by the evident impotence of the Polish party and government that military intervention is necessary. They have set preparations in motion and would have the capability to move in considerable force within 48 hours.”
September 1, 1983 Soviet fighter shoots down Korean Airlines Boeing 747 jetliner (Flight 007) off Sakhalin Island. All 269 passengers and crew on KAL 007 were killed, 61 of whom were Americans.
November 2, 1983 U.S. Able Archer nuclear-release exercise begins in West Germany. Between November 2-11, 1983, SIGINT detected Soviet ground forces in East Germany and the Baltic Military District moving to a heightened readiness status; Soviet air units in East Germany and Poland were placed on alert and routine training flights suddenly stopped; Soviet fighter interceptors and nuclear-capable fighter bombers were placed on runway alert on airfields in East Germany and western Poland; and the Soviets suddenly ceased broadcasting weather reports throughout the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
December 8, 1987 President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev sign the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) in Washington, which ordered the dismantling all U.S. and Soviet medium and short-range nuclear ballistic missiles in Europe. 

April 1988
Mikhail Gorbachev signs an agreement committing the USSR to withdraw all Soviet troops from Afghanistan by February 1989.
January 1989 Last Soviet troops withdraw from Afghanistan.
December 1989 Communist governments fall in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Rumania.
October 3, 1990 East and West Germany reunited.
August 19, 1991 Revolt in Moscow against Mikhail Gorbachev put down.
October 25, 1991 CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev resigned all of his government positions.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ORGANIZATIONAL GLOSSARY

PERSONALITIES GLOSSARY
Secretaries of defense
Central Intelligence Agency
Defense Intelligence Agency
National Reconnaissance Office
National Security Agency
Federal Bureau of Investigations

ACRONYMS


ORGANIZATIONAL GLOSSARY


Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) - AFSA was the U.S. government's first centralized SIGINT organization from 1949 to 1952. After a turbulent three year lifetime that was marred by systemic organizational problems and a number of costly operational failures, AFSA was disestablished in November 1952 and redesignated as the National Security Agency (NSA).

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) - Successor to America's wartime clandestine intelligence gathering organization, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the CIA is today the U.S. intelligence community's principal human intelligence (HUMINT) gathering organization. Created by the National Security Act of 1947, the CIA then had three primary functions: serving as the U.S. intelligence community's lead producer of finished intelligence analysis; conducting clandestine HUMINT collection; and managing all covert action operations on behalf of the U.S. government. Between 1947 and April 2005, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was also responsible for managing and coordinating the efforts of the entire U.S. intelligence community until that responsibility was transferred to the newly created position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI). For most of its history, the CIA has operated its own SIGINT collection organizations which operated largely autonomously from NSA's jurisdiction.

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) - Created in October 1961, the DIA is the intelligence arm of the Defense Department, producing tailored foreign military intelligence reporting for the Secretary of Defense's office, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and military commanders in the U.S. and overseas. It is an important consumer of NSA's SIGINT product.

Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) -  Created in 1935 under the direction of its first director, J. Edgar Hoover, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) can trace its history back to 1908, when Attorney General Charles Bonaparte created a small force of Special Agents to investigate violations of federal law on behalf of the U.S. Department of Justice. Since 1935, the FBI grew dramatically both in size and in power. Today, the FBI?s 31,000 personnel investigate potential terrorist threats at home and abroad; closely monitor the activities of foreign intelligence agencies and their operatives inside the U.S.; investigate violations of federal criminal and civil statutes; and coordinate their intelligence and investigative activities with other federal, state, and local intelligence and law enforcement agencies and departments.

Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) - GCHQ is the British SIGINT and information security agency based at Cheltenham, England. GCHQ is the successor to the Government Communications & Cipher School (GCCS), the famed British codebreaking organization which solved the German Enigma cipher systems during World War II. After the end of the war, GCCS was disbanded and replaced by a new peacetime cryptologic organization called the London Signals Intelligence Centre (LSIC), which existed from September 1945 until it was formally renamed as GCHQ in June 1946. GCHQ?s operations have historically been closely coordinated with those of NSA and its predecessor organizations, first by virtue of the March 1946 British-USA COMINT Agreement (the BRUSA Agreement), followed in 1954 by the signing of the UKUSA Agreement, which expanded BRUSA to include the SIGINT activities of Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) - Formed on September 6, 1961, the NRO is a joint DOD-CIA intelligence organization that designs, builds and operates all reconnaissance satellites on behalf of the U.S. intelligence community, including SIGINT satellites on behalf of NSA. The NRO?s headquarters is located in Chantilly, Virginia. NRO is a pure collection agency, with the intelligence product from the satellites that it operates being processed, analyzed and reported by other agencies. For example, NSA is responsible for processing and analyzing all COMINT, ELINT and telemetry intelligence produced by NRO satellite systems in conjunction with other members of the U.S. intelligence community.

