U.S. Intelligence on Asia, 1945-1991

U.S. Intelligence on Asia, 1945-1991
The purpose of this unique online collection is to provide students and researchers with the declassified documentary record about the successes and failures of the U.S. intelligence community in the Far East during the Cold War (1945-1991). Particular emphasis is given to America’s principal antagonists in Asia during the Cold War era: the People’s Republic of China, North Korea and North Vietnam. However, countries such as Japan, Taiwan, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Australia are covered as well.
Purchase Access

Page 1 of 9 (showing 0 - 500 of 4284 entries).
Go to | Next page


TRYING TO PENETRATE THE BAMBOO CURTAIN

By Matthew M. Aid

TABLE OF CONTENTS


THE US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE COLD WAR IN ASIA: 1945-1991

The purpose of this latest document collection is to give the reader the declassified documentary record, such as it exists today, about the successes and failures of the U.S. intelligence community in the Far East during the Cold War (1945-1991). Particular emphasis is paid to America's principal protagonists in Asia during the Cold War era - the People's Republic of China, North Korea and North Vietnam, although Japan, Taiwan, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Australia are covered as well.

Scholars and researchers using this collection should bear in mind that while the U.S. government and the American intelligence community have declassified hundreds of thousands of pages of formerly classified documents concerning its Cold War espionage efforts, most of the materials pertain to the secret intelligence war waged against the former Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies. With the exception of the Vietnam War, far less attention has been given by the US government's declassification staffs to the activities of the US intelligence community in the Far East, in part because these efforts were less glamorous, but also far less successful that those that were focused on the USSR.

It is a sad fact of life that while not admitted publicly, the “embarrassment factor” plays an important part in what materials the US government decides to declassify. All one has to do is look at the CIA's furious efforts to suppress the Senate Intelligence Committee's report on the torturing of Al Qaeda captives after the 9/11 terrorist attacks for proof of this assertion. My personal experience is slightly more mundane. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks the CIA and the US Army have fought me tooth-and-nail to try to prevent the declassification of documents related to human intelligence (HUMINT) and covert action efforts directed against mainland China and North Korea during the early stages of the Cold War, and these two agencies continue to use their powers to prevent the National Declassification Center (NDC), which is part of the US National Archives, from declassifying materials on these, and a host of other intelligence-related subjects which do not reflect well on the CIA's work in the past.

But on the other hand, the National Security Agency (NSA), America's giant electronic eavesdropping agency, and the State Department have generally been far more amenable to declassifying historical materials, which explains why the majority of the 260+ documents obtained through the use of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) that are contained in this collection, come from these two agencies. In other words, it is getting harder and harder to conduct scholarly research on intelligence topics because of the obstruction of certain elements of the US intelligence community. And I fear that this process will become even more difficult during the tenure of the Trump administration, whose commitment, or lack of it, to transparency and declassification is not encouraging.

KEY POINTS

Using the failures of the US intelligence community in the events leading up to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and the Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) intelligence failure in 2002-2003 as a reference point, a close review of the documents contained in this collection revealed a number of systemic problems which have plagued the US intelligence community since time immemorial.

Over and over again in the documents contained in this collection we run into the serious problem that the U.S. intelligence community has never been involved in a war in Asia (or anywhere else for that matter) that it was actually prepared for. When North Korea invaded South Korea in June1950, the US intelligence community had virtually no intelligence assets in Korea, no databases of information about the North Korean government or military, and no Korean linguists. There were not even any Korean-English dictionaries to help translate captured documents or interrogate prisoners.[1] Sadly, the lessons from the Korean War were not learned, resulting in many of the same mistakes being committed during the early stages of America's involvement in the Vietnam War in the early 1960s. For example, even as the administration of President John F. Kennedy was in the process of rashly committing American forces to the wars in Vietnam and Laos in 1961, US intelligence officials were warning that they knew very little about the enemies that they were about to face, and that the US intelligence community had few resources available in the region that were needed to rectify this problem. Nonetheless, the Kennedy administration pushed forward with its plans (which looked great on paper) to counter the Communist threat in Southeast Asia.[2]

Readers will note the heavy emphasis by the US intelligence community on intelligence reporting of a military nature on China, North Korea and North Vietnam from the time the Korean War ended in July 1953 right up until the Nixon administration took office in January 1969. To a certain degree this is understandable given the near-constant state of war or military crisis that existed in the Far East during this timeframe. But the principal reasons for so little focus on political and economic intelligence reporting on America's three principal communist protagonist in the Far East is that there was much of this sort of analysis taking place (China was rated far below the USSR as a focus area by the CIA's intelligence analysts), and what political analysis that was being produced during this timeframe was honestly not very good. It was only after President Nixon and Henry Kissinger took their steps to restore relations with Beijing in 1970 that the CIA finally began putting resources into this area and producing a higher quality analytic product for the White House.

Some of the conclusions reached in these classified CIA studies were so far off the mark that they bordered on the humorous, although they were not meant to be so at the time they were written.

  • In April 1962 the CIA's top Chinese political analysts produced a lengthy study confidently predicting that Mao's health was rapidly failing and that he was not long for this world. In fact, the CIA analysts botched this report rather badly. Mao lived another 15 years, dying in his bed in Beijing on September 9, 1976, and in the process, probably outliving some of the CIA analysts who had predicted his demise back in 1962.[3]
  • A lengthy June 1968 CIA report detailing the political machinations of Mao Tse-tung's wife, Chiang Ching (a/k/a Madame Mao), was classified as Top Secret despite the fact that there was only one single use of intelligence derived from SIGINT in the entire 68-page report, which otherwise should have been classified no higher than Confidential. This was a rather cynical use of classified information by the report's authors, who knew that the more highly classified the report was, the more high-level officials in Washington who would read it.[4]
  • Another CIA analytic report, dated January 21, 1970, confidently predicted that Chinese defense minister Lin Piao, who the report characterized as a “devoted Maoist” and one of Mao Tse-tung's closest confidants and friends, would become the next leader of China after Mao's death.[5] But eighteen months later, on the night of September 12-13, 1971,  Lin Piao mounted a coup d'etat against Mao Tse-tung. When the coup failed, Lin Piao and his family fled Peking to Peitaiho airfield outside the capital, where they boarded a British-made Trident VIP aircraft and hastily took off for the city of Irkutsk in the Soviet Union. Three hours later, at 0300 on the morning of September 13, 1971, NSA SIGINT intercepts confirmed that Chinese air defense forces had shot the plane down near the village of Khentai in Chinese Outer Mongolia, killing Lin and his family, along with six other aides, before they could reach Russia.[6]

CIA historians are fond of pointing to the small number of important spies who volunteered to provide the Agency with intelligence from behind the Iron Curtain during the Cold War, the two most important of whom were Oleg Penkovskiy in the Soviet Union and Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski in Poland. By contrast, all available evidence indicates that not one Chinese, North Korean, or North Vietnamese government official or senior military officer ever volunteered to spy for the CIA or any other US intelligence agency during the Cold War. Sadly, the CIA still refuses to declassify any materials concerning this massive Cold War intelligence failure, and has redacted all mention of these failures from its official histories of the period. As mentioned above, the “embarrassment factor” remains an important determinant in what the US intelligence community chooses to declassify about its past.

Thousands of Russians, ranging from mid-level diplomats and KGB spies down to low-ranking soldiers and ballet dancers defected from the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The number of defectors from the Eastern European countries was even higher. By contrast, the documents in this collection confirm that very few people of any significance ever managed to defect from China, North Korea or North Vietnam during the Cold War years.[7] During the 1950s, the CIA spent millions of dollars on a wide array of defection inducement programs aimed getting  Chinese and North Korean officials and soldiers to defect, none of which worked. A handful of Chinese and North Korean pilots flew their antique fighters over in order to collect the reward money, but the information they brought with them was not very impressive.[8] And to make matters worse, many of the Chinese, North Korean or North Vietnamese defectors who did come over were later deemed to be false defectors, Communist double agents, or more usually, intelligence fabricators trying to make a quick buck at the expense of the American taxpayers.[9]

Over and over again, one finds evidence in the declassified documents that the intelligence components of the U.S. military have been since the end of World War II, and remain to this day, poorly organized and resistant to efforts to coordinate their efforts with other agencies. This was true in both the Korean and Vietnam Wars, where US Army, Navy and US Air Force intelligence components openly competed with one another and with the CIA for sources and the privilege of being able to claim an “exclusive” intelligence discovery.[10] Since the early 1960s, much of the criticism of US military intelligence has been directed at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), which, rightly or wrongly, has for decades been referred to within the US intelligence community as the “poor man” of the community, particularly on matters involving the Far East. There are a number of documents in this collection with support this contention.[11]

US dependence on foreign intelligence services in the Far East during the Cold War was, at times, extremely high, as was the case with the Chinese Nationalist intelligence and security services on the island of Taiwan, who throughout the 1950s provided upwards of 80% of the intelligence information on mainland China that was reaching Washington.[12] This heavy dependence on information received from foreign intelligence services oftentimes created an unhealthy situation whereby US intelligence analysts came to adopt the assessments of the foreign services, as was the case in French Indochina between 1950 and 1954, where American dependence on the French intelligence services was almost 100%. This led the CIA to issue a number of faulty intelligence estimates and estimates which adopted the French viewpoint on the military situation in Indochina that were at variance with the facts-on-the-ground.[13]

The US intelligence community's dependence on the South Vietnamese intelligence community (if it can be called such) during the early stages of the Vietnam War prior to the entry of the U.S. military into the ground war in 1965, particularly in the area of human intelligence (HUMINT), was extraordinarily high. Unfortunately, the half-dozen South Vietnamese intelligence and security agencies were so badly disorganized and mismanaged, in large part because they were run by incompetent officials chosen for their loyalty to Prime Minister Diem instead of their professionalism, that the declassified documents reveal that Washington had little, if any, confidence in the information they were producing.[14] Problems with the reliability of the South Vietnamese intelligence and security services, as well as unerring inability of South Vietnamese officials to effectively use the intelligence they were given, remained a systemic problem right until the day Saigon fell to the communists in 1975. It did not matter how many millions of dollars the CIA and the U.S. military poured into trying to improve the South Vietnamese intelligence community, which is a situation comparable to the frustration felt by the CIA and the US military over their inability to build a professional and effective Afghan intelligence service since the 9/11 terrorist attacks.[15]

The declassified documents in this collection reveal that, in many instances, the intelligence services of America's communist protagonists were just as good, if not better in many cases, than their American counter parts. This collection contains a number of declassified reports concerning the capabilities of enemy intelligence services in Asia, particularly the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong intelligence organizations, whose skill at agent penetration operations inside the South Vietnamese government far surpassed anything the CIA ever accomplished during the Vietnam War.[16] For instance, declassified documents indicate that the North Koreans ran a large and very sophisticated agent network in Japan during the Korean War, which US and Japanese counterintelligence agents did not root out until near the end of the war.[17] A number of declassified documents in this collection indicate that the Soviet and Chinese intelligence services almost certainly had a number of high-level agents reporting from inside Chiang Kai-shek's government on Taiwan, who were providing Beijing with timely information about Taipei's planning for an invasion of China in the early 1960s.[18]

The most talented and toughest of the enemy intelligence services that the CIA had to contend with probably belonged to North Vietnam, who were so effective that they made North Vietnam the hardest “denied area target” that the CIA had to deal with in the 1960s and 1970s. And the North Vietnamese spies were very good at their jobs. In February 1966 the CIA had to inform President Lyndon Johnson that SIGINT showed that the North Vietnamese air defense system was being informed within minutes about the takeoff of American bombers and fighter aircraft from air bases in Thailand and South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese agents were reporting in near-realtime the numbers and types of planes taking off and what direction they were headed. Within minutes of this information being radioed to Hanoi, the entire North Vietnamese air defense system was placed on alert. Latter in the war, Viet Cong captives admitted they knew in some cases a day in advance about the location of B-52 ARC LIGHT air strikes in South Vietnam.[19] A 1968 report based on the interrogation of a captured enemy officer revealed that Viet Cong forces usually got several days of advance warning of planned American and South Vietnamese attacks from their intelligence people, almost certainly from sources inside the South Vietnamese government or military.[20] Even NSA admits that the combined North Vietnamese-Viet Cong SIGINT organizations were very efficient and capable, taking full advantage of the propensity of chatty American commanders to disclose secret information over unenciphered radio channels, allowing the enemy to gather high-grade intelligence on current and/or forthcoming operations.[21]

The declassified documents reveal that as time went by, more and more US intelligence community analytic reporting was marked “NOFORN,” meaning that it could not be seen, much less shared with America's foreign allies and intelligence partners, including but not limited to Great Britain. By the 1970s, even most of the more mundane intelligence products being produced by the CIA and other US intelligence agencies were being routinely stamped NOFORN. The import of this fact is that hundreds of the documents contained in this collection were never meant to be read by anyone outside of the US government or military in perpetuity. The CIA continues to try to hide this fact, routinely deleting the “NOFORN” handling restrictions found on the cover of each of its declassified reports in an effort to try to hide the fact that in the past, very little of the finish intelligence product it produces is shared with its allies.

A big gap in our knowledge is that we still know relatively little about the intelligence reporting coming out of the U.S. military intelligence components, particularly the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), since the early 1960s. The reason for this is simple - getting DIA to declassify information requires something akin to an “Act of God.” DIA is infamous for having one of the worst record keeping systems in the US intelligence community, which makes it nigh on impossible for the DIA's vastly undermanned and underfunded FOIA staff to find and process documents in a timely manner that are responsive to declassification requests from outside researchers.

INTELLIGENCE SUCCESS STORIES

Intelligence performance during the three Taiwan Strait crises in 1954-1955, 1958 and 1962 was generally good, despite the fact that the US intelligence community had no high-level agent sources inside the Chinese government and military, nor was there any high level SIGINT penetration of high-level Chinese government or military communications. The NSC Briefings contained in this collection show that whatever intelligence was available to the CIA's analysts, most of which came from low-level SIGINT intercepts and photo reconnaissance overflights, was diligently sifted and reported in a sober, facts-only style that you don't find anymore in US intelligence reporting.[22] There was, however, occasionally a tendency on the part of the CIA's consumers, to misread the data they were getting and panic. For example, in February 1955 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles told the NSC that the Chinese military buildup opposite Taiwan had reached the point that the island was indefensible, asking President Eisenhower for permission to let the Chinese Nationalist military to strike military targets on the Chinese mainland. The Pentagon wanted President to authorize the use of nuclear weapons to defend Taiwan if the Chinese attacked.[23]

War between Indonesia and the Netherlands in July-August 1962 1962 over the disputed Dutch colony of Netherlands New Guinea (or West New Guinea) was averted at the last moment only by the outstanding performance of the US intelligence community, which provided the US government with high-grade intelligence information that allowed the US mediator to head off war. The now forgotten 1962 Netherlands New Guinea crisis was highlighted by the fact that the CIA had agents high up inside the Indonesian government, and the highest-level codes and ciphers of the Indonesian military had been broken by NSA, allowing the US government unparalleled access to the plans and intentions of the Indonesian government. The information produced was so good that the US government knew weeks in advance what day in early August 1962 the Indonesian government had set for the invasion of Netherlands New Guinea and what forces the Indonesian military had assembled for the attack.[24] What is not known is how much of the information contained in the CIA intelligence reporting going to President Kennedy came from the Dutch foreign intelligence, which was running at the time a stable of high-levels inside the Indonesian government, including the Indonesian foreign minister, Ruslan Abdulgani[25]

The CIA and US military intelligence spent a great deal of time and resources spying on the leaders of friendly governments in the Far East. For instance, spying on the mercurial South Korean president Syngman Rhee was a fulltime preoccupation of the US intelligence community even before Rhee became the leader of South Korea in 1948. The US Army began intercepting all of his incoming and outgoing international cables in late 1946 while he was still a right-wing political leader in Seoul.[26] The antagonism between Rhee and the US military governor in South Korea, General Hodge, became so bad that the US Army almost ordered Rhee's arrest for subversive activities in July 1947.[27] Shortly after the Korean War began, the CIA recruited a number of his top aides to report on his activities, which sometimes bordered on the bizarre. For example, in January 1952 the CIA reported for the first time that Rhee, who was unhappy about not being consulted by the US government about the ongoing ceasefire talks being held an Panmunjon, told a meeting of his closest advisors that he intended to release all Chinese prisoners of war to the Chinese Nationalist government on Taiwan. If Rhee had followed through on his threat, this singular action would have destroyed any chance of obtaining a cessation of the Korean War. In 1953 and 1954, the CIA's sources inside the South Korean government reported that Rhee was threatening to destroy the July 1953 Panmunjon armistice agreement by invading North Korea just with his own army. Fortunately, the top generals of South Korea's armed forces somehow managed to scotch this idea, but Rhee's threats badly scared the Eisenhower administration in Washington. The spying on Rhee only ceased on April 26, 1960, when Rhee was forced to resign from office after several days of bloody rioting in the port city of Masan, which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of civilians. Rhee died in exile in Hawaii on July 19, 1965.[28]

Thanks to a number of high-level agent sources inside the Chinese Nationalist government and military, and especially an important source within the Chinese Nationalist military intelligence service, the CIA's Taipei station was able to closely monitor all Chinese Nationalist maritime commando raids and agent airdrops into mainland China during the early to mid-1960s. All of these operations were so-called ‘unilateral missions', conducted by the Chinese Nationalist government without the consent of the CIA. The CIA agents confirmed the radio broadcasts from Beijing which reported that the Chinese military and security services had captured or killed almost all of these Chinese Nationalist commando or agent teams. One October 11, 1962 report confirmed that the Chinese Nationalists had lost 85% of all personnel that had tried to infiltrate onto the Chinese mainland earlier that year.[29] Despite these horrific losses, Chiang Kai-shek and his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, refused to concede defeat, sending even more commando teams to conduct pinprick raids on the Chinese coastline and airdropping agents teams into China throughout the 1960s. The results, however, were exactly the same. Virtually none of these commandos or agents ever returned from their missions.[30] The U.S. tried to stall Chiang Kai-shek's “Return to Mainland” program of commando and guerrilla attacks on China through a Joint U.S.-Chinese Nationalist planning body called the Blue Lion Committee, whose purpose was try to teach the Chinese Nationalists that no large-scale invasion of mainland China was feasible with the forces available on Taiwan. But Chiang and his top commanders did not learn this lesson, instead choosing to believe that the far-fetched invasion scenarios cook up by the committee were actually within the realm of possibility.[31]

The declassified documents in this collection confirm that by far, the best and most reliable source of intelligence about military developments taking place inside China for most of the 1950s and 1960s were hundreds of top secret aerial reconnaissance overflights of the mainland, almost all of which were conducted by Chinese Nationalist Air Force aircrews working for the CIA or the US Air Force.[32] The first USAF-sponsored psychological warfare overflights of mainland China by B-26 aircraft modified for leaflet drops were conducted from Taiwan in July 1954, and the first ELINT overflight of China by specially configured PB4Y-2 patrol planes and B-17 bombers were flown by Chinese Nationalist aircrews in August 1955.[33] From this point onwards, overflights of mainland China became a large-scale operation, albeit a very secret one. Between 1958 and late 1966, Chinese Nationalist B-17 and P2V planes flew 585 STPOLLY ELINT collection and agent airdrop missions over the Chinese mainland China for the CIA to keep the Agency abreast of the latest developments in the Chinese air defense system.[34] As detailed below, CIA U-2 reconnaissance planes flown by Chinese Nationalist pilots conducted 104 spectacularly successful overflights of mainland China between 1962 and 1968.[35] It is a testament to the skill and courage of the Chinese Nationalist flight crews and the CIA and USAF mission planners that these missions were so successful. But by the mid-1960s the Chinese air defense system had matured to the point that they were able to shoot down an increasing number of the Chinese Nationalist reconnaissance aircraft, forcing the CIA and the State Department to cancel these operations because the death toll exceeded the imagery these missions were bringing back.[36]

The U-2 overflights of China, known within the intelligence community by the codename TACKLE, which were conducted jointly by the CIA and the Chinese Nationalist Air Force, produced spectacular results concerning China's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs at a time when America's first generation of KEYHOLE spy satellites could not produce imagery with the level of detail or clarity as the CIA spy planes could..[37] One 1963 CIA memo admitted that photo intelligence from U-2 overflights of mainland China were the only reliable source of information available concerning China's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs that were then available.[38] The U-2's also produced crystal clear pictures of China's military airfields, army and naval bases and arms factories. But unfortunately, outside of these specific military subjects the U-2 overflights produced only limited amounts of hard intelligence information about what was going on inside China before the TACKLE overflight program was abruptly cancelled by Secretary of State Dean Rusk in 1968.[39]

A recently declassified CIA history of the U-2 program shows that the ROCAF U-2s alone conducted 104 Project TACKLE overflights of mainland China between 1962 and 1968.[40]

CIA-Chinese Nationalist U-2 Overflights of China: 1962-1968

Fiscal Year

Overflights

1962

18

1963

17

1964

13

1965

30

1966

10

1967

14

1968

2

TOTAL

104

SOURCE: CIA, Report, History of the Office of Special Activities: Chapter XVII, April 1, 1969, Top Secret, CIA FOIA.

After the termination of the TACKLE U-2 overflight program in July 1968, KEYHOLE satellite imagery became the principal source of intelligence information about the Chinese, and more recently North Korea's nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programs. This collection contains dozens of imagery analysis reports concerning the Chinese and North Korean nuclear and missile programs, as well imagery reports on a broad array of other subjects, usually of a military nature. Not surprisingly, satellite imagery remains to this day the principal means by which we monitor China and North Korea. Because of the severe climatic conditions that prevailed in Southeast Asia for much of the year, photo reconnaissance satellites played only a minimal role in collecting intelligence on North Vietnam during the Vietnam War.[41]

The US intelligence community did a reasonably good job of monitoring developments inside China during the Cultural Revolution, a nationwide effort launched by Mao Tse-tung in May 1966 to reinforce his own personal power over the policymaking apparatus of the Chinese regime. The Cultural Revolution, which lasted from 1966 to 1969, paralyzed the entire country, as Mao's political storm troops, the Red Guards, rampaged through the countryside persecuting anyone they believed was not loyal to Mao and his teachings. The entire Chinese government and military bureaucracy was purged of elements deemed to be disloyal to Mao. Thousands of government officials, as well as many of the country's top military commanders and scientists were publicly disgraced and removed from office, setting back the modernization of the Chinese military and the country's nuclear and missile development programs by almost a decade. But like all previous revolutions, the Red Guards went too far, leading to a rising number of bloody armed clashes between Red Guards and troops of the Chinese army, who had been sent into the biggest Chinese cities to restore some semblance of order. In the city of Wuhan, there were pitched street battles between Red Guard and Chinese army units during the summer of 1967 that resulted in thousands of casualties. The US intelligence community was able to follow the events taking place in China through a combination of sources, the most important of which were intercepts of Chinese commercial cable traffic and the interrogation of thousands of ordinary Chinese who fled the country to Hong Kong and other countries in order to escape the chaos.[42]

NSA's SIGINT collection operations during the Vietnam War, with one or two notable exceptions, were highly successful in terms of their immensely important contribution to American battlefield successes despite the fact that NSA lost its access to high-level North Vietnamese government and military communications in 1962 after Hanoi changed all their codes to unbreakable one-time pad cipher systems. On the battlefield, SIGINT was, by far, the best source of intelligence information available to US military commanders. SIGINT was instrumental in tracking North Vietnamese troop movements and activities, North Vietnamese infiltration activities along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and details concerning effectiveness of the U.S. strategic bombing campaign against North Vietnam. SIGINT even allowed US intelligence analysts to accurately predict in advance virtually every North Vietnamese offensive in Vietnam from 1965 until the last days of the Vietnam War in 1975. The problem was that intelligence consumers and analysts oftentimes did not believe the information they were getting from SIGINT, which led to some dismal intelligence failures, such as the 1968 Tet Offensive.[43]

The CIA's analytic reporting on the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of the U.S. military's strategic bombing campaign against North Vietnam from 1965 onwards was excellent in terms of the quality of its analysis and the correctness of its conclusions that the bombing was having little effect on North Vietnam's capacity to continue to prosecute its war in South Vietnam. The problem is that it directly contradicted the overly-optimistic intelligence reporting coming from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), who argued that the B-52 strikes against North Vietnam were pushing the country “back into the Stone Age” and making it increasingly difficult for Hanoi to prosecute its war in South Vietnam. The CIA's pessimistic reporting also infuriated President Lyndon Johnson, who wanted “success stories” from the CIA. In retaliation, Johnson barred CIA director John McCone from access to the Oval Office, leading ultimately to McCone's resignation in April 1965. It did not help McCone's case that he alone among President Lyndon Johnson's senior advisors opposed the introduction of US ground troops into the war in South Vietnam.[44] Well after McCone's resignation, Lyndon Johnson's top White House advisors were “cherry picking” data from intelligence reporting trying to prove that the strategic bombing campaign of North Vietnam was working, despite the CIA's adamant refusal to back down on its position that the bombing campaign was not accomplishing what the White House was publicly claiming.[45] This same pattern continued after Richard Nixon became president of the US in January 1969. The CIA continued to assess that the strategic bombing of Hanoi and the surround area, as well as the mining of Haiphong harbor in 1972, was having no effect on North Vietnam's capacity to fight the war. Henry Kissinger's National Security Council (NSC), however, like their counterparts in the Johnson administration, continued to argue that the bombing campaign was working and affecting North Vietnam's fight capabilities. These two parties continued talking past one-another until the last US forces pulled out of Vietnam in 1973.[46]

The U.S. intelligence community's collection efforts, particularly those of the National Security Agency (NSA), on North Vietnamese infiltration along the Ho Chi Minh Trail after the Tet Offensive were excellent, despite the fact that NSA's SIGINT efforts against this target were inhibited by a severe lack of resources needed to maintain continuity coverage of radio traffic along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. From 1968 onwards, the White House and the US intelligence community came to depend almost entirely on the growing volume of NSA SIGINT reporting for most of what it knew about the number of troops and amount of supplies and equipment that North Vietnam was infiltrating into South Vietnam.[47]

The CIA maintained a stable of high-level agents inside the South Vietnamese government and military, who kept the CIA's Saigon station reasonably well informed about the decision-making process inside the South Vietnamese government throughout the Vietnam War. The CIA's Saigon Station also bugged the phones in President Nguyen Van Thieu and Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky's offices and secretly installed audio eavesdropping devices inside both their offices in Saigon.[48] But there were also other sources for information about what the South Vietnamese government was up to. Throughout most of the Vietnam War, NSA could read virtually all of the high-level codes and ciphers used by the South Vietnamese government and military, giving the US intelligence community unparalleled access to the plans and intentions of America's oftentimes irascible allies in Saigon. In 1968, NSA's ability to read the highest level South Vietnamese diplomatic communications, especially those of South Vietnam's ambassador to the US, Bui Diem, played an important, albeit unheralded, role in allowing the Johnson administration to monitor the South Vietnamese government attempts to stymie the ongoing negotiations with Hanoi in Paris until the more sympathetic Nixon administration took power in January 1969.[49]

INTELLIGENCE FAILURES

In the early morning hours of June 25, 1950, over 100,000 North Korean troops invaded South Korea. The invasion came as a complete surprise to both the U..S. and South Korean governments and intelligence communities. The declassified documents reveal that the State Department and virtually every member of the U.S. intelligence community, including the CIA, to one degree or another, lied about what (if anything) they knew about North Korea's intentions to invade South Korea for fear that they would be raked over the coals by Congress, as had happened after the Pearl Harbor attack in December 1941.[50] In secret behind closed doors testimony before Congress, CIA director Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter said the CIA did report to Washington indications that a North Korean invasion of South Korea was ‘imminent.' But a review of the declassified CIA HUMINT reports from Korea shows that Hillenkoetter was less than honest with Congress. The handful of CIA reports revealed nothing substantively about North Korea's intentions to invade the South, nor was there ever any report from the CIA indicating that an invasion was 'imminent.'[51] To make matters worse, the CIA had not reported to consumers in Washington what little information they did have about North Korea's military intentions until days, and in some cases months, after the invasion had begun, probably because someone in charge at CIA headquarters went through the files and discovered that these low-grade intelligence reports had been lying around gathering dust and had not been sent to consumers in Washington.[52] The only branch of the US intelligence community that did not apparently lie about its performance were the SIGINTers of the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA), who with great embarrassment  had to admit that they had not been covering North Korea at all prior to June 25, 1950, and therefore they had no materials in their files about the subject.[53] Fortunately for the American spies, Congress chose not to hold any hearings into the matter, nor was any investigation ever conducted to determine how such a massive intelligence failure could have occurred less than ten years after the tragedy of Pearl Harbor.

Then there was the massive failure of the US intelligence community to foresee China's military intervention in the Korean War in October-November 1950. The declassified documents reveal that the White House, the Pentagon, State Department and General MacArthur's headquarters staff in Tokyo all suffered from a calamitous bout of “group think,” unanimously believing that China would not dare intervene in the Korean War in the face of America's nuclear might. Declassified documents show that this underlying belief pervaded all CIA and Pentagon intelligence estimates of the time, and all intelligence reporting that ran contrary to this basic precept was discounted or rejected outright because it did not conform to the consensus opinion of the U.S. intelligence community and General Douglas MacArthur, the commander of U.S. forces in the Far East at the time.[54] Even after Chinese troops entered the war, the U.S. intelligence community and General MacArthur moved en masse into a collective state of denial, refusing to accept the fact that the Chinese military was in Korea despite the plethora of evidence to the contrary. When CIA officers in Korea had the temerity to cable Washington with the results of the interrogations of the Chinese prisoners, General MacArthur's intelligence chief, General Charles A. Willoughby, barred CIA personnel from further access to the POW cages, telling the Eighth Army's G-2 to “Keep him [the CIA station chief in Korea] clear of interrogation.” It was the prototypical case of shooting the messenger because you did not like what he said. But as it turned out, General MacArthur's staff need not have bothered, because the CIA's intelligence analysts back in Washington did not believe what the Chinese POWs were saying anyway, with one CIA report concluding that the Chinese POWs had been “sent to North Korea to plant misleading reports in the hope of slowing the UN advance.”[55]

The US intelligence community was not alone in failing to predict that China would intervene in the Korean War. The British intelligence community, and the intelligence services of all of America's foreign partners had all concluded that China would not intervene in the fighting in Korea. The only exception was the Dutch government, which told the US ambassador in The Hague in mid-October 1950 that reporting from their embassy in Beijing indicated that China would, in fact, intervene militarily in Korea. Not surprisingly, the State Department and the US intelligence community ignored the reports coming from The Hague.[56]

The performance of the CIA's Clandestine Service during the Korean War was nothing short of abysmal, with the Agency's human intelligence and covert action operations in Korea achieving very little by the time the war ended in July 1953.[57] A number of formerly classified memos in this collection confirm that despite claims to the contrary, neither the CIA nor the U.S. military ever succeeded in operating agent networks inside North Korea during the war. Moreover, this failed effort was very costly in terms of human lives lost, with CIA post-mortem histories confirming that dozens of agents were either captured or killed by the Chinese or North Korean security services. There were even instances of agents being killed by US troops as they tried to cross the frontlines to report their intelligence to their handlers because the soldiers did not know the friend/foe recognition signals used by the agents. Efforts by the CIA's covert action arm, the OPC, to organize a guerrilla army behind enemy lines came to naught, with North Korea security forces destroying the last organized CIA-controlled guerrilla bands during the winter of 1951-1952. The US Army and the CIA never managed to organize a system to coordinate the HUMINT gathering operations, and the bureaucratic mechanisms that were created only made matters worse. As a result, many of the US Army and CIA's agent networks were penetrated by the Chinese and/or the North Korean intelligence service, resulting in catastrophic personnel losses and the submission to consumers of information that was fabricated by the enemy. So not surprisingly, the CIA's Korean Mission, on orders from Washington, secretly withheld the identities of its sensitive sources and the intelligence they produced from the US Army's intelligence organization, and vice-a-versa.[58]

Arguably the CIA's largest failure in Asia during the Cold War was the inability of the Agency's Clandestine Service to penetrate Communist China to any measurable degree between 1949 and 1991. Those efforts to infiltrate agents into mainland China overland from Hong Kong, by parachute, or by landing them by boat on the China coastline all ended in failure. Hundreds of agents, most of them Chinese Nationalist personnel recruited on Taiwan, perished or were captured by the near omnipresent Chinese security services. As far as can be told from the declassified documents currently available, the CIA nor any of its partners in the Far East, including Great Britain's MI6 and the intelligence services of Nationalist China, were ever was able to recruit any high-level Chinese agents inside China, nor was the CIA and its allies ever able to operate any lower-level agent networks inside China for any period of time before the CIA cut its losses and terminated its agent penetration operations in 1966.[59] The situation was so bad that in March 1963, CIA director John McCone told President John F. Kennedy that “Despite contrary claims, it is my opinion that intelligence sources from the mainland of China are very inadequate.... It should be further noted that as of now no major political character of the Chicom Party has defected. Similarly no highly placed officer in the Chicom armed forces has defected.”[60]

Not far behind was the inability of the US intelligence community to develop sources inside mainland China was the failure of the America's spies to penetrate North Korea and North Vietnam. Although the CIA has declassified nothing on the subject, former CIA and South Korean intelligence officials have confirmed in interviews over the past decade that their respective intelligence services repeatedly tried to infiltrate agents into North Korea by air, land and sea, but all these operations failed. The casualty rate among the CIA and ROK agents sent into North Korea was catastrophic. In 2002, South Korean government officials admitted that between 1953 and 1972, 300 South Korean agents were killed, 203 wounded, and 130 were arrested by the North Koreans, and that an additional 4,849 South Korean agents sent north during this time period were still listed as missing in action and were presumed dead. SIGINT was also producing very little about what was going on inside North Korea other than sketchy details about North Korean military exercises and North Korean air force flight activity and ship movements.[61] Only the sporadic reconnaissance overflights of North Korea between 1962 and 1971 provided the US intelligence community with any level of high-grade intelligence about what was transpiring north of the DMZ. A complete list of all known CIA and USAF overflights of North Korea are contained in Appendix I to this essay.

The exact same set of circumstances occurred during the Vietnam War. The CIA's Clandestine Service was never able to build and maintain any agent networks inside North Vietnam for any period of time because of the efficiency of North Vietnam's security services and counterintelligence organizations. George Carver, the CIA's top intelligence official on Vietnamese affairs, later admitted to an interviewer that the CIA's HUMINT collection program inside North Vietnam had been “a very perplexing problem, which we never really resolved.” This a polite way of saying the CIA just could not figure out a way to insert agents into North Vietnam.[62]

With no high-level agents or SIGINT intercepts available about what was transpiring in mainland China, North Korea or North Vietnam, and no American embassies in any of these countries to provide on-the-ground political reporting, the CIA's analytic efforts to try to understand the behavior and intentions of the Chinese, North Vietnamese and North Korean governments were reduced essentially to educated guesswork, with the analysts forced to subsist on the very thin gruel of what they were able to learn from press reports and radio broadcasts from Beijing, Hanoi and Pyongyang. Not surprisingly, when you read these reports today one cannot help but be struck by how little in the way of insights these reports provided on the inner workings of America's main protagonists in the Far East at the height of the Cold War.[63]

The CIA's intelligence collectors and analysts spent most of the Cold War searching for the “Holy Grail,” i.e. any reliable sources of intelligence about what was going on inside China, North Korea and North Vietnam.[64] The result was that the US intelligence community was essentially deaf, dumb, and blind as to what our enemy's capabilities and intentions were for much of the Cold War. For example, an April 1964 postmortem evaluation of a recent CIA intelligence estimate on North Vietnam revealed that the CIA's Clandestine Service was producing “unspectacular results” because of what were described as “Hanoi's isolation and tight security.”[65] As of the early 1970s, with the war in Vietnam winding down, the CIA still had not developed any meaningful or trustworthy sources on the Chinese leadership or Chinese foreign policy, with one State Department intelligence report stating “such clandestine reporting as we get is generally either unreliable or unilluminating.”[66] And this was the state of the CIA's analytic competency by the time the Cold War came to an end in 1990-1991, with the CIA's analysts still being reduced to trying to divine Chinese, North Korean and North Vietnamese domestic issues and foreign policy matters from open-source newspaper reports and transcripts of radio broadcasts and propaganda materials. There was some hope that the intelligence picture would improve with the increased number of Western travelers to China and the new pipeline of Chinese students attending universities in the U.S. beginning in the early 1970s, but everyone in the intelligence community doubted that these low-grade sources would produce the kind of high-level intelligence the U.S. government desperately wanted.[67]

Though the CIA continues to resolutely refuse to declassify any meaningful documentary materials about its covert action operations in Asia during the Cold War, a small number of documents have slipped through the dragnet of Langley's censors over the years. These documents confirm that these operations, which involved virtually every country, both friendly and unfriendly, in East Asia, were almost entirely unmitigated failures. And in some cases, these operations had the opposite desired effect - they angered the countries the US government said they were trying to protect, and in some cases were dragged into the public light and caused huge amounts of diplomatic humiliation.

For example, during the Korean War the US Army recruited close to 40,000 guerrillas to fight behind-the-lines against Chinese and North Korean forces. But these partisans, most of whom were recruited using press-gang tactics on the streets of major South Korean cities, accomplished very little despite their impressive numbers. Rather than use them in a guerrilla warfare mode, the unimaginative US Army officers running the program formed them into regular army units and tried to use them as conventional infantry against the far larger and better equipped Chinese and North Korean forces. After experiencing a series a of bloody defeats, the Korean partisans, perhaps feeling that discretion was the better part of valor, opted to limit their losses by remaining safe and warm on their island bases off the west coast of North Korea for the rest of the war, becoming nothing more than garrison troops for these desolate islands.[68]

Then there were the joint efforts by the CIA and the Chinese Nationalist intelligence services to build an anticommunist guerrilla army inside mainland China, all of which came to naught. The CIA did not know that Chinese military wiped out all the pro-Chiang Kai-shek guerrilla forces operating since China by the time that Beijing intervened in the Korean War in October-November 1950. Over the next decade, the Chinese security services easily destroyed all of the CIA-backed Chinese Nationalist agents teams that were covertly sent into China by air and sea to try to form new anticommunist guerrilla units. Few, if any, of the agents sent into China to kick-start these guerrilla operations ever returned. By 1958, even the CIA and the State Department knew that these operations were hopeless endeavors and urged Chiang Kai-shek to stop advocating more of these operations.[69]

Then there is the CIA's Tibetan covert action program, which lasted from 1957 until the program mercifully died of benign neglect in the early 1970s. The Tibet operation was a prototypical example of a program that began as a small-scale, low budget project meant to gather intelligence inside Chinese-occupied Tibet, which beginning in 1959 morphed into a full-blown covert action program with a multi-million dollar budget involving the creation of a huge Tibetan resistance army in India and Nepal. The problem was that Desmond Fitzgerald, the CIA official who pushed the Tibet program within the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, paid no attention to those Agency officials who said that it was impossible for a lightly equipped guerrilla army to beat the Chinese army. He also ignored the fact that many of the Tibetans who joined the guerrilla army in India and Nepal were little more than crass opportunists who were more than willing to take the CIA's money and weapons, but showed little enthusiasm for actually crossing back into Tibet and waging war on the Chinese military.[70] Of the 49 CIA agents parachuted into Tibet between 1957 and 1960, only 12 survived.  Of the remainder, 37 were killed or committed suicide, one surrendered, and one was captured by the Chinese.[71] Recognition in Washington that the Tibet program was a failure came too late, in large part because the State Department and the American intelligence bureaucracy was committed to the continuation of the program because it did not want to admit defeat. Those few American officials, like the US ambassador to India, John Kenneth Galbraith, who saw the Tibet operation for what it was - a giant waste of money that was achieving nothing - were ignored, bypassed, or secretly written out of the program entirely.[72]

The joint CIA-Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) OPLAN 34A covert action operations against North Vietnam from 1963 onwards, involving agent airdrops, commando raids, sabotage operations and psychological warfare activities, was also a complete disaster. The operation, from its inception until it died a few years later, was marked by one failure after another, including the embarrassing public exposure of the operation after the Gulf of Tonkin incidents in July and August 1964.[73] Once again, the CIA and the Pentagon launched OPLAN 34A despite warnings from the CIA's intelligence analysts that the OPLAN 34A operation was highly unlikely to impact in any appreciable way Hanoi's strategic intent to prosecute the war in South Vietnam, much less damage North Vietnam's capacity to wage the war.[74] The secret CIA and US Army effort to infiltrate agents into North Vietnam was a shambles from the very begin. A number of document contained in this collection, tell the sad story of how the CIA and the US Army air dropped over one hundred agents into North Vietnam between 1961 and 1968, all of whom were captured or killed shortly after landing. Even after it became clear in the mid-1960s that these operations had been thoroughly penetrated by North Vietnamese intelligence and that the operation's security had been blown by news reports and radio broadcasts emanating from Hanoi, for reasons defying explanation the CIA and MACSOG continued to drop dozens of additional agents into North Vietnam, knowing full well that their life expectancy could be measured in minutes from the time they jumped from their transport planes.[75]

Despite some important successes after the 1968 Tet Offensive, during the critical early stages of the Vietnam War (1961-1967) the US intelligence community never really had a good idea  how many troops North Vietnam was infiltrating every month into South Vietnam via the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The main reason was that there was only one viable source for this information - the interrogation of North Vietnamese soldiers captured in South Vietnam. By the time these captives were interrogated, their information was months (or even years) old, so much of the intelligence that the US intelligence community was getting at the time from this source was ancient history, and as such, not much use on the battlefield.[76]

Then there was the failure of the U.S. intelligence community to warn of the nationwide North Vietnamese-Viet Cong Tet Offensive in January-February 1968. Despite danger signs everywhere, recently declassified documents show that the U.S. intelligence community, especially the intelligence analysts at the CIA and in Saigon, steadfastly refused to accept mounting indicators appearing in SIGINT reporting and from other sources that the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong were about to undertake a major nationwide offensive. On January 25, 1968, NSA sent a report to MACV entitled “Coordinated Vietnamese Communist Offensive Evidenced in South Vietnam,” the lead conclusion of which was that the North Vietnamese were about to launch a major coordinated offensive in Vietnam. But declassified documents make it clear that nobody in Washington (including President Johnson) or Saigon paid much credence to the  messages flowing out of NSA headquarters at Fort Meade warning of a nationwide North Vietnamese offensive being in the offing. Not only did the White House, the CIA and MACV commander General William Westmoreland believe that the North Vietnamese were incapable of mounting a major coordinated nationwide offensive, but they also believed that the real focus of the forthcoming enemy offensive was going to be the Marine combat base at Khe Sanh.[77]

The efforts of the CIA's Clandestine Service from 1965 until America forces left Vietnam in 1973 to destroy or neutralize the Viet Cong's base of support and logistics infrastructure in South Vietnam were a complete failure, despite the commitment of millions of dollars and hundreds of CIA operatives to the effort. The goal of this CIA covert action operation, codenamed TUJOCKEY, which was approved by the National Security Council (NSC) in 1966, was to attack by all means available the organization that controlled the Viet Cong insurgency in South Vietnam, known as the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), and all of its subordinate commands inside South Vietnam. The plan, which was not particularly well conceived, never really got off the ground and achieved very little in the way of tangible results and diverted much needed resources away from the Agency's efforts to build up its agent networks in South Vietnam.[78]

APPENDIX I

CIA AND USAF OVERFLIGHTS OF NORTH KOREA: 1962 - 1971

December 5-6, 1962

First U.S. reconnaissance overflight of North Korea since the end of the Korean War in July 1953. CIA U-2 aircraft flown by Chinese Nationalist pilot covered all of North Korea and parts of Manchuria. Highlight of the mission was the discovery of Soviet-made MiG-21 fighters at Pukchang-ni airfield and IL-28 bombers at Uiju and Sunan airfields in North Korea. Two Soviet-made W-class submarines were also observed at the Mayang-do naval base (3959N 12812E) in North Korea. Mission results were rated as “Good.”