National Security Agency (NSA) - Created on November 4, 1952 from the assets of the former Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA), NSA?s is the U.S. government's principal cryptologic organization, responsible for both SIGINT collection and analysis, as well as protecting the communications and computer systems of the U.S. government and military. Its headquarters is located at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. In addition to its headquarters staff, NSA also controls the activities of the three military SIGINT organizations, referred to as Service Cryptologic Elements (SCE), who historically have performed the majority of NSA's SIGINT collection activities: the U.S. Army Security Agency (USASA); the Naval Security Group (NAVSECGRU), and the U.S. Air Force Security Service (USAFSS). Since the mid-1990s, the U.S. Coast Guard has developed a small independent SIGINT organization of its own within its intelligence staff in Washington, D.C., which also reports to NSA for direction and support.


PERSONALITIES GLOSSARY


Secretaries of defense

James V. Forrestal September 17, 1947 - March 28, 1949
Louis A. Johnson   
March 28, 1949 - September 19, 1950
George C. Marshall  
September 21, 1950 - September 19, 1950
Robert A. Lovett
September 17, 1951 - January 20, 1953
Charles E. Wilson  
January 28, 1953 - October 8, 1957
Neil H. McElroy
October 9, 1957 - December 1, 1959
Thomas S. Gates, Jr. 
December 2, 1959 - January 20, 1961
Robert S. McNamara
January 21, 1961 - February 29, 1968
Clark M. Clifford
March 1, 1968 - January 20, 1969
Melvin R. Laird 
January 22, 1969 - January 29, 1973
Elliot L. Richardson January 30, 1973 - May 24, 1974
James R. Schlesinger July 2, 1973 - November 19, 1975
Donald H. Rumsfeld
November 20, 1975 - January 20, 1977
Harold Brown  
January 21, 1977 - January 20, 1981
Caspar Weinberger January 21, 1981 - November 23, 1987
Frank C. Carlucci                   November 23, 1987 - January 20, 1989
Richard B. Cheney
March 21, 1989 - January 20, 1993


Central Intelligence Agency                     

Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, USN January 23, 1946 - June 7, 1946
Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, USAF June 10, 1946 - May 1, 1947
Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, USN
May 1, 1947 - October 7, 1950
Lt. General Walter Bedell Smith, USA (ret.)
October 7, 1950 - February 9, 1953
Allen W. Dulles 
February 26, 1953 - November 29, 1961
John A. McCone 
November 29, 1961 - April 28, 1965
Vice Admiral William F. Raborn, Jr., USN 
April 28, 1965 - June 30, 1966
Richard Helms  
June 30, 1966 - February 2, 1973
James R. Schlesinger February 2, 1973 - July 2, 1973
William E. Colby September 4, 1973 - January 30, 1976
George H.W. Bush January 30, 1976 - January 20, 1977
Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN March 9, 1977 - January 20, 1981
William J. Casey January 28, 1981 - January 29, 1987
William H. Webster May 26, 1987 - September 1991
Robert M. Gates  
November 6, 1991 - January 20, 1993


Defense Intelligence Agency

Lt. General Joseph F. Carroll, USAF October 1961 - September 1969
Lt. General Donald V. Bennett, USA September 1969 - August 1972
Vice Admiral Vincent P. de Poix, USN
August 1972 - September 1974
Lt. General Daniel O. Graham, USA September 1974 - December 1975
Lt. General Samuel V. Wilson, USA 
May 1976 - August 1977
Lt. General Eugene F. Tighe, Jr., USAF September 1977 - August 1981
Lt. General James A. Williams, USA September 1981 - September 1985
Lt. General Leonard H. Perroots, USAF October 1985 - December 1988
Lt. General Harry E. Soyster, USA
December 1988 - September 1991
Lt. General James R. Clapper, Jr., USAF November 1991 - August 1995



National Reconnaissance Office

Dr. Joseph V. Charyk September 1961 - March 1963
Dr. Brockway McMillan March 1963 - October 1965
Dr. Alexander H. Flax 
October 1965 - March 1969
Dr. John L. McLucas March 1969 - December 1973
James W. Plummer December 1973 - June 1976
Dr. Charles W. Cook (Acting) June 1976 - August 1976
Thomas C. Reed August 1976 - April 1977
Dr. Charles W. Cook (Acting) April 1977 - August 1977
Dr. Hans Mark August 1977 - October 1979
Dr. Robert J. Hermann October 1979 - August 1981
Edward C. 'Pete' Aldridge, Jr. August 1981 - December 1988
Jimmie D. Hill (Acting) December 1988 - September 1989
Martin C. Faga September 1989 - March 1993