February 25, 1963

A CIA P2V aircraft with a Chinese Nationalist aircrew conducted an STPOLLY ELINT overflight of the northeast portion of North Korea above the 42nd Parallel, with the aircraft landing the next morning at Kunsan Air Base. The mission was rated a success.

May 8-9, 1963

Chinese Nationalist U-2 conducted an overflight of Manchuria and North Korea. Detected for the first time a Soviet-made SA-2 SAM site outside Pyongyang. Mission results were rated as “Fair.”

May 27-28, 1963

Chinese Nationalist U-2 conducted an overflight mission of North Korea and parts of Manchuria. Two North Korean W-class submarines were photographed at the Mayang-do naval base on the east coast of North Korea. Plane landed at Kunsan Air Base, Korea. Mission results were rated as “Fair.”

October 5-6, 1963

Chinese Nationalist U-2 overflight of North Korea and the adjacent Liaotung Peninsula area of China. Numerous airfields and military installations were covered, but no new significant intelligence resulted from this mission. Mission results were rated as “Excellent.”

October 8, 1963

Chinese Nationalist U-2 overflight of Manchuria and North Korea. In China the mission covered the Lien-Shan cruise missile launch site, and a number of military airfields, including Tientsin airfield (3907N 11721E). In North Korea, the mission covered a number of airfields, the most important of which were Saamcham (3945N 12554E) and Pyong-Ni (3924N 12554E), the port of Wonsan, and a number of military installations around the cities of Kaesong, Kumchon (3812N 12631E) and Singye (3832N 12632E). Mission results were rated as “Good.”

November 7, 1964

Chinese Nationalist U-2 overflight of North Korea and airfields in northern and northeastern China. Observed the Chinese G-class SSBN at a shipyard near Dairen for the first time. Also flew over the Dengshahe SSM Field Garrison on the Liaotung Peninsula, where SRBM ground support equipment was again observed. Two cruisers, four destroyers, and 7 W-class subs were spotted at Lushun naval base. Most North Korean airfields were covered, and no major changes in strength was recorded. Four MiG-21 fighters were observed at Pukchang-ni airfield. North Korea's Mayang-do naval base was also covered, spotting two W-class submarines. Mission results were rated as “Good.”

July 31, 1965

Chinese Nationalist U-2 overflight mission covered North Korea. Seven hour mission covered 26 COMOR-designated targets in North Korea, including the Cho-Do Naval Base and the Munchon Naval Base at Wonsan. Aircraft was over North Korean airspace for 1 hour and 56 minutes at 69,000 feet. Mission results were rated as “Good.”

January 26, 1968

First CIA A-12 OXCART overflight mission was flown over North Korea at Mach 3.2 and 83,500 feet, with particular focus on determining the USS PUEBLO's location in or around Wonsan harbor. The aircraft made three east-to-west passes over the entire North Korean landmass. The mission detected no unusual North Korean military activities or movements other than the fact that almost all of North Korea's SA-2 SAM sites appeared to be on a high state of alert. SIGINT detected no hostile air defense reactions to the mission.

February 19, 1968

Second CIA A-12 OXCART/BLACK SHIELD overflight mission flown over North Korea at Mach 3.2 and 83,500 feet. Aircraft conducted a two-pass overflight of North Korea. 20% of the target area was cloud covered, including the port of Wonsan. One new North Korean SA-2 SAM site was detected near Wonsan.

May 6, 1968

CIA OXCART overflight mission was flown over North Korea at Mach 3.2 and 84,700 feet. Imagery quality was fair due to haze and scattered clouds over target areas. (Report, PFIAB Submission for 30 June 1968: OXCART, 1968, Top Secret Oxcart, CREST Collection, Document No. CIA-RDP33-02415A000400400013-8, NA, CP) [view]

June 30, 1969

USAF SR-71 conducted its first overflight reconnaissance mission over North Korea. Amongst the targets, the mission took photos of seven North Korean armor concentrations along the DMZ.

October 17, 1969

A USAF SR-71 conducted a reconnaissance overflight of North Korea, including the Pyongyang area.

November 22, 1969

USAF SR-71 conducted a GIANT SCALE reconnaissance overflight of North Korea. Mission time: 3 hours 17 minutes. Mission air aborted after one pass over North Korea. Flight landed at Kunsan Air Base in South Korea because of maintenance problems.

May 7, 1970

USAF SR-71 conducted a GIANT SCALE overflight mission of North Korea. Duration: 3 hours, 26 minutes. No further details of this mission are available.

September 19, 1970

USAF SR-71 conducted a GIANT SCALE reconnaissance overflight of North Korea.

December 25, 1970

SR-71 conducted a GIANT SCALE reconnaissance overflight of North Korea.

March 14, 1971

SR-71 conducted a GIANT SCALE overflight mission of North Korea. Mission covered three North Korean military airfields (Koksan, Ongjin, and Haeju) within 40 miles of the DMZ.

May 17, 1971

SR-71 conducted a GIANT SCALE overflight mission (Mission GS 359) of North Korea. North Korea strongly protested the overflight, and no further SR-71 overflights of North Korea were ever flown.

[1].   US Army, Memorandum, Korea Liaison Office Report, May 15, 1951, Confidential, MACL [view]
State Department, Memorandum, Attached Document, May 17, 1951, Top Secret, NARA  [view]
US Air Force, Report, A Historical Study of the Air Force Security Service and Korea: June 1950 - October 1952, October 2, 1952, Top Secret Canoe, USAF FOIA  [view]
US Air Force, Report, History of Detachment 2, 6004th Air Intelligence Service Squadron: June 1946 thru December 1952, September 17, 1953, Secret, USAF FOIA. [view]
US Air Force, Report, An Historical Analysis of the USAFSS Effort in the Korean Action: June 1950 - October 1953, 1954, Top Secret Eider, US Air Force FOIA [view]
US Army, Report, Intelligence and Counterintelligence Problems During the Korean Conflict, February 7, 1955, Secret/NOFORN, CMH [view]
CIA, Report, Intelligence Operations in the Korean War, 1994, Unclassified/FOUA, CIA [view]
  NSA, Report, The Korean War: The SIGINT Background, 2000, Unclassified, NSA [view]
CIA, Report, American Cryptology During the Korean War, 2001, Unclassified, CIA FOIA [view]
NSA, Report, SIGINT in the Defense of the Pusan Perimeter, Korea 1950, undated, Top Secret Copse, NSA FOIA [view]
US Air Force, Report, Origins of USAF HUMINT in Korea, undated, unclassified, USAF FOIA.  [view]

[2].   DOD, Memorandum, Military Intelligence Deficiencies in Southeast Asia, June 19, 1961, Secret, CREST [view]
DOD, Memorandum, Minutes of Intelligence Discussion, October 20, 1961, Top Secret, NDU [view]
DOD, Memorandum, Unconventional Warfare, October 23,1961, Top Secret, JFKL [view]
DOD, Letter, Taylor to The President, November 3, 1961, Top Secret, FRUS; DOD, Report, (extract) Report on General Taylor's Mission to South Vietnam, November 3, 1961, Top Secret, LBJL [view]
DIA, Memorandum, Review of U.S. Foreign Intelligence and Related Activities in Southeast Asia and the Far East, May 27, 1963, Top Secret, NARA.  [view]

[3].   CIA, Report, The Decline of Mao Tse-tung, April 9, 1962, Secret/NOFORN, CIA.  [view]

[4].   CIA, Report, Mao's “Cultural Revolution” III. The Purge of the PLA and the Stardom of Madame Mao, June 1968, Top Secret [codeword not declassified]/NOFORN. [view]

[5].   CIA, Report, Lin Piao and the Great Helmsman, January 21, 1970, Secret/NOFORN. [view]

[6].   CIA, Memorandum, The Situation in Communist China, October 8, 1971, Top Secret [Ruff Umbra]; CIA, Report, The Purge of Lin Piao's “Conspiratorial Clique”: A Tentative Reconstruction, July 1972, Top Secret [Umbra].;

[7].   See for example US Navy, Cable, ALUSNA Taipei to CNO, August 20, 1954, Top Secret, NARA [view]
DOD, Cable, 6499SPTGP TAS Taipei to Department of State et al., January 20, 1967, Confidential, NARA [view]
DOD, Cable, 6499SPTGP TAS Taipei to Department of State et al., February 3, 1967, Confidential, NARA; DOD, Cable, 6499SPTGP TAS Taipei to Department of State et al., February 8, 1967, Confidential, NARA [view]
NSC, Memorandum, Intelligence Items, February 13, 1969, Top Secret/Sensitive/Contains Codeword, NARA. [view]

[8].   US Army, Memorandum, Defections of North Koreans, August 23, 1950, Secret, NARA [view]
US Air Force, Cable, CG FEAF to HQ USAF, August 6, 1952, Top Secret/Personal For, NARA [view]
State Department, Memorandum, Escapee Program: FY 1954 Budget, August 29, 1952, Top Secret, NARA [view]
US Army, Cable, CINCFE to DEPTAR, November 18, 1952, Top Secret, NARA. [view]
US Air Force, Cable, CG FEAF to HQ USAF, November 24, 1952, Top Secret, NARA [view]
US Air Force, Memorandum, MIG Defection, September 23, 1953, Secret, NARA [view]
JCS, Cable, JCS to CINCFE, September 23, 1953, Top Secret, NARA [view]
US Air Force, Cable, COMDR FEAF to COFS USAF, October 20, 1953, Top Secret/Personal For, NARA. [view]

[9].   State Department, Memorandum, no subject, February 2, 1950, Top Secret, NARA FOIA [view]
US Army, Cable, USARMLO Hong Kong to CINCFE and DEPTAR, November 21, 1951, Top Secret/NOFORN/Asylum, NARA FOIA [view]
State Department, Report, no subject, April 23, 1953, Secret, NARA [view]
US Courts, Affidavit of John Limond Hart, 1982, Unclassified, Vietnam Archive TTU. [view]

[10].   US Army, Memorandum, SSU in Mukden, June 28, 1946, Top Secret, NARA [view]
State Department, Letter, Ward to Clark, April 9, 1948, Top Secret, NARA FOIA [view]
State Department, Letter, Clark to Butterworth, April 29, 1948, Top Secret, NARA FOIA [view]
US Army, Memorandum, Coordination of Theater Intelligence and Related Subjects, August 5, 1950, Top Secret, NARA [view]
US Army, Memorandum, Commando Projects, August 5, 1950, Top Secret, NARA [view]
US Army, Memorandum, Intelligence and Related Covert Activities, Far East Command, November 4, 1950, Top Secret, NARA [view]
US Army, Index Card, Relations With Central Intelligence Agency, December 7, 1950, Top Secret, NARA [view]
JCS, Memorandum, Report on Trip to FECOM, 26 November - 17 December 1951, December 20, 1951, Top Secret, NARA FOIA [view]
DOD, Report, (extract) Report on General Taylor's Mission to South Vietnam, November 3, 1961, Top Secret, LBJL [view]
DOD, Memorandum, Coordination of OPLAN 34A, September 23, 1964, Top Secret/Eyes Only, GRFL. [view]

[11].   CIA, Memorandum, Evaluation of the Defense Intelligence Agency With Respect to the Far East, December 14, 1964, Secret, CREST [view]
State Department, Cable, Amb Taylor Saigon to Gen Wheeler CJCS, April 15, 1965, Top Secret, LBJL [view]
US Army, Report, A Critical Analysis of US Army Intelligence Organizations and Concepts in Vietnam, 1965-1969, March 8, 1971, Secret/NOFORN, AWC. [view]

[12].   See for example, US Air Force, Cable, HQ USAF to USAIRA Taipei, December 27, 1950, Top Secret, NARA [view]
USCIB, Memorandum, [Nationalist China], April 13, 1954, Top Secret, NSA. [view]

[13].   A useful guide to French-American intelligence cooperation in Indochina during 1950-1954 can be found in CIA, Report, French and American Intelligence Relations During the First Indochina War, 1950-1954, September 2011, Unclassified, CIA [view]. For examples of US dependence on French intelligence in Indochina, much of which was faulty, and the declining value of this source as time went by, see State Department, Cable, USMINISTER Saigon to Secretary of State, March 14, 1950, Top Secret, NARA [view]
State Department, Cable, Saigon to Secretary of State, April 1, 1950, Top Secret, NARA [view]
State Department, Letter, John to William, August 18, 1950, Top Secret, NARA [view]
US Army, Memorandum, Situation Report on Indo-China, January 10, 1951, Top Secret, NARA [view]
State Department, Cable, Saigon to Secretary of State, September 20, 1951, Top Secret, NARA [view]
State Department, Cable, Department of State to Amlegation Saigon, January 26, 1952, Secret, NARA [view]
CIA, Report, Current Intelligence Bulletin, October 24, 1952, Top Secret [codeword not declassified]]/NOFORN/Continued Control, CREST [view]
State Department, Cable, State Department to Amlegation Saigon, January 21, 1953, Top Secret, NARA FOIA [view]
CIA, Report, The Military Situation in Indochina, March 23, 1953, Top Secret, CREST [view]
US Army, Cable, CHIEF MAAG Saigon to CINCPAC, December 1, 1953, Top Secret, NARA [view]
CIA, Report, Current Intelligence Bulletin, January 13, 1954, Top Secret [codeword not declassified]]/NOFORN/Continued Control, CREST. [view]

[14].   DOD, Memorandum, Minutes of Intelligence Discussion, October 20, 1961, Top Secret, NDU [view]
DOD, Memorandum, Unconventional Warfare, October 23,1961, Top Secret, JFKL [view]
DOD, Letter, Taylor to The President, November 3, 1961, Top Secret, FRUS [view]
DOD, Report, (extract) Report on General Taylor's Mission to South Vietnam, November 3, 1961, Top Secret, LBJL [view]
CIA, Report, Covert Actions in Vietnam, November 28, 1961, Top Secret, JFKL [view]
CIA, Report, Covert Annex to Status Report of Joint Task Force Vietnam, June 12, 1962, Top Secret, JFKL [view]
White House, Memorandum, Minutes of Meeting of Special Group (CI), June 21, 1962, Secret, JFKL [view]
White House, Memorandum, Intelligence Collection and Evaluation in South Vietnam, June 25, 1962, Secret/Eyes Only, JFKL [view]
PFIAB, Report, Excerpts from Subsidiary Board Recommendations Based on U.S. Foreign Intelligence and Related Activities in Southeast Asia and the Far East, October 19, 1962, Top Secret, CREST. [view]

[15].   White House, Memorandum, VC/NVA in Northern II Corps, September 27, 1966, Secret, LBJL [view]
US Army, Report, A Critical Analysis of US Army Intelligence Organizations and Concepts in Vietnam, 1965-1969, March 8, 1971, Secret/NOFORN, AWC. [view]

[16].   MACV, Report, Counterintelligence Estimate: Republic of Vietnam, December 1, 1967, Confidential, AWC. [view]
US Army, Report, (extract) MACV Intelligence Bulletin, February 22, 1968, Secret, AFHRA [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Viet Cong Covert Agencies in South Vietnamese Territory, May 1970, Top Secret [codeword not declassified]/NOFORN, CREST [view]
US Army, Report, VC/NVA Alert and Early Warning Systems, June 30, 1970, Confidential/NOFORN, AWC [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Communist Subversion In the South Vietnamese Army and Security Apparatus, September 1970, Top Secret [codeword not declassified]/NOFORN, CREST. [view]

[17].   US Army, Report, Intelligence and Counterintelligence Problems During the Korean Conflict, February 7, 1955, Secret/NOFORN, CMH. [view]

[18].   White House, Memorandum, Presidential Conference on Taiwan, May 29, 1962, Top Secret, FRUS [view]
State Department, Cable, Hong Kong to Secretary of State, February 19, 1966, Top Secret, State Department FOIA. [view]

[19].   CIA, Report, The President's Daily Brief, March 2, 1965, Top Secret/President's Eyes Only, CIA [view]
White House Situation Room, Memorandum, Memorandum for the President, February 20, 1966, Top Secret, LBJL [view]
CIA, Report, Viet Cong Advance Warning of B-52 Raids, and Effects of Raids on Viet Cong Morale, August 10, 1967, Secret, LBJL. [view]

[20].   US Army, Report, MACV Intelligence Bulletin, February 22, 1968, Secret, AFHRA [view]

[21].   NSA, Report, Deadly Transmissions, December 1970, Secret/NOFORN, NSA FOIA [view]
US Army, Report, Intelligence Collection Activities of the B-28 Technical Reconnaissance Unit, November 11, 1971, AWC [view]
US Army, Report, Summary of Activities: North Vietnamese Intelligence Services (1 July 1971 - 30 June 1972), September 1, 1972, Secret/NOFORN, NARA [view]
US Army, Report, Summary of Activities: North Vietnamese Intelligence Services (1 July 1972 - 30 June 1973), July 15, 1973, Secret/NOFORN, NARA [view]
NSA, Report, Remembering the Lessons of the Vietnam War, Spring-Summer 2004, Secret/COMINT, NSA FOIA [view]
NSA, Report, The Unrealized Enemy: A Preliminary Historical Consideration of Vietnamese Communist COMINT in South Vietnam, 1962-1971, October 2005, Unclassified, NSA. [view]

[22].   For examples of the CIA's analytic reporting to President Eisenhower and the National Security Council during the 1954-1955 and 1958 Taiwan Strait crises, see the dozens of “NSC Briefing” reports contained in this collection, beginning with the first, CIA, NSC Briefing, Chinese Offshore Islands, October 5, 1954, Top Secret [codeword not declassified], CREST. [view]

[23].   State Department, Cable, Manila to Secretary of States, February 21, 1955, Top Secret, DDEL [view]
White House, Memorandum, Memorandum for the President, March 15, 1955, Top Secret, DDEL [view]
White House, Memorandum, Notes Taken During Meeting, 11 March 1955, March 16, 1955, Top Secret, DDEL. [view]

[24].   CIA, Report, West New Guinea, June 8, 1962, Top Secret [codeword not declassified], CIA FOIA [view]
CIA, Report, West New Guinea, July 6, 1962, Top Secret [codeword not declassified], CIA FOIA [view]
CIA, Report, Central Intelligence Bulletin, July 19, 1962, Top Secret [codeword not declassified]/NOFORN/Continued Control, CREST [view]
CIA, Report, West New Guinea, July 20, 1962, Top Secret [codeword not declassified], CIA FOIA [view]
Department of State, Memorandum, Indonesian Action Against West New Guinea Probable in Early August, July 26, 1962, Secret/NOFORN, NARA [view]
CIA, Report, West New Guinea, August 9, 1962, Top Secret [codeword not declassified], CIA FOIA [view]
CIA, Report, West New Guinea, August 17, 1962, Top Secret [codeword not declassified], CIA FOIA. [view]

[25].   Bob de Graaff and Cees Wiebes, Villa Maarheeze: De Geschiedenis van de Inlichtingendienst Buitenland (Den Haag: Sdu Uitgevers, 1998).

[26].   There are several dozen documents in this collection containing mail and cable intercepts of Syngman Rhee's personal communications, beginning with US Army, Cable, CG XXIV Corps to CINCAFPAC, December 10, 1946, Confidential, NSA FOIA [view]
US Army Report, Censorship Intercept, January 2, 1947, Confidential, NSA FOIA [view]
US Army, Memorandum, Intercepted Letters of Dr Rhee, Syng Man, February 24, 1947, Secret, NSA FOIA. [view]

[27].   State Department, Cable, Seoul (Jacobs) to Secretary of State, July 9, 1947, Secret, FRUS [view]
CIA, Report, Daily Summary, July 15, 1947, Top Secret, CREST. [view]

[28].   CIA, Cable, CIA to CSUSA et al., January 21, 1952, Top Secret/Control - US Officials Only, NARA [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Reaction of Syngman Rhee to Truce Talks, April 30, 1953, Secret/Eyes Only, CREST [view]
CIA, Report, The Prisoner-of-War Issue in the Korean Truce Talks, June 4, 1953, Top Secret, CIA [view]
CIA, Report, Rhee Gives Assurance Against Unilateral Step, June 6, 1953, Top Secret, CREST [view]
US Army, Cable, CINCUNC to DEPTAR (JCS), June 8, 1953, Top Secret, NARA [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Syngman Rhee and the Korean Armistice, July 1, 1953, Top Secret/Eyes Only, CIA [view]
CIA, Report, Prospects for an Effective Truce in the Korean War, July 22, 1953, Top Secret Canoe, CIA [view]
CIA, NSC Briefing, The Prospects for an Effective Truce in the Korean War, July 24, 1953, Top Secret Canoe, CREST [view]
CIA, Report, Ranking South Korean Army Officer Opposes Northward Attack, October 4, 1953, Top Secret Froth, CIA [view]
JCS, Draft Cable, JCS to CINCFE, November 10, 1953, Top Secret/Eyes Only, NARA [view]
US Army, Memorandum, Unilateral Action: Summary of Reports of Rhee's Intentions and Related Intelligence Reports, November 11, 1950, Top Secret, NARA [view]
CIA, Report, Current Intelligence Bulletin, December 10, 1953, Top Secret [codeword not declassified]]/NOFORN/Continued Control, CREST [view]
CIA, Report, Rhee Apparently Determined to Sabotage Political Conference, December 11, 1953, Top Secret Froth, CIA [view]
US Army, Memorandum, ROK Interference With US Intel Collection Efforts in Korea, December 14, 1953, Secret, NARA [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Dulles to President, January 8, 1954, Top Secret, DDEL [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Probable Reaction of President Rhee to Termination of Korean Talks at Geneva (Draft for the Board), June 17, 1954, Secret, CIA [view]
US Air Force, Cable, COMFEAF to COFS USAF, September 3, 1954, Top Secret, NARA. [view]

[29].   White House, Memorandum, President to Harriman, March 9, 1962, Secret, JFKL [view]
State Department, Cable, Taipei to Secretary of State, March 30, 1962, Secret/Roger Channel, FRUS [view]
State Department, Letter, Rice to Tsiang, October 11, 1962, Top Secret, NARA [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Chinese Nationalist Maritime and Paramilitary Operations Against the China Mainland, January 14, 1963, Secret, JFKL [view]
State Department, Cable, Taipei to Secretary of State, February 21, 1966, Top Secret, State Department FOIA [view]
State Department, Cable, Taipei to Secretary of State, October 25, 1966, Top Secret, FRUS [view]
CIA, Report, Defense Minister Chiang's Instructions to Prepare Plans for Infiltrating GRC Teams Into the China Mainland, August 16, 1967, Secret, CIA [view]
CIA, Report, The President's Daily Brief, February 11, 1969, 1969, Top Secret/President's Eyes Only, CIA  [view]
State Department, Cable, Taipei to Secretary of State, July 4, 1969, Top Secret, State Department FOIA [view]
CIA, Report, The President's Daily Brief, July 5, 1969, 1969, Top Secret/President's Eyes Only, CIA [view]
State Department, Cable, Hong Kong to Secretary of State, July 5, 1969, Secret, NARA. [view]

[30].   CIA, Report, Chinese Nationalist Preparations for Counterattack, May 5, 1963, Secret/NOFORN, CREST [view]
State Department, Cable, Amembassy Taipei to Secretary of State, July 28, 1964, Secret, LBJL [view]
CIA, Report, The President's Daily Brief, August 7, 1965, Top Secret/President's Eyes Only, LBJL. [view]

[31].   State Department, Letter, Wright to Bundy, August 7, 1964, Top Secret, NARA [view]
DOD, Cable, CINCPAC to CJCS, September 15, 1965, Top Secret/EXDIS, State Department FOIA [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Taipei's Capabilities to Attack the Mainland, August 18, 1965, Top Secret Dinar/NOFORN, LBJL [view]
State Department, Letter, Hummel to Berger, October 23, 1965, Top Secret, NARA. [view]

[32].   US Air Force, Cable, COMFEAF to COFS USAF, May 31, 1956, Top Secret, NARA

[33].   CIA, Cable, deleted to Director, July 21, 1954, Secret, CREST [view]
CIA, Report, [Mission Report], August 17, 1955, Top Secret/US Eyes Only, CREST [view]
US Air Force, Cable, CINCSAC to COFS USAF, October 18, 1955, Top Secret, NARA [view]
US Air Force, Cable, USAIRA Taipei to CSAF, October 26, 1955, Top Secret, NARA. [view]

[34].   The best overview of the still classified STPOLLY program can be found in Chris Pocock and Clarence Fu, The Black Bats: CIA Spy Flights Over China from Taiwan: 1951-1969 (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 2010). For documents about this secret program, see CIA, Memorandum, Review of ELINT Requirements, March 23, 1959, Top Secret, CREST [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Review of Intelligence and Equipment Requirements for the [STPOLLY] P2V-7 Program, September 22, 1959, Top Secret, CREST [view]
CIA, Cable, Director to deleted, April 6, 1961, Secret, CREST [view]
CIA, Memorandum, [STPOLLY] Overflights for June, June 6, 1961, Top Secret, CREST [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Status Report on CIA Air Activities for the Period 14 Through 20 February 1963, February 20, 1963, Top Secret, CREST.  See also “34th Air Squadron Marks Bygone Era in Military History,” Taipei Times, October 7, 1999.

[35].   CIA, Report, History of the Office of Special Activities: Chapter XVII, April 1, 1969, Top Secret, CIA FOIA. See also Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1975 (Washington, D.C.: CIA History Staff, April 1992), p. 244 [view]
Pocock, Chris, 50 Years of the U-2: The Complete Illustrated History of the “Dragon Lady” (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 2005).;

[36].   CIA, Report, The Growth of China's Air Defenses: Responding to Covert Overflights, 1949-1974, June 2013, Unclassified, CIA. [view]
Memorandum, Memorandum for Secretary of State Rusk Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, undated but circa December 1, 1966, Secret/Eyes Only, FRUS.;

[37].   CIA, Report, History of the Office of Special Activities: Chapter XVII, April 1, 1969, Top Secret, CIA FOIA. Examples of this kind of intelligence can be found in: CIA, Memorandum, Significant Intelligence Items, April 5, 1962, Top Secret Chess Ruff, CREST [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Proposed U-2 Reconnaissance Program for China, August 20, 1962, Top Secret IDEALIST/TACKLE, CREST [view]
NPIC, Report, Missile Installation Near Lien-Shan, China, October 1962, Top Secret Ruff, CREST [view]
NPIC, Cable, NPIC to Distribution List, May 1, 1963, Top Secret Ruff, CREST [view]
ACDA, Report, Summary and Appraisal of Latest Evidence on Chinese Communist Advanced Weapon Capabilities, July 10, 1963, Top Secret, NARA [view]
NPIC, Report, Shuang-Cheng-Tzu Missile Test Center, China, August 1964, Top Secret Ruff, CREST. [view]

[38].   CIA, Memorandum, ORR Activities Relating to Communist Chinese Advanced Weapons Systems, January 15, 1963, Top Secret Dinar/NOFORN, CREST. [view]

[39].   CIA, Memorandum, Handling of Products and Information Resulting from Reconnaissance Over Communist China in Taiwan Straits Crisis, June 20,1962, Top Secret, CREST [view]
NPIC, Report, Hsiang-Hsiang Explosives Complex, July 1962, Top Secret [codeword not declassified], CREST [view]
NPIC, Report, Shenyang Airframe Plant 112, Shenyang (Mukden), China, May 1963, Top Secret Chess/NOFORN, CREST [view]
ACDA, Report, Summary and Appraisal of Latest Evidence on Chinese Communist Advanced Weapon Capabilities, July 10, 1963, Top Secret, NARA [view]
NPIC, Report, Lu-ta Shipyards, China, December 14, 1964, Top Secret [codewords not declassified], CREST [view]
NPIC, Report, Ling-shui Airfield, Hai-nan Tao, China, April 27, 1965, Top Secret [codewords not declassified], CREST [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Preliminary Evaluation of GRC Mission 395C, Flown on 20 July 1965, July 22, 1965, Top Secret [codewords not declassified], CREST [view]
CIA, Report, “G” Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Construction, Lu-Ta Shipyard, Dairen, China, September 1965, Secret/[NOFORN], CREST [view]
CIA, Report, P.I. Notes, September 2, 1965, Top Secret [codeword not declassified], CREST [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Supplementary Submarine Order of Battle Information Obtained in Mission C535C of 16 October 1965, October 25, 1965, Top Secret [codeword not declassified], CREST [view]
NPIC, Report, Electronic Intercept Site, Ta-chiu, China, March 20, 1967, Secret, CREST. [view]

[40].   Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1975 (Washington, D.C.: CIA History Staff, April 1992), Secret, p. 244.;

[41].   CIA, Memorandum, Information Concerning the PI Effort on the Chinese Atomic Energy Program, March 28, 1963, Top Secret Dinar Chess Ruff/NOFORN, CREST [view]
CIA, Report, The President's Intelligence Checklist, August 20 1964, Top Secret/For the President's Eyes Only, CIA [view]
CIA, Report, Photographic and Communications Intelligence Substantiate Severre Flooding in the North China Plain in 1964, March 24, 1965, Top Secret Ruff [codeword not declassified], CREST [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Intelligence Impact Forecast for KH-4 FY 1968 Program, May 3, 1967, Top Secret, NRO FOIA [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Urgent Requirement for Priority Collection Efforts Against Key Chinese Communist Strategic Missile Targets, July 14, 1968, Top Secret [codewords not declassified], CREST [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Urgent Requirement for Priority Collection Efforts Against Key Chinese Communist Strategic Missile Targets, July14, 1969, Top Secret [codewords not declassified], CREST. [view]

[42].   Examples of CIA reporting on the chaos reigning in China during the Cultural Revolution can be found in CIA, Report, Central Intelligence Bulletin, January 1966, Top Secret [codeword not declassified]/NOFORN/Continued Control, CREST [view]
CIA, DCI Briefing, Soviet and Chinese Military Developments, February 21, 1967, Top Secret Ruff Trine, CREST [view]
CIA, Report, The President's Daily Brief, July 27, 1967, Top Secret/President's Eyes Only, CIA [view]
CIA, Report, The President's Daily Brief, July 28, 1967, Top Secret/President's Eyes Only, CIA [view]
CIA, Report, The President's Daily Brief, July 29, 1967, Top Secret/President's Eyes Only, CIA [view]
CIA, Report, The President's Daily Brief, July 31, 1967, Top Secret/President's Eyes Only, CIA [view]
CIA, Report, Mao's “Cultural Revolution” III. The Purge of the PLA and the Stardom of Madame Mao, June 1968, Top Secret [codeword not declassified]/NOFORN, CIA [view]
CIA, Report, Central Intelligence Bulletin, June 21, 1968, Secret/NOFORN, CREST [view]
CIA, Report, The President's Daily Brief, July 26, 1968, Top Secret/President's Eyes Only, CIA [view]
CIA, Estimate, The Sino-Soviet Relationship: The Military Aspects (Supporting Analysis), September 20, 1973, Top Secret [multiple codewords not declassified], CREST [view] [view]
CIA, Report, The President's Daily Brief, March 4, 1969, 1969, Top Secret/President's Eyes Only, CIA. [view]

[43].   DIA, Memorandum, Ad Hoc Committee Report and Recommendations Relating to Disclosure of US SIGINT Successes Against North Vietnam, June 13, 1964, Top Secret Dinar, LBJL [view]
State Department, Memorandum, Recent Infiltration of PAVN Personnel Into Northern South Vietnam, July 24, 1964, Top Secret Dinar, LBJL [view]
US Army, Report, (extract) Evaluation of US Army Combat Operations in Vietnam: Vol 2, Annex A - Intelligence, April 25, 1966, Secret, Vietnam Archives TTU [view]
NSA, Memorandum, Interview With Mr. Arthur McCafferty, White House Staff, on the Use of SIGINT in Shaping W.H. Decisions on Southeast Asia, undated but circa early 1968, Top Secret Trine, NSA [view]
US Army, Report, Combat Operations After Action Report: TF Schnoor, October 4, 1968, Confidential, NARA [view]
NSA, Report, Operation Starlight: A SIGINT Success Story, Fall 1971, Secret, NSA FOIA [view]
NSA, Report, Southeast Asia: Focus on Cambodia, January 1974, Top Secret Umbra, NSA FOIA. [view]
NSA, Report, Direct Support During Operation DEWEY CANYON, Summer 1981, Secret Spoke, NSA FOIA [view]
NSA, Report, TEABALL: Some Personal Observations of SIGINT at War, Winter 1991, Secret Spoke, NSA FOIA [view]
NSA, Report, SIGINT and the Battle of the Ia Drang Valley, November 1965, March-April 2002, Secret/COMINT, NSA FOIA [view]
NSA, Report, Vietnam: A SIGINT Paradox (Part I), May-June 2002, Top Secret/COMINT, NSA FOIA [view]
NSA, Report, Vietnam: A SIGINT Paradox (Part II), May-June 2002, Top Secret/COMINT, NSA FOIA. [view]

[44].   CIA, Memorandum, Reported Air Strike Damage to North Vietnam, March 6, 1965, Top Secret [codeword not declassified], LBJL [view]
JCS, Memorandum, Over-all Appraisal of Air Strikes Against North Vietnam: 7 February 1965 to 4 April 1965, April 6, 1965, Top Secret, LBJL [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Results of US Air Strikes in South Vietnam, April 21, 1965, Top Secret [codeword not declassified], LBJL [view]
State Department, Memorandum, The Effects of the Bombings of North Vietnam, June 29, 1965, Secret/NOFORN, LBJL [view]
CIA-DIA, Report, An Appraisal of the Effects of the First Year of Bombing in North Vietnam, June 1, 1966, Top Secret [codeword not declassified], LBJL. [view]

[45].   See for example White House, Memorandum, no subject, March 8, 1967, Top Secret, LBJL [view]
CIA, Memorandum, An Evaluation of the Effects of Bombing on Infiltration Into South Vietnam, March 9, 1967, Top Secret [codeword not declassified]/NOFORN, CREST. [view]

[46].   CIA, Memorandum, Quarantine Impact Memorandum, May 6, 1972, Secret Spoke/Sensitive, CREST [view]
CIA, Memorandum, The Effect of the Past Two Month's Events on North Vietnamese Military Capabilities, June 1972, Top Secret Ruff Umbra, CREST [view]
NSC, Memorandum, Assessment of the Effects of the Air War on North Vietnam, July 26, 1972, Top Secret/Sensitive, CREST [view]
CIA, Memorandum, The Overall Impact of the US Bombing and Mining Program on North Vietnam, August 1972, Top Secret Ruff Umbra/NOFORN/Sensitive, CREST [view]
NSC, Memorandum, Rapid Reconstruction in North Vietnam, December 6, 1972, Secret Spoke, CREST. [view]

[47].   NSA, Memorandum, Interview With Mr. Arthur McCafferty, White House Staff, on the Use of SIGINT in Shaping W.H. Decisions on Southeast Asia, undated but circa early 1968, Top Secret Trine, NSA [view]
NSA, Memorandum, National Security Agency Requirements for Collection, April 10, 1968, Secret/HVCCO, LBJL [view]
PFIAB, Memorandum, NSA Requirements for Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Collection in the Vietnam Theater, April 19, 1968, Top Secret, LBJL [view]
DIA, Report, DIA Intelligence Supplement: Status of Infiltration Groups: 1 Jan - 31 May 1968, June 4, 1968, Secret [codeword not declassified], CREST [view]
PFIAB, Memorandum, National Security Agency Requirements for Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Collection in the Vietnam Theater, June 10, 1968, Top Secret, LBJL [view]
CIA, Memorandum, The General Directorate of Rear Services (GDRS), circa July 1969, Secret [codeword not declassified], CREST [view]
US Courts, Stipulation of Facts, General William C. Westmoreland v. CBS Inc et al., October 15, 1984, unclassified, Vietnam Archive TTU. [view]

[48].   CIA, Report, Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States Bui Diem's Assessment of the Influence of the Anti-War Group in the United States, March 10, 1967, Secret, LBJL [view]
CIA, Report, The President's Daily Brief, March 4, 1969, 1969, Top Secret/President's Eyes Only, CIA [view]
CIA, Memorandum, President Thieu's Views Regarding the Issues Involved in Agreeing to a Bombing Halt, October 26, 1968, Secret/Sensitive, LBJL [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Presidential Views Concerning the Bombing Halt and the Paris Talks, October 27, 1968, Secret/Sensitive, LBJL [view]
White House, Cable, Rostow to The President, Secret/Eyes Only, LBJL; NSC, Memorandum, Intelligence Items, January 23, 1969, Top Secret/Eyes Only, NARA. [view]

[49].   NSA, Cable, DIRNSA TO White House, October 21, 1968, Top Secret Trine, LBJL [view]
White House, Cable, Rostow to The President, November 2, 1968, Secret/Eyes Only, LBJL [view]
White House, Memorandum, Vietnam Bombing Halt - The Chennault Affair, February 25, 1970, Top Secret/NODIS/HAVAN/DOUBLE PLUS, RNL. [view]

[50].   US Army, Cable, CINCFE to DA WASH DC, June 29, 1950, Top Secret, MACL [view]
State Department, Memorandum, Alleged Warning of Invasion of South Korea by the North Koreans, September 11, 1950, Secret, NARA [view]
State Department, Memorandum, Reported Intelligence Warning of Invasion of South Korea, October 5, 1950, Secret, NARA [view]
US Army, Report, North Korean Intentions and Capabilities as Reported to Assistant Chief of Staff - G-2, October 18, 1950, Top Secret, NARA. [view]

[51].   JCS, Memorandum, Intelligence Aspects of the Korean Situation, June 29, 1950, Top Secret, NARA. [view]

[52].   CIA, Report, Military Preparations and Evacuation of Areas North of the 38th Parallel, June 27, 1950, Confidential, CREST [view]
CIA, Report, Korean Military Movements in the 38th Parallel Area, July 25, 1950, Confidential, CREST [view]
CIA, Report, Chinese Communist With North Korea, July 25, 1950, Secret, CREST [view]
CIA, Report, Military Training Progress in the 38th Parallel Area, August 8, 1950, Confidential, CREST. [view]

[53].   US Air Force, Report, A Historical Study of the Air Force Security Service and Korea: June 1950 - October 1952, October 2, 1952, Top Secret Canoe, USAF FOIA [view]
US Air Force, Report, An Historical Analysis of the USAFSS Effort in the Korean Action: June 1950 - October 1953, 1954, Top Secret Eider, US Air Force FOIA [view]
NSA, Report, The US COMINT Effort During the Korean Conflict - June 1950 - August 1953, January 6, 1954, Top Secret Froth, NSA FOIA. [view]

[54].   CIA, Estimate, Critical Situations in the Far East, October 12, 1950, Top Secret, CIA [view]
CIA, Estimate, Review of the World Situation, October 18, 1950, Secret, CREST [view]
US Army, Cable, DEPTAR to CINCFE, October 22, 1950, Top Secret, MACL; US Army, Report, Weekly Intelligence Report, October 27, 1950, Secret, NARA [view]
  Memorandum, Bolling to Chief of Staff, U.S. Intelligence Coverage of the Relationship of Communist China to the Korean War from 25 June to 24 November 1950, May 7, 1951, RG-319, Entry 1041, ID No. 928809, National Archives, College Park, Maryland; See also Cynthia M. Grabo, “The Watch Committee and the National Indications Center: The Evolution of U.S. Strategic Warning: 1950-1975,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 3, No. 3, p. 367; Matthew M. Aid, “American Comint in the Korean War (Part II): From the Chinese Intervention to the Armistice,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2000.;