National Security Agency 

Rear Admiral Earl. E. Stone, USN
July 15, 1949 - July 15, 1951
Major General Ralph J. Canine, USA July 15, 1951 - November 4, 1952
Lt. General Ralph J. Canine, USA November 4, 1952 - November 23, 1956
Lt. General John A. Samford, USAF November 24, 1956 - November 23, 1960
Vice Admiral Laurence H. Frost, USN November 24, 1960 - June 30, 1962
Lt. General Gordon A. Blake, USAF July 1, 1962 - May 31, 1965
Lt. General Marshall S. Carter, USA June 1, 1965 - July 31, 1969
Vice Admiral Noel Gayler, USN August 1, 1969 - July 31, 1972
Lt. General Samuel C. Phillips, USAF August 1, 1972 - August 24, 1973
Lt. General Lew Allen, Kr., USAF August 25, 1973 - July 4, 1977
Vice Admiral Bobby R. Inman, USN July 5, 1977 - March 31, 1981
Lt. General Lincoln D. Faurer, USAF April 1, 1981 - April 1, 1985
Lt. General William E. Odom, USA May 8, 1985 - August 1, 1988
Vice Admiral William O. Studeman August 1988 - 1992



Federal Bureau of Investigations

J. Edgar Hoover March 22, 1935 - May 2, 1972
L. Patrick Gray (acting) May 2, 1972 - April 27, 1973
William D. Ruckelshaus (acting)
April 30, 1973 - July 9, 1973
Clarence M. Kelley July 9, 1973 - February 15, 1978
William H. Webster February 23, 1978 - May 25, 1987
John E. Otto (acting) May 26, 1987 - November 2, 1987
William S. Sessions November 2, 1987 - July 19, 1993


ACRONYMS

AAA Anti-Aircraft Artillery
ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile
ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
AEDS Atomic Energy Detection System
AFB Air Force Base

AFSA Armed Forces Security Agency
AFTAC Air Force Technical Application Center (nuclear test detection)
ASA Army Security Agency
ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare
C3 Command, control and communications

CCF Chinese Communist Forces
CHICOM Chinese Communist
CIA Central Intelligence Agency (1947-present)
CIC Counter-Intelligence Corps (1942-1960)
CIG Central Intelligence Group (1946-1947)

CINCEUR Commander-in-Chief, Europe
CINCFE Commander-in-Chief, Far East
CINCLANT Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic
CINCPAC Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
CINCPACFLT Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet

CNO Chief of Naval Operations
COMINT Communications Intelligence
COMOR Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (CIA)
COMSEC Communications Security
CONUS Continental United States

COS Chief of Station (CIA)
CP College Park, Maryland (National Archives)
DA Department of the Army
DCI Director of Central Intelligence
DCID Director of Central Intelligence Directive

DDI Deputy Director for Intelligence (CIA)
DDO Deputy Director Operations (CIA 1973-present)
DDS&T Deputy Director for Science and Technology (CIA 1963-)
DEFSMAC Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DIRNSA Director, National Security Agency
DOD Department of Defense
ELINT Electronics Intelligence
EUCOM U.S. European Command
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FEAF Far East Air Forces (U.S. Air Force)
FECOM Far East Command (U.S. military)
FOIA Freedom of Information Act
G-2 U.S. Army intelligence staff
GCHQ Government Communications Headquarters (U.K.)

GDR German Democratic Republic (East Germany)
GRU Glavnoye Razvedatelnoye Upravleniye - Soviet General Staff Intelligence Directorate
GSFG Group of Soviet Forces, Germany
HUMINT Human Intelligence
HVCCO Handle Via COMINT Channels Only

ICBM Intercontinental ballistic missile
IMINT Imagery Intelligence
INR Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
IRBM Intermediate-range ballistic missile
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

KGB Committee for State Security (Soviet)
LRA Long Range Aviation (Soviet)
LRAF Long Range Air Forces (Soviet)
MAAG Military Assistance Advisory Group
MIRV Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle

MND Ministry of National Defense
MRBM Medium-range ballistic missile
MVD Ministry of the Interior (Soviet)
NA National Archives (U.S.)
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NIE National Intelligence Estimate
NOFORN Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NPIC National Photographic Interpretation Center (CIA)
NRO National Reconnaissance Office
NSA National Security Agency

NSC National Security Council
NSCID National Security Council Intelligence Directive
ONI Office of Naval Intelligence
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSS Office of Strategic Services

PFIAB President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
PHOTINT Photo Intelligence
PLA People’s Liberation Army
PRC People’s Republic of China
PVO Strany Strategic Air Defense of the Homeland (Soviet)

RAF Royal Air Force
RG Record Group
RV Reentry Vehicle
SAC Strategic Air Command
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

SAM Surface-to-air missile
SECDEF Secretary of Defense
SENSINT Sensitive intelligence (USAF overflights 1949-1956))
SIGINT Signals Intelligence
SIS Secret Intelligence Service, or MI6 (UK)

SLBM Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
SNIE Special National Intelligence Estimate
SRF Strategic Rocket Forces (Soviet)
SSM Surface-to-Surface Missile
SSU Strategic Services Unit (1945-1946)

TSCW Top Secret Codeword
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
USAF U.S. Air Force
USAFE U.S. Air Forces, Europe (USAF)
USIB U.S. Intelligence Board
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Cite this page

Cold War Intelligence, advisor: M.M. Aid, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013 <http://primarysources.brillonline.com/browse/cold-war-intelligence>