[55].   For Willoughby barring the CIA from the Korean POW cages and the refusal of the U.S. intelligence community to accept the presence of Chinese forces being in Korea, see US Army, Letter, White to Tarkenton, October 27, 1950, Secret, NARA [view]
CIA, Report, Daily Summary, October 30, 1950, Top Secret, CREST [view]
US Army, Cable, CINCFE to CG Army Eight, October 31, 1950, Secret, MACL [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea, November 1, 1950, Secret, NARA [view]
CIA, Report, Daily Summary, November 2, 1950, Top Secret, CREST [view]
CIA, Estimate, Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea, November 8, 1950, Secret, CREST [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Summary of Intelligence Estimates on Intervention by Chinese Communists in the Korean War (12 October - 24 November 1950), May 4, 1951, Top Secret, NARA [view]
State Department, Memorandum, State Department Intelligence View of Likelihood of CHICOM Intervention as of November 21, 1950, May 5, 1951, Secret, NARA [view]
US Army, Memorandum, Intelligence and Information Available to FECOM Concerning Chinese Communist Intervention, May 6, 1951, Top Secret, NARA [view]
US Army, Memorandum, US Intelligence Coverage of the Relationship of Communist China to the Korean War from 25 June to 24 November 1950, May 7, 1951, Top Secret, NARA FOIA [view]
State Department, Report, Outline Chinese Communist Intervention, May 7, 1951, Top Secret, NARA. [view]

[56].   State Department, Cable, The Hague to Secretary of State, September 1, 1950, Secret, NARA [view]
State Department, Cable, The Hague to Secretary of State, September 12, 1950, Confidential, NARA [view]
State Department, Cable, The Hague to Secretary of State, October 3, 1950, Secret, HSTL [view]
State Department, Cable, The Hague to Secretary of State, October 13, 1950, Secret, NARA [view]
State Department, Report, Outline Chinese Communist Intervention, May 7, 1951, Top Secret, NARA. [view]

[57].   For an excellent overview concerning the performance of th CIA and US military intelligence during the Korean War based on private access to classified CIA historical documents, see Michael E. Haas, In the Devil's Shadow: U.N. Special Operations During the Korean War (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000).;

[58].   US Army, Letter, Farrell to Coulter, February 10, 1951, Secret, NARA [view]
JCS, Memorandum, Report on Trip to FECOM, 26 November - 17 December 1951, December 20, 1951, Top Secret, NARA FOIA [view]
US Army, Letter, Collins to Smith, February 4, 1952, Secret, NARA [view]
CIA, Memorandum, deleted Report on CIA Installations in the Far East, March 14, 1952, Secret, CREST [view]
CIA, Letter, Smith to Ridgway, April 14, 1952, Top Secret, CREST [view]
CIA, Memorandum, [daft message], April 26, 1952, Top Secret, CREST [view]
JCS, Cable, DEPTAR (JCS) to CINCFE, April 30, 1952, Top Secret, NARA [view]
US Army, Memorandum, Combat Intelligence, August 27, 1952, Top Secret, NARA [view]
US Army, Memorandum, Problems Incident to Friendly Agents, January 22, 1953, Secret, NARA [view]
CIA, Report, The Secret War in Korea: June 1950 - June 1952, July 17, 1968, Secret, CIA FOIA [view]
US Courts, Affidavit of John Limond Hart, 1982, Unclassified, Vietnam Archive TTU. [view]

[59].   State Department, Memorandum, U.S. and Soviet Knowledge About CHICOM Advanced Weapons Programs, July 9, 1963, Top Secret, NARA [view]
State Department, Memorandum, Meeting on China Study, August 27, 1965, Top Secret, State Department FOIA. [view]

[60].   CIA, Memorandum, Decisions Facing the United States vis-a-vis Chiang Kai-shek, March 29, 1963, Top Secret, JFKL, [view]

[61].   Confidential interviews. For the ROK government's admission of heavy agent losses in North Korea, see “Ex-Spies Protest in S. Korea,” Associated Press, September 29, 2002. For complaints within the US intelligence community about the paucity of intelligence being collected from inside North Korea, see State Department, Briefing Book, Chairman Park's Visit, November 14-15, 1961, Secret, JFKL [view]
CIA, Report, Oxcart Reconnaissance of North Korea, September 4, 1967, Top Secret Oxcart, CREST [view]
CIA, Report, Ambassador Walker's Concerns About North Korea, March 21, 1984, Secret [codeword not declassified], CREST [view]
NSA, Report, The Capture of the USS Pueblo and Its Effect on SIGINT Operations, 1992, Top Secret Umbra, NSA FOIA [view]
CIA, Report, Persuading a President: Jimmy Carter and American Troops in Korea, 1996, Unclassified, CIA. [view]

[62].   JCS, Letter, Wheeler to Raborn, August 31, 1965, Secret, CREST [view]
CIA, DCI Briefing, Supplemental Appropriation, February 21, 1967, Secret, CREST [view]
White House, Memorandum, Covert Operations in North Vietnam, April 16, 1970, Top Secret/Sensitive, CREST [view]
White House, Memorandum, Covert Operations in North Vietnam, April 17, 1970, Top Secret/Sensitive, CREST [view]
US Army, Report, MACSOG Documentation Study: MACSOG Operations Against North Vietnam, July 10, 1970, Top Secret/Sensitive, DOD FOIA [view]
DOD, Letter, Laird to Rogers, June 16, 1971, Top Secret/Sensitive, NARA; CIA, Report, The Way We Do Things: Black Entry Operations Into North Vietnam, 1961-1964, May 2005, Secret, CIA FOIA [view]
CIA, Report, CIA and the Wars in Southeast Asia, 1947-75: A Studies in Intelligence Anthology, August 2016, Unclassified, CIA[view]. See also Robert M. Hathaway and Russell Jack Smith, Richard Helms As Director of Central Intelligence: 1966-1973 (Washington, D.C.: CIA History Staff, 1993), p. 70.;

[63].   For excellent examples of the CIA's “thin gruel” political intelligence reporting on the People's Republic of China, North Vietnam and North Korea, see CIA, Report, Sino-Soviet Competition in North Korea, April 5, 1961, Secret [view]
CIA, Report, North Vietnam and Sino-Soviet Relations, March 4, 1962, Secret [view]
CIA, Report, Political Problems in Communist China, July 19, 1965, Secret/NOFORN; CIA, Memorandum, The Leadership Upheaval in Communist China, June 17, 1966, Secret, CREST [view]
CIA, Memorandum, The Crisis in China, July 15, 1966, Secret, LBJL [view]
CIA, Report, Asian Communist Employment of Negotiations As a Political Tactic, November 1966, Secret/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Report, Mao's “Cultural Revolution” III. The Purge of the PLA and the Stardom of Madame Mao, June 1968, Top Secret [codeword not declassified]/NOFORN [view]
CIA, Report, Kim Il-Sung's Military Adventurism, November 26, 1968, Top Secret [codeword not declassified] [view]
and CIA, Report, Lin Piao and the Great Helmsman, January 21, 1970, Secret/NOFORN. [view]

[64].   CIA, Memorandum, Intelligence on Communist China, December 22, 1965, Top Secret [codeword not declassified], CREST [view]
CIA, Memorandum, China Intelligence Activities, May 9, 1966, Secret, CREST [view]
CIA, Report, Oxcart Reconnaissance of North Korea, September 4, 1967, Top Secret Oxcart, CREST. [view]

[65].   David Robarge, John McCone as Director of Central Intelligence: 1961-1965 (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005), p. 366.;

[66].   State Department, Memorandum, Mao Worries Over Sino-US Relations, September 20, 1973. Secret/NOFORN/Eyes Only, NARA. [view]

[67].   CIA, Report, The Art of China-Watching, Spring 1975, Secret/NOFORN, CIA [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Conversation With the Secretary of Defense, 27 November 1978, November 28, 1978, Secret, CREST [view]
NSC, Memorandum, Intelligence Community Watch on China, April 4, 1980, Secret, FRUS. [view]

[68].   US Army, Memorandum, EUSAK Requirements, Partisan Operations, December 18, 1951, Secret, NARA [view]
US Army, Memorandum, Employment of Partisan Forces, January 24, 1953, Top Secret, NARA [view]
US Army, Report, UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict, January 26, 1953, Secret, NARA FOIA [view]
US Army, Report, Headquarters [Covert, Clandestine and Related Activities Korea] Combat Command Report, January 1953, February 1953, Top Secret, NARA; ORO, Report, UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 1951-1954, June 1956, Secret, AWC. [view]

[69].   State Department, Letter, Rankin to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, December 20, 1950, Secret, FRUS [view]
State Department, Cable, State Department to SCAP (POLAD), January 12, 1951, Top Secret, NARA [view]
State Department, Memorandum, Support of China Mainland Resistance and Use of Nationalist Forces on Formosa, January 24, 1951, Top Secret, NARA. [view]
US Army, Memorandum, Planning for Employment of Chinese Nationalist Forces, July 3, 1951, Top Secret, NARA [view]
US Air Force, Memorandum, Military Support to Anti-Communist Groups in China, October 19, 1951, Top Secret, NARA FOIA [view]
CIA, Report, Estimate of the Present Strength and Capabilities of Anti-Communist Guerrillas in China, January 9, 1952, Top Secret, CREST [view]
CIA, Report, A Summary Appraisal of the Guerrilla Situation in China, January 9, 1952, Top Secret, CREST [view]
JCS, Memorandum, United States Policies on Support for Anti-Communist Chinese Forces, March 4, 1952, Top Secret, NARA [view]
NSC, Memorandum, United States Policies on Support for Anti-Communist Chinese Forces, March 28, 1952, Top Secret, HSTL [view]
CIA, Memorandum, United States Policies on Support for Anti-Communist Chinese Forces, April 10, 1952, Top Secret/Eyes Only, FRUS [view]
US Army, Memorandum, Guerrilla Activity on the China Mainland, September 4, 1952, Secret, NARA [view]
US Navy, Cable, CINCPAC to CHMAAG Formosa, May 6, 1953, Top Secret/Optic, NARA [view]
US Navy, Cable, CHMAAG Formosa to CINCPAC, November 27, 1954, Top Secret, NARA [view]
  State Department, Letter, Robertson to Drumright, April 29, 1958, Secret, FRUS [view]
State Department, Letter, Drumright to Robertson, May 27, 1958, Secret, NARA [view]
State Department, Memorandum, Republic of China - Paramilitary Activities on the China Mainland, November 24, 1959, Top Secret, NARA [view]
State Department, Memorandum, Talking Papers for Your December 16 Meeting With Ambassador Yeh, December 15, 1959, Secret, NARA. [view]

[70].   The CIA's side of the Tibet operation is told in State Department, Memorandum, Intelligence Note: Resistance in Tibet, March 6, 1959, Secret/NOFORN, NARA [view]
CIA, Memorandum, deleted Tibet, April 1, 1959, Secret, FRUS [view]
NSC, Memorandum, Memorandum for President Eisenhower's Files, April 6, 1959, Secret, FRUS [view]
State Department, Memorandum, Intelligence Note: The Tibetan Situation, April 6, 1959, Secret, NARA [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Tibet Summary, April 12, 1959, Secret, CREST [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Review of Tibetan Operations, April 27, 1959, Secret/Eyes Only, FRUS [view]
White House, Memorandum, JSDE to Goodpaster, April 27, 1959, Secret, DDEL [view]
White House, Memorandum, Discussion on Tibet, February 4, 1960, Secret/Eyes Only, DDEL [view]
White House, Memorandum, Discussion With the President on Tibet, February 4, 1960, Secret/Eyes Only, DDEL [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Transmittal of Revised Paper on Impact of the Tibetan Campaign on the Economy of Communist China, July 13, 1960, Top Secret Daunt/NOFORN/Continued Control, CREST [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Transmittal of Paper on Impact of Continued Tibetan Resistance on the Economy of Communist China, June 6, 1961, Top Secret Dinar/NOFORN/Continued Control, CREST [view]
NSC, Memorandum, no subject, December 9, 1961, Top Secret, JFKL; CIA, Memorandum, Review of Tibetan Operations, January 9, 1964, Secret/Eyes Only, State Department FOIA [view]
State Department, Memorandum, Status Report on Tibetan Operations, January 26, 1968, Secret/Eyes Only, State Department FOIA [view]
State Department, Memorandum, Status Report on Support to the Dalai Lama and Tibetan Operations, January 11, 1971, Secret/Eyes Only, FRUS. [view]

[71].   John Kenneth Knaus, Orphans of the Cold War: America and the Tibetan Struggle for Survival (NY: BBS Public Affairs, 1999), p. 233; William M. Leary, "Secret Mission to Tibet," Air & Space, January 1998, pp. 62, 70.;

[72].   State Department, Memorandum, no subject, November 30, 1961, Secret/Eyes Only, FRUS. [view]

[73].   DOD, Memorandum, Memorandum for Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 3, 1963, Top Secret, NARA [view]
JCS, Memorandum, Military Operations in North Vietnam, December 26, 1963, Top Secret, NARA [view]
White House, Memorandum, Minutes of the Meeting of the Special Group, 2 April 1964, April 3, 1964, Top Secret, CREST [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Special Group Meeting on 23 April and Other Matters, April 25, 1964, Secret/Eyes Only, CREST [view]
JCS, Memorandum, Resumption of 34A Actions, August 12, 1964, Top Secret/Sensitive, NARA. [view]

[74].   CIA, Memorandum, Probable North Vietnamese Reaction to Certain Clandestine Operations, December 20, 1963, Secret/Eyes Only. CIA. [view]

[75].   FBIS, Press Translation, Truth on US Diem Plane Shot Down in North Vietnam, July 18, 1961, Official Use Only, NARA [view]
NSC, Memorandum, Operation Against Barracks and Storage Facilities in Dien Bien Phu in North Vietnam, July 18, 1969, Secret/Eyes Only, FRUS [view]
White House, Memorandum, Covert Operations in North Vietnam, April 16, 1970, Top Secret/Sensitive, CREST [view]
White House, Memorandum, Covert Operations in North Vietnam, April 17, 1970, Top Secret/Sensitive, CREST [view]
US Army, Report, MACSOG Documentation Study: MACSOG Operations Against North Vietnam, July 10, 1970, Top Secret/Sensitive, DOD FOIA [view]
USAF, Report, Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report: The Role of the USAF in Support of Special Activities in SEA, July 1, 1976, Top Secret/NOFORN, AFHRA [view]. See also Tourison, Sedgwick D. Tourison, Jr., Secret Army Secret War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), and Kenneth Conboy and Dale Andradé, Spies and Commandos: How America Lost the Secret War in North Vietnam (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000).;

[76].   CIA, Report, no subject, May 25, 1961, Top Secret [codeword not declassified]/NOFORN, JFKL [view]
DOD, Memorandum, Talking Paper for the Chairman, JCS, for Meeting with the President of the United States 9 January 1962, January 9, 1962, Top Secret, NARA [view]
CIA, Memorandum, North Vietnam Support to Viet Cong via Laos, July 10, 1962, Top Secret [codeword not declassified]/NOFORN, LBJL [view]
State Department, Memorandum, Evidence of Recent Communist Infiltration into South Vietnam from Laos, October 19, 1962, Secret/NOFORN, NARA [view]
State Department, Memorandum, Recent Infiltration of PAVN Personnel Into Northern South Vietnam, July 24, 1964, Top Secret Dinar, LBJL [view]
USIB, Memorandum, Infiltration in South Vietnam - 1964, November 17, 1964, Top Secret, CREST [view]
White House, Report, Reconciliation of Present and Past Estimates of VC Infiltration, December 3, 1964, Confidential, LBJL [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Interdiction of Communist Infiltration Routes in Vietnam, June 24, 1965, Top Secret [codeword not declassified]/NOFORN, LBJL [view]
NIC, Memorandum, Information from PAVN Prisoners, September 2, 1965, Top Secret [codeword not declassified], CREST [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Status of Infiltration into South Vietnam, November 18, 1965, Secret, CREST. [view]

[77].   For NSA warnings of the impending North Vietnamese-Viet Cong Tet offensive, see NSA, Memorandum, Interview With Mr. Arthur McCafferty, White House Staff, on the Use of SIGINT in Shaping W.H. Decisions on Southeast Asia, undated but circa early 1968, Top Secret Trine, NSA [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Comments on Saigon Embassy Telegram13107, 4 January 1968, January 5, 1968, Secret/Sensitive, CREST [view]
NSA, Report, Southeast Asia SIGINT Summary, January 18, 1968, Top Secret Trine, NSA FOIA [view]
NSA, Report, Coordinated Vietnamese Communist Offensive Evidenced in South Vietnam, January 25, 1968, Secret Savin, NSA FOIA. For the US intelligence community's analysts botching the analytic reporting about North Vietnam's capacity to undertake a nationwide offensive in South Vietnam, see CIA, Memorandum, Early Warning of Viet Cong Tet Offensive, February 14, 1968, Secret, CREST [view]
CIA, Report, The Intelligence Background of the Current Communist Offensive, February 15, 1968, Top Secret [codeword not declassified], CIA FOIA [view]
CIA, Report, Intelligence Warning of the Tet Offensive in South Vietnam, April 8, 1968, Top Secret [codeword not declassified]/NOFORN, NARA [view]
CIA, Report, Intelligence Warning of the Tet Offensive in South Vietnam, April 15, 1968, Top Secret [codeword not declassified], CREST [view]. See also Harold P. Ford, CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes 1962-1968 (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1998), pp. 104-118; Bruce Palmer, Jr. “US Intelligence and Vietnam,” Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 28 No. 5 1984 Special Edition, pp. 55-59; Matthew M. Aid, The Secret Sentry: The Untold Story of the National Security Agency, New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2009), pp. 118-121.;

[78].   CIA, Memorandum, Attacking the Vietnamese Communists' Southern Organization, March 17, 1967, Secret, LBJL [view]
CIA, Memorandum, The Intelligence Attack on the Viet Cong Infrastructure, May 23, 1967, Secret, CREST [view]
CIA, Memorandum, Transmittal of Vietnam Report, July 27, 1967, Secret/Sensitive, LBJL [view]
CIA, Report, John McCone as Director of Central Intelligence: 1961-1965, 2005, Secret/NOFORN, CIA.;

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

  • Accinelli, Robert, Crisis and Commitment: United States Policy Toward Taiwan, 1950-1955 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996)
  • Aid, Matthew M., The Secret Sentry: The Untold Story of the National Security Agency (NY: Bloomsbury Press, 2009)
  • Aldrich, Richard J., Gary D. Rawnsley and Ming-Yeh T. Rawnsley (eds.), The Clandestine Cold War in Asia, 1945-65 (London: Frank Cass, 2000)
  • Alvarez, David, Secret Messages: Codebreaking and American Diplomacy: 1930-1945 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000)
  • Andrew, Christopher, For the President's Eyes Only (NY: HarperCollins, 1995)
  • Chang, Gordon H., Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990)
  • Cline, Ray S., The CIA Under Reagan, Bush and Casey (Washington, D.C.: Acropolis Books, 1981)
  • Cline, Ray S., Chiang Ching-kuo Remembered: The Man and His Political Legacy (Washington, D.C.: United States Global Strategy Council, 1989)
  • Conboy, Kenneth and Morrison, James, Feet to the Fire: CIA Covert Operations in Indonesia: 1957-1957 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1999)
  • Conboy, Kenneth and Andradé, Dale, Spies and Commandos: How America Lost the Secret War in North Vietnam (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000)
  • Conboy, Kenneth and Morrison, James, The CIA’s Secret War in Tibet (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002)
  • Curey, Cecil B., Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet American (NY: Houghton Mifflin, 1988)
  • de Graaff, Bob and Cees Wiebes, Villa Maarheeze: De Geschiedenis van de Inlichtingendienst Buitenland (Den Haag: Sdu Uitgevers, 1998)
  • de Silva, Peer, Sub Rosa: The CIA and the Uses of Intelligence (NY: Times Books, 1978)
  • Domes, Jurgen, Peng Te-huai: The Man and the Image (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1985)
  • Faligot, Roger, Naisho: enquête au coeur des services secrets japonais (Paris: Éditions La Découverte, 1997)
  • Foot, Rosemary, The Practice of Power, U.S. Relations with China Since 1949 (NY: Oxford University Press, 1995)
  • Garver, John W., The Sino-American Alliance (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997)
  • Goncharev, Sergei N., Lewis, John W. and Litai, Xuei, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993)
  • Gravel, Senator Mike, The Pentagon Papers: The Senator Gravel Edition (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971)
  • Hall, R. Cargill and Laurie, Clayton D. (eds.), Early Cold War Overflights 1950-1956: Symposium Proceedings (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Historian, National Reconnaissance Office, 2003)
  • Hansen, James H., Japanese Intelligence: The Competitive Edge (Washington, D.C.: NIBC Press, 1996)
  • Holober, Frank, Raiders of the China Coast (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1999)
  • I, Fu-en, My Memoirs (Taipei: Li Ching Cultural and Educational Foundation, 2003)
  • Jian, Chen, China's Road to the Korean War (NY: Columbia University Press, 1994)
  • Knaus, John Kenneth, Orphans of the Cold War: America and the Tibetan Struggle for Survival (NY: Public Affairs, 1999)
  • Leary, William M., Perilous Missions: Civil Air Transport and CIA Covert Operations in Asia (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1984)
  • Lerner, Mitchell B., The Pueblo Incident (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002)
  • Lewis, John Wilson and Litai, Xue, China Builds The Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988)
  • Lilley, James with Lilley, Jeffrey, China Hands: Nine Decades of Adventure, Espionage, and Diplomacy in Asia (NY: Public Affairs, 2004
  • Lin, Hu, Bao wei zu guo ling kong de zhan dou (Fight to Protect the Motherland’s Airspace) (Beijing: Di 1 ban, 2002)
  • Marks, Thomas A., Counterrevolution in China: Wang Sheng and the Koumintang (London: Frank Cass, 1998)
  • Marolda, Edward J., The Approaching Storm: Conflict in Asia, 1945-1965 (Washington, D.C.: Naval History and Heritage Command/GPO, 2009)
  • McDonald, Robert A. (ed.), Corona: Between the Sun & The Earth: The First NRO Reconnaissance Eye in Space (Bethesda, MD: The American Society for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing, 1997)
  • McGehee, Ralph W., Deadly Deceits: My 25 Years in the CIA (NY: Sheridan Square Publications, 1983)
  • Peng Dehuai, Memoirs of a Chinese Marshal, trans. Zheng Longpu (Beijing, 1984)
  • Pocock, Chris, 50 Years of the U-2: The Complete Illustrated History of the “Dragon Lady” (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 2005)
  • Pocock, Chris with Fu, Clarence, The Black Bats: CIA Spy Flights Over China from Taiwan: 1951-1969 (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 2010)
  • Prados, John, Lost Crusader: The Secret Wars of CIA Director William Colby (NY: Oxford University Press, 2003)
  • Richelson, Jeffrey T., The Wizards of Langley (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001)
  • Richelson, Jeffrey T., Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea (NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006)
  • Rositzke, Harry, The CIA's Secret Operations (Boulder: Westview Press, 1977)
  • Shu, Guang Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995)
  • Smith, Joseph P., Portrait of a Cold Warrior (NY: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1976)
  • Stueck, William, Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).
  • Thomas, Evan, The Very Best Men: Four Who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA (NY: Simon & Schuster, 1995)
  • Tourison, Sedgwick D.,  Jr., Secret Army Secret War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995)
  • Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, 1945-1992: Uncertain Friendships (NY: Twayne Publishers, 1994)
  • Wakeman, Frederic, Jr., Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003)
  • Weber, Ralph E. (ed.), Spymasters (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Books, 1999)
  • Whiting, Allen S. China Crosses the Yalu (New York: Macmillan, 1960)
  • Y’Blood, William T. (ed.), The Three Wars of Lt. General George E. Stratemeyer: His Korean War Diary (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1999)
  • Yu, Maochun, OSS in China (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996)
  • Zhai, Qiang, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000)
  • Zhang, Shu Guang, Mao's Military Romanticism (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1995)

Articles

  • Aid, Matthew M., “U.S. Humint and Comint in the Korean War: From the Approach of War to the Chinese Intervention,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 14, No. 4, Winter 1999, pp. 17-23.
  • Aid, Matthew M., “American Comint in the Korean War (Part II): From the Chinese Intervention to the Armistice,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 15, No. 1, Spring 2000, pp. 14-49.
  • Burr, William and Richelson, Jeffrey T., “Whether to Strangle the Baby in the Cradle: The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Winter 2000/2001), pp. 54-99.
  • Christensen, Thomas J., “Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace,” International Security, Vol. 17, No. 1, Summer 1992.
  • Dingman, Roger, “Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War,” International Security, Vol. 13, No. 3, Winter 1988/89.
  • Jian, Chen, “China's Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-69,” China Quarterly no. 142 (June 1995), pp. 356-87.
  • Leary, William M., “Secret Mission to Tibet,” Air & Space, January 1998.
  • Prados, John, “The Chinese Military: North Vietnam's Strategic Reserve,” VVA Veteran, Vol. 26, No. 5, September/October 2006, pp. 25-28.
  • Whiting, Allen S., “China’s Use of Force, 1950-96, and Taiwan,” International Security, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Fall 2001), pp. 103-131.


Archives

NARA National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland
CREST CIA-CREST database
HSTL Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri
DDEL Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas
JFKL John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts
LBJL Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas
RNL Richard M. Nixon Presidential Library, Yorba Linda, California
GRFL Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan
JCL Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, Georgia
RRL Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California
LOC Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.
CMH U.S. Army Center for Military History, Washington, D.C.
AFHRA U.S. Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Alabama
NHC Naval Historical Center Operational Archives, Washington, D.C.
MACL Douglas MacArthur Library, Norfolk, Virginia
NAUK National Archives of the United Kingdom, Kew, UK
NA Australia National Archives of Australia, Canberra, Australia
Vietnam Archive TTU Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Texas
NDU Archives of the National Defense University, Washington, D.C.
AWC Archives of the Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania


Glossary of Acronyms

AAA Anti-Aircraft Artillery
AB Air Base
ADSO Assistant Director for Special Operations (CIA)
AEC Atomic Energy Commission
AEDS Atomic Energy Detection System (USAF)
AF Air Force
AFB Air Force Base
AFHRA US Air Forced Historical Research Agency (Maxwell AFB, Alabama)
AFSA Armed Forces Security Agency
AFTAC Air Force Technical Application Center (nuclear test detection)
AIRA Air Attache
ALUSNA Naval Attache
Amembasy American embassy
ARDF Aerial Radio Direction Finding
AS Air Station
ASA Army Security Agency
ASAPAC Army Security Agency Pacific
ASYLUM US Army codeword which denotes that the document contains information derived from sensitive HUMINT sources
AWC Army War College (Carlisle, Pennsylvania)
C3 Command, control and communications
CAS Controlled American Source, covername used in communications traffic for the CIA
CI counterintelligence
CIA Central Intelligence Agency (1947-present)
CHICOM Chinese Communist
ChiNat Chinese Nationalist
CIC U.S. Army Counter-Intelligence Corps (1942-1960)
CIG Central Intelligence Group (1946-1947)
CINCAFE Commander-in-Chief Air Forces in Europe (USAFE)
CINCEUR Commander-in-Chief, Europe
CINCFE Commander-in-Chief, Far East
CINCLANT Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic
CINCNELM Commander-in-Chief, Northeast Atlantic and Mediterranean
CINCPAC Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
CINCUSAFE Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Air Forces in Europe
CMH U.S. Army Center for Military History (Washington, D.C.)
CNO Chief of Naval Operations
COMINT Communications Intelligence
COMOR Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (CIA)
COMSEC Communications Security
CONUS Continental United States
COS Chief of Station (CIA)
CREST CIA Records Search Tool. An electronic full-text searchable system installed and maintained by the CIA. Until 17 January 2017, it was accessible only as a standalone database at NARA II in College Park, Maryland and could be used on site only. Since then, the documents have been made available in the CIA’s Electronic Reading Room on CIA's website, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom.
CSAF Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force
CSG Current Support Group/Cryptologic Support Group/Cryptologic Services Group (NSA)
CSUSA Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
DA Department of the Army
DCI Director of Central Intelligence
DCID Director of Central Intelligence Directive
DDEL Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas
DDI Deputy Director for Intelligence (CIA)
DDO Deputy Director Operations (CIA 1973-present)
DDP Deputy Director for Plans (CIA 1952-1973)
DDS&T Deputy Director for Science and Technology (CIA 1963-)
DEPTAR Department of the Army
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
DIRNSA Director, National Security Agency
DOD Department of Defense
DTIC Defense Technical Information Center
ELINT Electronics Intelligence
ESD External Survey Detachment (CIG/CIA unit in China)
EUCOM U.S. European Command
EUR Europe
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEC / FECOM Far East Command, Douglas MacArthur’s headquarters in Tokyo
FI foreign intelligence
FOIA Freedom of Information Act
FRU Field Research Unit, the covername for the CIA in the Far East from 1949 onwards
FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States, a series of historical volumes published by the US State Department
G-2 U.S. Army intelligence staff/section
GCHQ Government Communications Headquarters (U.K.)
GHWBL George H.W. Bush Library
GRC Government of the Republic of China (Taiwan)
GRFL Gerald R. Ford Library
GRU Glavnoye Razvedatelnoye Upravleniye - General Staff Intelligence Directorate (Soviet/Russian)
HSTL Harry S. Truman Library
HUMINT Human Intelligence
HVCCO Handle Via COMINT Channels Only
IMINT Imagery Intelligence
INR Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
IRBM Intermediate-range ballistic missile
ISCAP Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel
JCL Jimmy Carter Library
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFKL John F. Kennedy Library
JIC Joint Intelligence Committee
JSOB Joint Special Operations Branch, FECOM HUMINT organization (1950-1951) based in Tokyo
KGB Komitet Gosudarstvenoi Bezopastnosti - Committee for State Security (Soviet)
KMT Koumintang (Chinese Nationalist political party)
KUBARK CIA communications crytonym identifying the CIA as a recipient
LBJL Lyndon B. Johnson Library
LOC Library of Congress
MAAG Military Assistance Advisory Group
MACL Douglas MacArthur Library, Norfolk, Virginia
MACSOG Military Assistance Command, Vietnam - Studies and Observation Group
MACV Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MACV-SOG Military Assistance Command, Vietnam - Studies and Observation Group
MGB Ministry for State Security (Soviet)
MOD Ministry of Defence (UK)
MRBM Medium-range ballistic missile
MVD Ministry of the Interior (Soviet)
NA National Archives (U.S.)
NAS Naval Air Station
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAUK National Archives of the UK (Kew, England)
NDU National Defense University (Washinigton, D.C.)
NHC Naval Historical Center (Washington, D.C.)
NIC National Indications Center
NIE National Intelligence Estimate
NOFORN Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NPIC National Photographic Interpretation Center (CIA)
NRO National Reconnaissance Office
NSA National Security Agency
NSC National Security Council
NSCID National Security Council Intelligence Directive
OCB Operations Coordinating Board
ONI Office of Naval Intelligence
OPC Office of Policy Coordination
OPLAN Operations Plan
OPTIC US military codeword indicating that the document contained material pertaining to covert action operations
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSO Office of Special Operations (CIA)
OSS Office of Strategic Services
OXCART CIA’s codename for their version of the SR-71 spyplane
PAC Pacific
PFIAB President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
PHOTINT Photo Intelligence
PKI Communist Party of Indonesia
PLA People’s Liberation Army
PRC People’s Republic of China
PVO Strany Strategic Air Defense of the Homeland (Soviet)
RADINT Radar Intelligence
RAF Royal Air Force
RG Record Group
RNL Richard Nixon Library
ROK Republic of Korea (South Korea)
RRL Ronald Reagan Library
RUFF The top secret codeword indicating that a document contains intelligence material derived from satellite imagery.
RV Reentry Vehicle
SAC Strategic Air Command
SACLANT Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SAM Surface-to-air missile
SDECE Service de Documentation exterieure et de contre-espionage (French foreign intelligence service)
SECDEF Secretary of Defense
SECSTATE Secretary of State
SENSINT Sensitive Intelligence (USAF overflights of USSR and China from 1949-1956)
SHAPE Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers in Europe
SIGINT Signals Intelligence
SIS Secret Intelligence Service, or MI6 (UK)
SLBM Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
SNIE Special National Intelligence Estimate
SRF Strategic Rocket Forces (Soviet)
SSM Surface-to-Surface Missile
SSU Strategic Services Unit (1945-1947)
SUSLO Special U.S. Liaison Officer (NSA senior liaison officer)
TACKLE CIA codename for U-2 spyplane overflights of mainland China
TSCW Top Secret Codeword
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
USAF U.S. Air Force
USAFE U.S. Air Forces, Europe (USAF)
USAFSS US Air Force Security Service
USAIRA U.S. Air Attache
USARMA U.S. Army Attache
USCIB U.S. Communications Intelligence Board
USIB U.S. Intelligence Board.
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WHSR White House Situation Room
WJCL William J. Clinton Library
W/T Wireless Telephone (morse code radio transmissions)

CHRONOLOGY

August 14, 1945

Victory Over Japan (VJ) Day. Emperor Hirohito announces Japan’s surrender. Last day of World War II.

November 27, 1945

General George C. Marshall began his efforts to mediate an end to the Chinese Civil War.

December 22, 1945

George C. Marshall arrived in the Chinese capital of Chungking to try to mediate a peace conference between Chiang Kai-shek’s Chinese Nationalist regime and Mao Tse-tung’s Chinese Communist forces.

July 20, 1946

Chiang Kai-shek Chinese Nationalist forces launched a large-scale assault on Communist territory with 113 brigades (1.6 million troops). This marked the beginning of the final phase of the Chinese Civil War, which ended with the defeat of the Chinese Nationalist forces in 1949.

June 26, 1946

The ceasefire agreement between the Chinese Nationalist and Chinese Communist forces collapsed and intense fighting between the two sides resumed in northern China and Manchuria. The peace negotiations being brokered by General George C. Marshall ended, and shortly thereafter General Marshall returned to the U.S.

July 4, 1946

The Philippines was granted its independence from the U.S.

September 1946

CIG Deputy Director Captain W.B. Goggins, USN negotiated an agreement with General MacArthur’s intelligence chief, General Charles Willoughby, whereby in return for entre to Japan, the CIG agreed to give FECOM free access to intelligence information being collected by CIG’s External Survey Detachment 44 (ESD-44) in China. Also as part of the agreement, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) was also allowed to establish a radio broadcast intercept facility on Okinawa.

March 1947

Chinese Nationalist forces captured Mao Tse-tung’s former headquarters at Yenan.

April 6, 1948

The first president of the Philippines, Manuel Roxas, died of a heart attack. Marked the beginning of the rebellion in central Luzon of a communist guerrilla group called the Hukbalahaps, or simply the Huks. At their height, they controlled most of the area around Clark Air Base on Luzon and even parts of the capital city of Manila.

July 20, 1948

Syngman Rhee was elected president of South Korea.

August 15, 1948

The Republic of Korea was formally established in Seoul.

September 15, 1948

First discussions take place in Tokyo concerning the creation of  a secret Japanese human intelligence gathering operation called TAKEMATSU. According to a CIA report, “Takematsu is the code name for a secret intelligence operation presently being established by the AC/S G-2, GHQ FEC. The operation is designed to provide domestic intelligence from within Japan (MATSU) as well as positive intelligence from without (TAKE). TAKEMATSU is to be manned and run by Japanese personnel with U.S. personnel involved only at the high policy level. The entire operation is to be financed by [Far East Command] G-2.”

January 22, 1949

The Chinese capital of Beijing fell to Mao Tse-tung’s Chinese communist forces.

June 1949

First CIA (FRU/FEC) station opened in Seoul, South Korea under the cover of the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG). Philip C. Rowe (Vice Consul) arrived in Seoul in November 1949 to serve as the CIA chief of station.  

June 26, 1949

The Chinese Nationalist military announced the “closure” of all 13 major ports along the Chinese coast, signaling the beginning of what amounted to a multi-year naval blockade of mainland China.

October 1, 1949

The People’s Republic of China was created in Beijing.

December 10, 1949

Chinese Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo were evacuated by air from the besieged city of Chengdu on the mainland to Taiwan. Chiang Kai-shek would never return to the mainland.

December 19, 1949

Robert Gordon Menzies was elected prime minister of Australia, replacing Adam Chifley. A conservative anticommunist, Menzies was to remain PM of Australia for the next sixteen years until his retirement on January 26, 1966 at the age of 71. Menzies’ election allowed the U.S. to resume the exchange of classified information, including SIGINT, with Australia.

February 1950

French request U.S. military assistance in Indochina.

May 1950

CIA (FRU/FEC) established a small station in Taipei headed by Robert J. Myers, who would go on to serve as the OSO chief of station in Taiwan from 1950 until 1952.

June 25, 1950

North Korea invaded South Korea.

June 28, 1950

The North Koreans capture the South Korean capital of Seoul without a fight.

June 30, 1950

The first small party of CIA case officers and radio communicators from the FRU/FEC base at Yokosuka, Japan arrived by military transport plane at Suwon Air Base, Korea.

July 1, 1950

The commander in chief of the Far East Command, General Douglas MacArthur, is ordered by Washington to commit the first U.S. military forces to the fighting in Korea.

July 3, 1950

The North Koreans captured the South Korean port city of Inchon, followed by the key railroad junction and airfield at the town of Suwon the following day. AFSA produced its first translation of a plain-language North Korean intercept.

July 10, 1950

U.S. Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins sent a memorandum to the JCS recommending that the CIA’s Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) commence immediately a covert operation on the Chinese mainland so as to “reduce the Chinese Communist capabilities to reinforce North Korean forces, to attack Formosa, and to support Viet Minh forces.”

July 17, 1950

Intelligence analysts at AFSA report the first evidence from intercepted Chinese civil communications traffic indicating that large portions of the Chinese Fourth Field Army had been moved from central China to Manchuria beginning in April and May 1950.

July 27, 1950

The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for permission to conduct photo reconnaissance missions over the Chinese coastline opposite Taiwan in order to “... obtain advance knowledge of Communist intentions to launch an amphibious assault against Taiwan.

July 30, 1950

The Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized General MacArthur to conduct shallow reconnaissance overflights of mainland China south of the 32nd parallel opposite Taiwan in order to detect any indications that the Chinese military was preparing to invade the island of Taiwan.

August 14, 1950

The U.S. Air Force intelligence staff in Washington compiled the first list industrial and military targets inside China for either nuclear or conventional bombing attacks if the Chinese were to invade Taiwan.

August 24, 1950

North Korean offensive to take South Korean city of Taegu ends in failure.

September 1950

Lt. Col. Edward G. Lansdale, USAF and his deputy, Charles Bohannan, flew into Manila to establish the OPC’s first station in the Philippines. Operating undercover from the JUSMAG compound outside Manila, Lansdale operated completely independent of the OSO station in the U.S. embassy in Manila headed by John Richardson.

September18, 1950

The Burmese Ambassador in Beijing sent a cable to Rangoon reporting that Communist China would become involved militarily in Korea, telling his superiors that “China expects war, and is prepared.”

September 25, 1950

Chinese Premier Chou En-lai warned the Indian ambassador in Beijing, Ambassador K.M. Pannikar, that China would intervene militarily in Korea if U.N. forces crossed the 38th Parallel. The ambassador’s warning was ignored in Washington and Tokyo.

September 28, 1950

Seoul was recaptured by U.S. forces.

September 30, 1950

North Korean leader Kim Il Sung personally asked the Chinese ambassador to North Korea, Ni Zhiliang, for Chinese military assistance in staving off disaster for North Korea's beleaguered armed forces. (Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War (NY: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 172)

October 2, 1950

Mao Tse-tung convened an urgent meeting of the Chinese Communist Party’s Politburo to discuss the deteriorating military situation in Korea. After much debate, that evening the Politburo decided to intervene in the Korean War on or about October 15, 1950, and designated General Peng Dehuai, commander of the First Field Army in northwest China, as the commander of the Chinese forces to be used in Korea. (Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War (NY: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 172-177; Thomas J. Christensen, “Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace,” International Security, Vol. 17, No. 1, Summer 1992, pp. 151-152)

October 3, 1950

Chinese Premier Chou En-lai told the Indian ambassador in Beijing, K.M. Pannikar, that if U.N. forces other than the South Koreans, crossed the 38th parallel, China would send its forces across the Yalu River to defend North Korea.

October 5, 1950

The first American combat troops crossed the 38th Parallel and began advancing on the North Korean capital of Pyongyang.

October 8, 1950

Mao Tse-tung ordered the Chinese military to intervene in the Korean War. Mao issued a formal directive ordering the creation of the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) for the purpose of committing PLA forces in Korea and sent a telegram to Kim Il-sung informing him of his intention to intervene militarily in Korea.

October 12, 1950

CIA issues its first official intelligence estimate for President Harry S. Truman on the potential for Chinese military intervention in the Korean War, which concludes that “While full-scale Chinese Communist intervention in Korea must be regarded as a continuing possibility, a consideration of all known factors leads to the conclusion that barring a Soviet decision for global war, such action is not probable in 1950.”

October 19, 1950

The North Korean capital of Pyongyang fell to U.S. forces. That evening, troops belonging to the 13th Army Group of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) secretly began crossing the Yalu River into North Korea. By the following morning, four full-strength Chinese armies, consisting of about 260,000 men, had crossed the Yalu River into North Korea at seven points.

October 20, 1950

DCI General Walter Bedell Smith sent a Top Secret memorandum to President Truman warning that credible intelligence sources, including SIGINT, had detected in the previous two weeks indications of a notable increase in Chinese military activities in Manchuria. Smith’s memo concluded that all these indicators pointed to “... the possibility that the Chinese Communists might intervene in the Korean conflict to protect the [Suiho] hydro-electric dams.”

October 25, 1950

Elements of three Chinese armies launch concerted attack on U.S. and South Korean forces near the North Korean town of Unsan, decimating the South Korean II Corps and a regiment of the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division. The attack suddenly ceases on November 2, 1950.

November 16, 1950

Weekly report of the JIIC stated that “The increase in Chinese Communist forces in Manchuria and Northeast China, the widespread Chinese defensive measures, and the nature of Chinese Communist propaganda indicate the definite possibility of major Chinese Communist intervention in Korea.”

November 20, 1950

U.S. troops reach the Yalu River in North Korea.

November 25, 1950

At 8:00 p.m., the Chinese military openly intervenes in the Korean War, striking American and South Korean forces deployed along the full length of the Yalu River. U.S. military forces are decimated, and for the next month retreat southwards, in the process abandoning all of North Korea to the Chinese and North Korean forces.

December 24, 1950

General MacArthur submitted to the JCS his list of 21 urban and industrial targets inside the USSR and northern China which he recommended be struck with nuclear weapons to retard a Soviet military advance if war broke out. Included on the list was the port city and naval base at Vladivostok, the cities of Khabarovsk, Komsomolsk, Irkutsk, Chita, and Ulan Ude, the Manchurian cities of Mukden and Harbin, and the Chinese capital of Beijing.

January 4, 1951

Seoul falls to Chinese troops.

January 12, 1951

In a report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff delivered to the National Security Council (NSC) entitled NSC 101, Courses of Action Relative to Communist China and Korea, the JCS recommended that the U.S. “Remove now restrictions on air reconnaissance of China coastal areas and of Manchuria.” The document also recommended that the CIA be permitted to “Furnish now all practicable covert aid to effective Nationalist guerrilla forces in China.”

January 15, 1951

The NSC approved the January 12, 1951 JCS proposal, recommending to President Truman that he permit the military to launch reconnaissance missions over coastal China and Manchuria; and that the CIA be authorized to provide support to anti-communist guerrillas operating on the Chinese mainland.

February 1951

CIA’s Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) formed its own station in Taiwan using as cover the name of a Pittsburgh-based CIA proprietary company called “Western Enterprises, Inc.” (WEI). The first WEI personnel arrived in Taiwan in March 1951. (Frank Holober, Raiders of the China Coast (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1999), pp. 8, 14)

February 1951

The CIA’s Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) began a large-scale aerial resupply operation for General Li Mi’s Chinese Nationalist forces based in northern Burma. (William M. Leary, Perilous Missions: Civil Air Transport and CIA Covert Operations in Asia (University, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1984), p. 129; Government of the Union of Burma, Ministry of Information, Kuomintang Aggression Against Burma (Rangoon: Ministry of Information, 1955), p. 9)

April 11, 1951

President Truman fired General Douglas MacArthur. Lt. General Matthew B. Ridgway was named to succeed him as Command-in-Chief, Far East Command (CINCFE).

April 27, 1951

The commander of Far East Command, General Matthew Ridgway, sent a Top Secret Eyes Only cable to the JCS in Washington, stating “I have concluded that the military situation in this theater now requires that there should be delegated to me without delay authority to attack enemy air bases in Manchuria and the Shantung Peninsula at the earliest moment. I am prepared to do so following a major enemy air attack against our forces in Korean Area.”

May 18, 1951

United Nations passed a resolution calling on all member nations to halt the shipment of all weapons and military-related goods to mainland China.

May 18, 1951

General Li Mi’s KMT forces invaded Yunnan Province, capturing five border villages before being repelled by a counterattack by Chinese forces. By the end of May 1951, what was left of Li Mi’s battered forces had fled back across the border into northern Burma.

May 23, 1951

A USAF RB-45 reconnaissance aircraft based at Yokota Air Base, Japan flew the first Top Secret reconnaissance overflight of Manchuria.

July 10, 1951

Korean truce talks begin at Kaesong, and continue off and on for the next two years.

July 28, 1951

The CINCFE Counter-Intelligence Division recommended that the command move to form and expand Japanese intelligence and security services to take over functions that were then being performed by FECOM G-2 because Japan’s full independence was fast approaching.

April 1952

The first CIA “Third Force” agent team was parachuted into southern China. The team disappeared without a trace.

April 28, 1952

U.S. military occupation of Japan came to an end after Japan regained her independence.

June 11, 1952

The National Security Council issued a Top Secret directive entitled “NSC-128," which included a provision for a greatly expanded program of CIA-directed covert action operations against mainland China, including increased Chinese Nationalist maritime raids against the Chinese mainland and support of Chinese Nationalist-back guerrilla forces in southern China. The NSC decided that the approved program of CIA covert action operations against China must remain secret in order to offset the publicly-announced decision to fight a strictly limited war in Korea while at the same time engaging in cease-fire talks with the communists.

August 2, 1952

Korean security guards working for the CIA fired on a ship carrying South Korean president Synman Rhee off the island of Chodo, which was a major CIA training facility located off the south coast of South Korea. The incident, which became known within the US government as the “Judo Incident,” precipitated a secret political crisis that almost caused President Rhee to demand the expulsion of the entire CIA station from South Korea.

November 29, 1952

Civil Air Transport (CAT) C-47 aircraft with CIA officers John T. Downey and Richard G. Fecteau aboard was shot down by the Chinese over Manchuria.

January 12/13, 1953

A USAF B-29 psychological warfare aircraft belonging to the 581st ARC Wing went off course while on a nighttime psychological warfare leaflet drop mission over North Korea, and was shot down over Manchuria by Chinese fighters.  The entire crew of 13 men, including the wing commander, Colonel John K. Arnold, Jr., managed to parachute to safety, but were captured by Chinese internal security forces upon landing.

February 2, 1953

In his first State of the Union address to Congress, President Dwight D. Eisenhower announced that as a matter of policy, he had “de-neutralized” Taiwan and that he had issued new orders to the commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet ordering him not prevent or interfere with Chinese Nationalist raids on the Chinese mainland.

May 20, 1953

The JCS briefed the National Security Council on contingency plans should the armistice negotiations at Panmunjon break down. It was decided that should the truce talks break down, that the U.S. would: “... extend the war in an effort to gain a military decision.” USAF war planners in the Pentagon immediately began putting together a plan for a combined conventional-nuclear air assault on military and industrial targets in northern China and Manchuria if the truce talks broke down and the JCS gave the go-ahead to expand the war.

July 27, 1953

Armistice agreement signed at Panmunjom, ending the Korean War.

August 14, 1953

CIA HUMINT report stated that “The YOSHIDA cabinet intends to build a central intelligence organization around the Cabinet Research Chamber (Naikaku Chosa Shitsu) (CRC). This will not be accomplished, however, for some time.

September 1953

“Tripartite Conference” held in Melbourne, Australia between representatives of NSA, GCHQ and the Australian SIGINT organization, the Defence Signals Branch (DSB). As a result of the conference, the DSB is fully integrated into NSA-GCHQ SIGINT collection operations in the Far East.

October 4, 1953

Chinese Nationalist warships seize Polish tanker Praca in international waters east of Taiwan. This was the first seizure of a Soviet Bloc merchant vessel by the Chinese Nationalists. The Chinese Nationalist government later formally confiscated the vessel.

March 12, 1954

40,000 Viet Minh troops begin a massive assault on the surrounded French military garrison at Dien Bien Phu west of Hanoi.

May 7, 1954

The French garrison at Dien Bien Phu falls to the Viet Minh after a 57 day siege. The French lost more than 2,200 killed and 16,000 wounded in the fighting, and thousands more were taken prisoner.

June 22, 1954

Two Chinese Nationalist destroyers seize in international waters 100 miles due south of Taiwan the 9,051-ton Russian tanker Tuapse. The Russian tanker was bound for Shanghai carrying a load of 12,000-tons of Romanian kerosene.

July 7, 1954

Ngo Dinh Diem was named the premier of South Vietnam.

July 21, 1954

Geneva Conference Agreement signed. The agreement separated North and South Vietnam at the 17th parallel, and confirmed the independence of Laos and Cambodia.

July 26, 1954

Chinese fighters attacked a pair of U.S. Navy aircraft who had just made a low-level photo run over two Polish freighters and an escorting Chinese gunboat off Hainan Island. The CIA concluded that these incident was prompted by the Chinese military’s efforts to protect foreign shipping attempting to break the Chinese Nationalist naval blockade and enter southern Chinese ports.

August 1954

The Chinese Central Military Commission in Beijing issued an order to the commander of the Fujian (Fukien) Military District to begin an artillery bombardment of Chinese Nationalist military positions on Matsu and Quemoy (Kinmen) Islands.

August 11, 1954

Chinese foreign minister Chou En-lai publicly stated that China intended to liberate Taiwan.

September 3, 1954

Hundreds of Chinese artillery pieces began the bombardment of Chinese Nationalist military positions on the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. Two American military advisors were killed in the bombardment.

December 2, 1954

U.S. and Nationalist China signed a Mutual Defense Treaty, which formally committed the United States to defend Taiwan from attack.

January 21, 1955

In a surprise attack, Chinese troops capture the island of Ichiang from its Chinese Nationalist defenders.

February 5-11, 1955

Chinese Nationalist garrison on the Tachen Islands was evacuated by the U.S. Seventh Fleet.

March 1955

The overall management of covert action activities against mainland China, including commando raids, maritime interdiction, and other paramilitary activities, was transferred from the CIA to the MAAG staff in Taipei.

April 29, 1955

Bao Dai was removed as the leader of South Vietnam and replaced by Ngo Diem.

May 10, 1955

Eight U.S. Air Force F-86 jet fighters were attacked by 12 Chinese MiG-17 fighters off the west coast of North Korea. Two MiGs were confirmed shot down. No American casualties were reported.

October 1955

The CIA’s China Operations Group completed its move from NAS Atsugi, Japan to a newly constructed headquarters complex at the Subic Bay naval base in the Philippines. The chief of station was Desmond Fitzgerald. The Subic Bay station was closed down a year later in late 1956 after being determined to be superfluous to operational requirements.

October 26, 1955

Vietnam. Ngo Dinh Diem became the president of South Vietnam.

August 22/23, 1956

A US Navy P4M-1Q Mercator ferret aircraft was shot down 32 miles off the coast of Communist China by Chinese fighters . All 16 crew members killed.

February 21, 1957

Indonesian president Sukarno assumed semi-dictatorial powers in Djakarta with the support of the one million-man Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).

March 1957

A state of emergency was declared in Indonesia, but the Sukarno government in Djakarta took no military action against the various breakaway military factions spread across Indonesia, with the largest being on Sumatra.

March 17, 1957

Filipino president Ramon Magsaysay was killed when his airplane crashed into the side of a mountain outside Cebu City.

September 16, 1957

During a Thai army coup d’etat led by Marshal Sarit Thanarat, a column of Thai army troops tried to seize the CIA’s huge SEA Supply Company building on Chitlom Lane in downtown Bangkok, which was several blocks from the U.S. embassy. CIA agents inside the building had not yet finished burning their classified documents on the building’s roof when the Thai army troops and a mob of angry civilians arrived intent on sacking the CIA’s offices. They were prevented from entering the building only by the personal heroism of the CIA chief of station, John Hart, who stood in the building’s entrance and refused to let the soldiers pass.

February 10, 1958

Indonesia/covert action. While Sukarno was on a state visit to Japan, the CIA-backed rebel Indonesian army colonels at Padang on Sumatra issued an ultimatum to the Sukarno regime to resign without consulting the CIA. Five days later they formed their own government, called the PRRI, with the city of Padang on Sumatra serving as the capital of their breakaway republic. Most of the Indonesian army, however, remained loyal to Sukarno.

June 18, 1958

First CIA U-2 overflight of mainland China was flown from Okinawa. The mission covered a wide range of targets, including the cities of Beijing and Shanghai, as well as the coastal region of the Chinese mainland opposite Taiwan.

July 1958

The Chinese resumed their artillery bombardment of Chinese Nationalist-held Quemoy and Matsu Islands following the landing of U.S. forces in Lebanon.

Early August 1958

COMINT detected a dramatic buildup of Chinese Air Force units at airfields within striking distance of Taiwan.

August 20, 1958

A CIA U-2 reconnaissance mission was flown from Okinawa over the coastal portion of eastern China, which detailed a buildup of Chinese combat aircraft across the strait from Taiwan.

August 21, 1958

At a meeting of the National Security Council, CIA director Allen W. Dulles reported that “the Chinese Communist build-up in the area of the Taiwan Straits was of such character and magnitude that a Chinese Communist attack on the offshore islands could occur with virtually no advance warning.”

August 23, 1958

Following a gradual buildup of mainland airfields, bases, and artillery positions near the offshore islands, the Chinese Army resumed its artillery bombardment of the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. 40,000 artillery rounds hit Quemoy on this day alone. Eisenhower ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet to escort Chinese Nationalist merchant ships carrying supplies to the beleaguered offshore islands.

August 25, 1958

Meeting of the NSC at the White House to discuss the Taiwan Strait crisis. President Eisenhower approved JCS proposals to reinforce Taiwan’s air defenses, strengthen the Seventh Fleet, begin escorting supply ships destined for Quemoy at Matsu, and prepare to assume responsibility for the air defense of Taiwan. Eisenhower, however, rejected the outright use of nuclear weapons if hostilities commenced.

April 1959

Tibetans revolt against Chinese rule. The Dalai Lama fled Tibet for India.

July 1959

The CIA established a secret base for U-2 overflights of China at Takhli Royal Thai Air Force Base (RTAFB) in Thailand.

September 3, 1959

A Chinese Nationalist RB-57D overflight of the Chinese mainland brought back the first pictures of the Chinese gaseous diffusion plant at Lanchow, which was at the time in an advanced state of construction.

December 1959

Military coup d’etat that was covertly backed by the U.S. government overthrew the centrist Laotian government and replaced it with a right wing anticommunist government.

April 26, 1960

South Korean dictator Syngman Rhee was forced to resign from office after several days of bloody rioting in the port city of Masan, which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of civilians. Rhee died in exile in Hawaii on July 19, 1965.

May 2, 1960

All ROCAF reconnaissance overflights of the Chinese mainland were ordered halted the day after Francis Gary Powers’ U–2 was shot down over Sverdlovsk, Russia.

Summer 1960

The Soviets withdrew thousands of their technicians engaged in assisting various Chinese military and economic development programs, including the Chinese ballistic missile and nuclear weapons research and development programs.

August 9, 1960

The Laotian government was overthrown by leftist-neutralist military forces led by Captain Kong Le, an American trained paratrooper who commanded an airborne battalion. On August 17, 1960, Souvanna Phouma became the Laotian premier.

Mid-August 1959

The USIB SIGINT Committee tasked USAFSS with providing the maximum amount of intelligence concerning the movements and activities of North Vietnamese regular forces and Laotian Pathet Lao guerrilla forces in northern Laos.

August 26, 1960

The CIA’s proposal to create a Chinese Nationalist U-2 detachment to conduct overflights of the Chinese mainland was approved by the State Department.

November 4, 1960

President Eisenhower approved the joint CIA-Chinese Nationalist U-2 project.

November 11, 1960

Three battalions of South Vietnamese paratroopers tried to overthrow the Diem government in Saigon. Diem’s bodyguards held the paratroopers at bay.

December 8, 1960

SIGINT revealed that Soviet military transport aircraft based outside Hanoi had begun a large-scale airlift of supplies and military equipment to Pathet Lao troops in northern Laos. Over the next two years (December 1960 to the end of 1962), these Soviet transport aircraft were tracked by COMINT flying almost 3,000 sorties between North Vietnam and Pathet Lao forces in northern Laos.

December 14, 1960

Joint CIA-ROCAF U-2 detachment (Detachment H) was established at Taoyuan Air Base on Taiwan equipped with two U-2 reconnaissance aircraft.

January 20, 1961

John F. Kennedy was sworn in as the 35th President of the United States.

April 29, 1961

The National Security Council, with President John F. Kennedy presiding, approved a plan to deploy a small detachment of 78 ASA radio intercept personnel and $1.2 million worth of SIGINT collection equipment to Vietnam, as well as a team of 15 Army personnel to train members of the South Vietnamese Army in tactical COMINT intercept, traffic analysis, and HFDF operations. President Kennedy also agreed to a plan to provide limited intelligence derived from COMINT information to the South Vietnamese military.

May 12, 1961

The US ambassador to South Vietnam, the chief of MAAG in Saigon, Lt. General Lionel McGarr, and the CIA Chief of Station in Saigon, William Colby, obtained President Diem’s personal approval to deploy American COMINT intercept personnel to South Vietnam.

May 16, 1961

A force of some 3,600 army troops and marines led by Maj. Gen. Pak Chong-hui (Park Chung Hee), deputy commander of South Korea’s Second Army, seized Seoul and deposed the newly elected South Korean civilian government of Prime Minister Chang Myon.

August 15, 1961

CIA intelligence estimate (NIE 14-3/53.61) predicted that the South Vietnamese government was unlikely to fall to the communists, although the study noted that Diem’s regime was threatened by a possible military coup d’etat.

September 21, 1961

CIA reported that recent radio intercepts had identified the location of the Chinese ballistic missile test range outside the village of Shuangchengtzu in northern China, which apparently had been operating since January 1960.

December 1961

CIA CORONA reconnaissance satellite (Mission 9029) produced the first imagery of the Chinese Lop Nor nuclear weapons test site.

December 22, 1961

Army Security Agency enlisted man SP4 James T. Davis killed in South Vietnam. He was the first American combat casualty in Vietnam. Davis was killed by small arms fire along with nine ARVN SIGINT personnel after their truck was ambushed while trying to track down a Viet Cong radio transmitter with a portable AN/PRD-1 HFDF set.

January 12, 1962

First Chinese Nationalist-flown U-2 overflight of mainland China was conducted. The mission covered the Shuangchengtzu Missile Test Range and other targets in central China.

April 14, 1962

According to a declassified NSA history, “the roof fell in” when all 100+ Viet Cong radio transmitters in South Vietnam executed a major, nearly total communications and cryptographic change on their military and political-military networks.” The result was that as of April 20, 1962, all high-level North Vietnamese and Viet Cong cipher systems had become unreadable to the cryptanalysts at NSA.

Mid-April 1962

U.S. Navy destroyer USS DeHaven (DD 727) conducted the first Desoto naval reconnaissance patrol off the northern coast of China between Taiwan and the Chinese naval base of Tsingtao collecting ELINT and COMINT.

Early June 1962

SIGINT detected a major buildup of Chinese ground and air forces opposite Taiwan, which was Beijing’s reaction to the dramatic increase in Chinese Nationalist commando raids on the Chinese mainland.

June 15, 1962

ROCAF U-2 conducted the first reconnaissance overflight of Manchuria (Mission GRC 112), photographing a number of key strategic targets including the city of Harbin.

June 20, 1962

Concern at the CIA continued to mount as COMINT detected intensive PLA ground forces and military air movements into the Foochow-Amoy region opposite Taiwan. COMINT also detected indications that the Chinese were evacuating civilians from the coastal areas -- a clear sign among intelligence analysts of impending hostilities.

July 20, 1962

Agreement signed in Geneva, Switzerland which guaranteed the independence and territorial integrity of Laos. Both the U.S. and North Vietnamese governments secretly violated the terms of the Geneva agreements almost immediately.

August 15, 1962

Dutch-Indonesian ceasefire agreement signed. The Dutch colony of West New Guinea was ceded to Indonesia.

October 20, 1962

Heavy fighting broke out along the 2,500 mile-long Chinese-Indian border over control of a strip of territory along the border referred to as the North East Frontier Area (NEFA) near Tibet. Chinese forces advance across the border and soundly defeat the numerically weaker Indian forces in a week of fighting.

January 11, 1963

Because of growing evidence regarding developments in China’s nuclear weapons development program, DCI John McCone ordered the CIA to launch an “All-out intelligence effort against Communist China.” DCID 1/3 issued which declares that Chinese ‘advanced weapons systems’ were now a First Category Priority National Intelligence Objective.

November 1, 1963

Military coup d’etat in Saigon overthrew South Vietnamese government. Coup was led by Army General “Big” Minh. President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu were murdered.

1964

The CIA’s relationship with its Chinese Nationalist intelligence counterparts on Taiwan leveled off, then deteriorated somewhat after the agency cut off its financial support for a variety of what were described as “unproductive, infeasible GRC Mainland operations, particularly paramilitary, and reduced the size of its Taipei Station.”

January 11, 1964

President Lyndon Johnson approved OPLAN 34A, a joint CIA-DOD-South Vietnamese covert action program designed to harass North Vietnam through a combination of commando raids, sabotage operations, and the use of covert psychological warfare directed at government and civilian targets in North Vietnam.

January 30, 1964

Commander of the ARVN I Corps, General Khanh, launched a bloodless coup d’etat which overthrew the South Vietnamese government led by General “Big” Minh.

June 29, 1964

China successfully test fired an MRBM missile, designated the CSS-1 by American intelligence analysts and DF-2 by the Chinese, from the Shuangchengtzu Missile Test Center. The missile's dummy warhead impacted 630 miles to the southwest near the desert town of Minfeng.

July 11/12, 1964

The Chinese Navy sank four Chinese Nationalist Navy “mother ships” being used to launch commando raids on the Chinese mainland, killing 151 seamen and commandos. All further Chinese maritime commando raids on the mainland were suspended after this disastrous operation.

Early August 1964

KH-4 CORONA satellite imagery revealed that a tower and instrumentation sites were in place at the Chinese nuclear weapons test site at Lop Nor. CIA intelligence analysts concluded that “the previously suspect facility at Lop Nor is a nuclear test site which could be ready in two months.”

August 7, 1964

Congressional Joint Resolution (the Tonkin Gulf Resolution) passed by both houses of Congress. A SAC U-2 reconnaissance aircraft photographed 36 Chinese MiG-15 and MiG-17 jet fighters parked in protective revetments at Phuc Yen Air Base, north of Hanoi.

September 29, 1964

Secretary of State Dean Rusk publicly announced that China was about to conduct its first nuclear weapons test at Lop Nor in northwestern China.

October 16, 1964

The Chinese explode their first atomic bomb at the Lop Nor nuclear test center in western China, joining the ranks of the world’s nuclear powers. The device was a 25-kiloton fission weapon.

February 1965

SIGINT revealed that the headquarters of the 325th NVA Division plus a subordinate regiment were located about 40 miles northeast of the city of Kontum inside South Vietnam. This marked the first hard intelligence information confirming the presence of North Vietnamese regular forces operating in South Vietnam.

February 7, 1965

U.S. began retaliatory air strikes (known initially as Flaming Dart, then Rolling Thunder) against North Vietnamese military targets. COMINT detected the Phuc Yen-based MiG-15 and MiG-17 jet fighters performing defensive combat air patrols north of the 20th Parallel, but the MiGs refused to engage American aircraft in combat when approached.

February 19, 1965

Military coup d’etat attempt by a Colonel Thao in Saigon failed, but the ruling South Vietnamese military council used the event to remove General Khanh from office as the country’s leader. He was forced to leave the country several days later.

March 1965

First U.S. ground forces in Vietnam, U.S. Marines, land at Da Nang.

April 2, 1965

CIA director John McCone dissented from the decision taken the previous day to authorize the use of US troops in a ground role in Vietnam. “It is not justified unless we take radically stronger measures against North Vietnam.” McCone said present level of RT [Rolling Thunder] not hurting DRV enough to make them quit. He warned against putting more U.S. troops into SVN for combat operations, since that would merely encourage the USSR and China to support the DRV/VC at minimum risk. He predicted covert infiltration of PAVN and the U.S. getting mired down in a war it could not win.

 

 

April 9, 1965

Mao Tse-tung authorized the Chinese military to attack U.S. military aircraft flying over Chinese airspace.

April 28, 1965

A USAF RB-47H ferret aircraft belonging to the 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing was attacked by two North Korean MiG-17 fighters while flying a Box Top ELINT collection mission off the east coast of North Korea.

May 13, 1965

President Lyndon B. Johnson announced a temporary suspension of the Rolling Thunder bombing campaign against North Vietnam to see if the four months of massed air strikes had made the North Vietnamese regime more amenable to a negotiated settlement of the war. SIGINT showed that the bombing campaign had accomplished little to dissuade the North Vietnamese from continuing to prosecute the war.

Mid-June 1965

COMINT discovered that the Chinese had surreptitiously deployed regular Chinese Army troops inside North Vietnam. Radio intercepts revealed the identity of only one of the Chinese units detected as being in North Vietnam -- the 2nd Railway Engineer Division -- but COMINT also detected the radio call signs for two other unidentified Chinese units that were appearing in the radio intercepts, as well as traffic emanating from what appeared to be the senior Chinese military command headquarters located in North Vietnam.

July 1, 1965

CIA intelligence estimate concluded that “The principal development in Indonesia over the past year has been the sharply accelerated growth of the Communist Party (PKI) role in government. This trend is likely to continue as long as Sukarno is in control. Opponents of this trend are discouraged and intimidated; even the military has all but lost the will to resist.”

July 1965

President Lyndon Johnson announced the deployment of 150,000 U.S. troops to Vietnam.

September 30, 1965

Abortive Communist coup d’etat attempt in Indonesia. In the weeks that followed, the Indonesian army (with U.S. government support) practically destroyed the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), killing thousands of known or suspected PKI members and imprisoning thousands more.

October 17, 1965

CIA concluded based on SIGINT and some satellite reconnaissance imagery that the Chinese had deployed between 22,000 and 29,000 troops in the northernmost part of North Vietnam.

December 3, 1965

The State Department prepared a Top Secret intelligence report, which concluded that the “continued augmentation of Chinese forces provides an important token of Peking’s readiness to assist North Vietnam, even if this entails placing sizeable [Chinese] military units in jeopardy of US air attacks.”

January 31, 1966

President Johnson ordered the resumption of the Rolling Thunder bombing campaign against North Vietnam.

March 1966

Indonesian President Sukarno was forced to resign his post, ending the Indonesian “Confrontation” with British-backed Malaysia, which had lasted from 1963 to 1966.

June 15, 1966

The CIA issued a Top Secret Codeword assessment of the first year of bombing of North Vietnam, based in large part on SIGINT. The report concluded that, contrary to U.S. Air Force claims, that the massive Rolling Thunder bombing attacks had only lightly damaged North Vietnamese military and economic targets; had not interfered in any meaningful way with the infiltration of North Vietnamese military forces and supplies to South Vietnam; but had killed or wounded between 11,700 and 14,800 North Vietnamese, most of whom were civilians.

October 15, 1966

Five Chinese Nationalist assault craft belonging to the Intelligence Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense (IBMND) attacked a force of Chinese naval vessels near the offshore island of Matsu. In the ensuing naval battle, four of the five Taiwanese craft were sunk with heavy loss of life. This was the first IBMND maritime raid conducted against Chinese forces since 1964.

November 17, 1966

The CIA informed the Chinese Nationalist government that the agency was terminating its financial and technical support for the Goshawk (Grosbeak) P2V ELINT overflight program because “the product did not justify the risk of crew losses and the men, money and equipment involved could be better used elsewhere in the context of the Vietnam war.”

December 26, 1966

China successfully test fired its first Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM), designated the CSS-2 (the Chinese designation for the missile was DF-3), from the Shuangchengtzu Missile Test Center.

February 1967

NSA intercepted a series of directives issued by the commander of the Chinese armed forces, Marshal Lin Piao, which ordered Chinese units to cease their political agitation work and return to normal military training schedules.

June 16, 1967

China detonated its first thermonuclear weapon at the Lop Nor nuclear test site in western China. The 3.0-megaton device was air dropped by a TU-16 bomber.

October 25, 1967

The North Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee in Hanoi approved a secret directive ordering NVA and VC forces to launch the General Offensive/General Uprising in South Vietnam to coincide with the Tet holidays in January 1968.

January 17, 1968

NSA issued a bulletin warning that the NVA's B-3 Front headquarters, which controlled all NVA/VC forces in the II Corps area in the Central Highlands, was preparing to attack a number of major cities in Kontum, Pleiku and Darlac Provinces; that the NVA Military Region 5 headquarters was preparing to simultaneously attack targets in the coastal provinces of Quang Nam, Quang Tin, Quang Ngai, and Binh Dinh; and that there were indications that the VC intended to attack the northern city of Hue.

January 22, 1968

A 31-man North Korean commando team from the 124th Land Reconnaissance Unit, an elite infiltration unit, attacked the South Korean presidential mansion (Blue House) in Seoul intending to kill President Park Chung Hee. 28 members of the North Korean team were killed, one captured, and two escaped back to North Korea. 37 ROK soldiers were killed and 65 wounded in the attack.

January 23, 1968

North Korean Navy warships seized the U.S. Navy spy ship USS Pueblo (AGER 2) in international waters 25 miles off the North Korean port of Wonsan. One American sailor was killed and 82 were captured.

January 24, 1968

Top Secret Codeword cable from the Director of NSA to the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff admitted that the North Korean capture of the USS Pueblo was “a major intelligence coup without parallel in modern history.” According to the report, the damage to U.S. SIGINT collection operations was deemed to be “very severe” by NSA.

January 25, 1968

NSA issued a Secret Codeword report to the U.S. intelligence community entitled “Coordinated Vietnamese Communist Offensive Evidenced,” which stated that NSA had intercepted an “almost unprecedented volume of urgent messages... passing among major [enemy] commands.” The report, which was widely distributed within intelligence circles in Washington and Saigon, stated that coordinated NVA/VC attacks were to be expected in the very near future throughout all of South Vietnam, especially in the northern part of the country.

January 31, 1968

Vietnam. Tet Offensive began at 0300 local time. North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces launched coordinated attacks on 39 of South Vietnam's 44 provincial capitals, captured Hué and large portions of Saigon, and even managed to briefly seize portions of the American embassy in downtown Saigon.

.

 

March 16, 1968

Last Chinese Nationalist U-2 overflight of mainland China was conducted.

May 1968

Paris Peace Talks begin.

July 3, 1968

Secretary of State Dean Rusk ordered the immediate cessation of all further U-2 reconnaissance overflights of mainland China.

October 1968

NSA was able to intercept and decode a number of highly sensitive messages from the South Vietnamese ambassador in Washington, Bui Diem, to President Thieu urging the South Vietnamese government to stall the peace talks until after the November 1968 American presidential elections. Ambassador Diem confirmed in these intercepted messages that members of the Nixon entourage, especially Republican political activist Anna Chennault, had asked him to stand firm until after the election, when a Republican administration could offer the South Vietnamese government more favorable terms than an administration headed by the Democratic Party's presidential candidate, Hubert H. Humphrey.

November 1, 1968

President Lyndon Johnson ordered a halt to all ROLLING THUNDER bombing attacks on North Vietnam.

November 1, 1968

MACVSOG’s North Vietnamese paramilitary agent airdrop operation, codenamed FOOTBOY, was cancelled.

March 2, 1969

Chinese troops opened fire on a Soviet KGB border guard patrol on Damansky Island, which the Chinese called Chen-pao, along the Ussuri River. Thirty-eight KGB border guards were killed in the incident and another 30 were wounded.

March 15, 1969

Soviet KGB border guard units, backed by regular Russian Army troops and tanks, launched an attack on the Chinese forces on Damansky Island, with hundreds of troops reportedly being killed or wounded on both sides during the ensuing battle.

April 14, 1969

Two North Korean MiG fighters shot down a U.S. Navy EC-121M SIGINT aircraft 90 miles southeast of the North Korean port of Chongjin over international waters. Lost was the plane's entire crew of 31, including nine Navy/Marine Corps SIGINT operators.

September 1969

North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh died.

April 1970

President Nixon orders U.S. troops to cross into Cambodia in an effort to wipe out North Vietnamese and Viet Cong sanctuaries.

April 24, 1970

China successfully launched its first satellite, called SKW-1, into orbit from the Shuangchengtzu Missile Test Center, signaling China's formal entry into the “space race.”

July 1970

Henry Kissinger made a secret visit to the Peoples Republic of China.

November 21, 1970

Failed American commando raid on North Vietnamese POW camp at  Son Tay. No American POWs were recovered.

April 7, 1971

Mao Tse-tung made the decision to invite the U.S. national ping-pong team to visit China. On April 14, 1971, Premier Chou En-lai met with the American ping-pong players, the first official American delegation to visit China since 1949.

July 9, 1971

National security advisor Henry Kissinger arrived in Beijing on the first leg of a secret visit to the People’s Republic of China. During his 48-hour stay in Beijing, Kissinger met for almost 20-hours with Chinese premier Chou En-lai.

September 12/13, 1971

SIGINT revealed that the Chinese had grounded all civilian airliners; Chinese fighter interceptors had been hurriedly scrambled and placed in patrol orbits over key cities and military centers; and Chinese SAM sites and radar installations throughout northern and northeastern China had been placed on the highest state of alert. It was later determined that what COMINT had detected was the aftermath of an abortive coup d'etat by Chinese Defense Minister Lin Piao meant to overthrow Mao Tse-tung.

January 1972

American photo reconnaissance satellites spotted for the first time the construction of launch sites and support facilities for Chinese MRBM and IRBM missiles.

February 21, 1972

President Richard Nixon visited China. The visit ended on February 28, 1972 with the signing of the so-called Shanghai Communique, which committed both nations to work towards the restoration of full diplomatic relations.

March 30, 1972

North Vietnamese Easter Offensive began in northern South Vietnam. Four NVA divisions crossed the DMZ and attacked U.S. and ARVN positions throughout the I Corps zone.

April 10, 1972

U.S. began a new round of air strikes against targets in North Vietnam, prompting a new round of protests throughout the U.S.

May 8, 1972

Nixon announced that the U.S. would begin the mining of North Vietnamese harbors. Nixon’s decision set off a new wave of protest across the U.S.

August 12, 1972

Last U.S. combat troops left Vietnam.

December 18, 1972

President Richard Nixon ordered the resumption of B-52 bombing of North Vietnam, especially Hanoi and the port city of Haiphong. Between December 18-29, 1972, USAF and USN bombers conducted a massive bombing campaign called LINEBACKER II against targets in North Vietnam.

December 30, 1972

President Nixon announced that he had called a halt to the bombing of North Vietnam.

January 27, 1973

Paris Peace Accords signed. A cease fire between North Vietnamese and United States forces took effect immediately.

August 1973

China withdrew the last of its military forces from North Vietnam. Since the first Chinese troops had entered North Vietnam in June 1965, 1,100 Chinese soldiers had been killed and 4,200 had been wounded in the conflict.

June 26, 1974

The CIA’s Tackle U-2 program based on Taiwan was terminated by a joint U.S.- Taiwanese government agreement.

August 9, 1974

CIA/DIA/State issued a joint intelligence assessment of the military situation in Vietnam, and concluded (incorrectly as it turned out) that “We do not believe that a coordinated, countrywide offensive [by the North Vietnamese] similar to that of 1972 is in the offing for the remainder of 1974.”

December 3, 1974

Precisely on schedule, the NVA began the first phase of their winter-spring military offensive. The NVA quickly surrounded the provincial capital of Phuoc Bing (Song Be), which fell on January 6, 1975.

April 5, 1975

Longtime Chinese Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek died.

April 30, 1975

Saigon fell to North Vietnamese forces.

October 16, 1975

Indonesian forces invaded the Portuguese colony of East Timor.

November 11, 1975

At the height of a constitutional crisis, Australian prime minister Gough Whitlam was dismissed from office by the Governor General of Australia, Sir John Kerr, in a move that is still widely viewed as controversial.

December 12, 1975

The CIA reported that Indonesian troops had taken control of the principal cities in the former Portuguese Timor against virtually no opposition. CIA also reported that Indonesia now had 15,000 troops in Timor, and could rapidly reinforce these troops if needed.

March 21, 1976

U.S. negotiations with the Thai government over the status of U.S. military bases in that country collapsed. On March 21, 1976, the JCS ordered that all U.S. military installations in Thailand be shut down, including all but a few of the key U.S. intelligence installations.

August 18, 1976

Axe-wielding North Korean soldiers attacked an American and South Korean team trying to cut down a tree in the Joint Security Area in the DMZ, killing two American officers.

September 9, 1976

Longtime Chinese leader Mao Tse-tung died.

December 15, 1978

President Jimmy Carter announced that effective January 1, 1979, the U.S. and the People’s Republic of China would open full diplomatic relations. As part of this agreement, the U.S. abrogated the Taiwan Defense Treaty that had been in force since 1954, closed its embassy in Taipei, and ordered all remaining U.S. military personnel withdrawn from Taiwan by the end of the decade, including all intelligence personnel.

December 16, 1978

U.S. and Chinese officials signed a Joint Communique on Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, ending thirty years of hostilities.

December 29, 1978

Sizeable numbers of Chinese troops are detected deploying to China’s border with Vietnam in anticipation that Vietnamese military might invade China’s ally, Kampuchea (Cambodia).

January 1, 1979

Full U.S.-Chinese diplomatic relations begin after the U.S. severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan and transferred diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing.

January 4, 1979

Vietnamese forces invaded Kampuchea (Cambodia).

January 7, 1979

Cambodia/Vietnam/China. Vietnamese forces captured Phnom Penh and Kompong Som in Cambodia from Khmer Rouge forces. Heng Samrin was named the premier of the new Kampuchean government backed by Vietnam.

January 19, 1979

CIA director Stansfield Turner issued Alert Memorandum: China-Vietnam to NSC members, reporting the latest indications appearing in intelligence reporting that Chinese forces were rapidly building up along the Sino-Vietnamese border.

January 28, 1979

From January 28 to February 5, 1979, Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping made an official visit to the United States. He was the first senior Chinese leader to visit the U.S. since 1949.

February 17, 1979

Chinese forces invaded Vietnam in retaliation for Hanoi’s invasion of Cambodia a month earlier.

March 13, 1979

The Russians began an unscheduled major military exercise in the Transbaikal Military District and in Mongolia. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski reportedly handed the Chinese ambassador in Washington an intercept which showed that the Russian General Staff had ordered all Russian military weather stations in the Far East to send to Moscow weather forecasts for China the next day. The implication was that perhaps the Soviet Union was preparing to attack China.

April 10, 1979

U.S. Senate formally ratified the Taiwan Relations Act, recognizing Beijing as the legitimate government of China. On the same day, the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) was opened in Taipei, replacing the former U.S. embassy as the principal U.S. diplomatic representative on Taiwan.

April 20, 1979

In the course of a conversation with then Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaopeng, Senator Joe Biden asked Deng if he would be positively disposed to allowing American listening posts in western China in order to monitor Soviet missile tests. Deng reportedly replied that he would view such a proposal favorably, but only if the sites were manned by Chinese personnel, and if the existence of the sites were kept secret.

October 26, 1979

South Korean president Park Chung-hee was assassinated by the director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), Kim Jae-kyu.

November 1979

Secret U.S.-Chinese agreement signed whereby the U.S. agreed to build and equip two missile monitoring stations in the Tien Shan mountains of western China.

December 6, 1979

The CIA issued an Alert Memorandum based in part on NSA SIGINT reporting, reporting that there were strong indications that Vietnamese military forces inside Kampuchea were preparing to launch an offensive to ‘cleanse’ the Khmer Rouge refugee camps along the Thai-Kampuchean border.

September 27, 1983

Indonesia/Timor. CIA reported that “Jakarta has launched a major operation to eliminate all resistance by Fretilin guerrillas in East Timor following the breakdown of a three-month ceasefire. As many as 18,000 Indonesia troops may be involved against an estimated 600 armed guerrillas in the largest campaign since 1981.”

February 7, 1986

National election were held in the Philippines. The election was marred by massive fraud committed by supporters of Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos.

February 25, 1986

The “People Power Revolution” overthrew Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos. Corazon Aquino was sworn in as president of the Philippines.

June 4, 1989

Chinese military forces puts down the pro-democracy protests in Tiananmen Square in downtown Beijing.

June 1991

The joint USAF and US Navy listening post at Clark Air Base in the Philippines was closed following the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo, which destroyed much of Clark Air Base.

July 21-28, 1995

After the U.S. government allows the president of the Republic of China (Taiwan) to visit Cornell University in May 1995, the Chinese military fires a number of ballistic missiles into an impact area in international waters 80 miles northeast of Taiwan.

July 1, 1997

Great Britain returned Hong Kong to China.

May 7, 1999

U.S. Air Force fighter-bombers accidently bomb the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia at the height of the Kosovo War.

August 30, 1999

As part of a United Nations-sponsored election, voters in East Timor chose independence over remaining a part of Indonesia. In the rampage that ensued, pro-Indonesian militias brutally murdered thousands of pro-independence officials and civilians, while the Indonesian military stood idly by.

April 1, 2001

A U.S. Navy EP-3E ARIES II SIGINT reconnaissance aircraft collided with a Chinese fighter off Hainan Island. The aircraft was forced to execute an emergency landing at Lingshui Air Base on Hainan. The aircraft’s crew spent the next 11 and a half days in confinement before being released.

Cite this page

U.S. Intelligence on Asia, 1945-1991, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2017 <http://primarysources.brillonline.com/browse/us-intelligence-on-asia>